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 The moral concern for fairness is a core element of social life throughout the 
lifespan. Concerns about fairness arise in multiple contexts, and one very salient context 
is the allocation of resources. This study investigated how 3- to 8-year-old children (N = 
176) perceived of, and responded to, resource inequalities based on their status within the 
inequality (advantaged or disadvantaged) and whether the allocation was based on 
differences in individual merit or gender biases. Across a range of assessments, the 
present study documented how children’s status within individual and gender based 
inequalities had a profound influence on how they perceived a context of resource 
inequality.  
 Results revealed that children who were disadvantaged by an inequality judged it 
to be more unfair than children who were advantaged by it. However, both advantaged 
and disadvantaged children judged gender based allocations to be more unfair than 
individually based inequalities. Children were also more likely to rectify a gender based 
inequality than an individual one, whereas they were more likely to perpetuate an 
individual inequality than a gender based one. 
 Children’s intra- and intergroup attitudes and inclusion decisions were also related 
to their status and the type of inequality that they experienced. Although children were 
more favorable towards gender ingroup than outgroup members, with age, children 
preferentially included gender outgroup peers that performed well at the activities.  
Additionally, children who were personally disadvantaged by an inequality 
evaluated rectifying a separate, third-person, inequality more favorably and were also 
more likely to rectify the third-person inequality. Children with a more advanced 
understanding of others’ mental states also judged rectifying gender based inequalities 
more positively and were more likely to include gender outgroup peers who performed 
well at the activities (controlling for age).  
 Overall, the results document the critical role of children’s perspective within a 
context in their perceptions of, and responses to, the context. Results also have 
implications for fostering positive intergroup relationships, improving children’s concern 
for rectifying first and third-person inequalities, and for our understanding of how 
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CHAPTER I: Study Rationale and Aims 
The moral concern for fairness is a core element of social life throughout the 
lifespan. Concerns about fairness arise in multiple contexts, and one very salient context 
is the allocation of resources. Understanding the harmful consequences of unfair resource 
allocations, for example, is essential to ensuring social harmony and protecting the 
welfare of all individuals. Unfair allocations often result in social inequalities that 
disproportionately affect specific groups or individuals. When this situation arises, not 
only is there a violation of fairness in terms of distributions but there is also the 
consideration of overall social equality, that is, treating individuals equally regardless of 
their group membership or group identity. Recent research has demonstrated that, 
although children possess an understanding that resources ought to be allocated according 
to the moral principles of fairness, they also incorporate group concerns into their 
allocation decisions, such as group membership and group norms. 
An emerging body of literature, drawing from behavioral economics, 
developmental psychology, social psychology, and philosophy, has examined how 
children come to understand the fair allocation of resources. These largely separate 
bodies of research have documented important age-related changes throughout the 
lifespan regarding how individuals think about these concerns. For example, children’s 
understanding of equality, equity, and merit when allocating resources each undergo 
significant developmental changes between 3- and 8-years-old (Elenbaas, Rizzo, Cooley, 
& Killen, 2016; Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; Rizzo & Killen, 2016; 
Schmidt, Svetlova, Johe, & Tomasello, 2016). Further, children’s concern for group 
membership and group norms increasingly influence their allocation and inclusion 
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decisions throughout childhood (Cooley & Killen, 2015; McGuire, Rutland, Rizzo, & 
Killen, 2017). Finally, children’s ability to think and reason about others’ mental states 
(others’ beliefs, desires, and emotional wellbeing), as well as their understanding of 
personal ownership and property, undergo significant development throughout childhood 
(Friedman, Van de Vondervoort, Defeyter, & Neary, 2013; Nancekivell & Friedman, 
2017; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Comparatively little research, however, has examined how 
children coordinate moral, group, and personal/psychological concerns when allocating 
resources, which is critical to understanding how they make allocation decisions in their 
daily lives.  
The social reasoning developmental (SRD) model (Killen & Rutland, 2011; 
Rutland & Killen, 2015) provides a framework for addressing this gap by examining how 
children coordinate moral and group concerns in various social contexts. Thus, guided by 
the SRD model, the present study aims to examine how children coordinate moral, group, 
and personal concerns when making important resource allocation and inclusion 
decisions in familiar contexts. 
Theoretical Foundations 
 The SRD model integrates foundational theories on children’s social and social-
cognitive development. Specifically, the SRD model builds on the three domains – moral, 
social-conventional, and personal/psychological – outlined by social domain theory 
(SDT) (Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 1983, 2002), and the accounts of 
children’s developing understanding of group dynamics from social identity theory (SIT) 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and developmental subjective group dynamics (DSGD) (Abrams 
& Rutland, 2008). According to the SRD model, throughout development, individuals 
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take an active role in reasoning about moral, group, and personal concerns when making 
social decisions. Further, researchers working from the SRD model argue that it is not 
only children’s understanding of each of these concerns that develops, but also their 
ability to integrate and coordinate multiple, potentially conflicting, concerns when 
thinking and reasoning about their social world that undergoes significant development 
throughout childhood and adolescence. For example, although children’s understanding 
of merit and equity undergo their own distinct patterns of development (e.g., 
understanding that increased effort does not always lead to increased production and 
understanding how historical inequalities impact present day individuals and groups), 
children’s ability to coordinate between these concerns is also developing simultaneously 
(Rizzo & Killen, 2016; Rizzo et al., 2016). Thus, the SRD model provides an important 
theoretical framework for investigating how children navigate important social decisions, 
such as how to allocate resources and whom to include into a group (Killen, Rutland, 
Rizzo, & McGuire, 2017). 
 SRD and Group Dynamics. Further, the SRD model highlights the importance 
of investigating the various issues related to group identity (Killen & Rutland, 2011). 
Children belong to numerous social groups, ranging from broad categories of 
ethnicity/race, nationality, religion, and gender, to more narrow categories such as 
families, classrooms, clubs, and peer groups. Although affiliation with groups is an 
essential component of children’s healthy social development, these various group 
identities can lead to intergroup conflict as children incorporate them into their self-
concept and individual identity, particularly when demonstrating an ingroup bias 
reinforces children’s position within their ingroup.  
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Children also become increasingly aware of the specific norms of their groups 
with age. For example, children recognize that group norms, once established, are 
binding, and that it is the responsibility of all members of the group to ensure that 
everyone acts in accordance with these norms (Schmidt, Rakoczy, Miezsch, & 
Tomasello, 2016). Children then use these group norms to guide their social behavior in 
numerous contexts, including inclusion decisions (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & 
Hitti, 2013; Rizzo, Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2017) and when allocating resources 
(Cooley & Killen, 2015; McGuire, Rutland, Rizzo, & Killen, 2017). Importantly, with 
age, children coordinate the norms of their group with broader moral norms, which apply 
across groups, as they navigate social conflicts (Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey & Killen, 
2015). Thus, the SRD model expands on past theoretical models investigating group 
dynamics by examining how children coordinate their developing concerns for group 
membership, identity, and norms, with their developing concern for moral norms of 
fairness, justice, and others’ welfare. 
SRD and Theory of Mind. Recent work from the SRD model has also begun to 
investigate the role of children’s social-cognitive ability to interpret others’ mental states 
(desires, beliefs, intentions, emotions) in their evaluations of morally relevant contexts 
(see Killen, Rutland, Rizzo, & McGuire, 2017). Children’s theory of mind (ToM) 
capacities – their ability to recognize that others’ have their own distinct desires, beliefs, 
and intentions – play a critical role in their understanding of social contexts. For example, 
children’s ToM capacities have been found to develop in a bidirectional, reciprocal, 
relationship with their developing moral evaluations (Smetana et al., 2012). Children’s 
understanding of others’ intentions also plays an important role in their judgments and 
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reasoning about morally relevant scenarios (Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & 
Woodward, 2011; Li, Rizzo, Burkholder, & Killen, 2017; Nunez & Harris, 1998; Rizzo, 
Li, Burkholder, & Killen, 2017; Zelazo et al., 1996).  
Furthermore, the SRD model builds upon previous work documenting the 
relationship between children’s ToM capacities and their ability to recognize prejudicial 
attitudes in others (Brown & Bigler, 2004, 2005; McKown & Weinstein, 2003), by 
arguing that children’s ToM capacities also influence children’s own behavior and 
evaluations. Children with more advanced ToM capacities are more likely to support 
individuals who challenge stereotypic group norms regarding activities (Mulvey, Rizzo, 
& Killen, 2015), and are less likely to allocate resources in line with stereotypes, such as 
those about gender  (Rizzo & Killen, 2017).  
Thus, the SRD model argues that children’s developing ToM capacities influence 
their social decision making and evaluations in three key ways: (1) ToM capacities 
enable children to recognize the intentional status of an action (whether a transgression 
was done intentionally or by accident), which influences their evaluations of the action, 
(2) ToM capacities enable children to recognize that individuals do not always conform 
to stereotypic expectations about their group, thus allowing them to recognize the 
heterogeneity of groups, and (3) ToM capacities enable children to have a better 
understanding of the beliefs, desires, and emotional wellbeing of others, which in turn 
enables them to better recognize the consequences of a potential transgression on others’ 
welfare. Therefore, given the importance of group dynamics and theory of mind, the 
current project is designed to investigate how children’s understanding of group 
dynamics and theory of mind knowledge bears on their resource allocation decisions. 
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SRD Methodologies. Research guided by the SRD model has used a diverse 
range of assessments to assess children’s behavior, judgments, and reasoning in different 
contexts. Behavioral assessments, including asking children whom they would like to 
include into a group and how they would like to allocate resources amongst a set of 
recipients, provide an important insight into how children act in certain contexts, and 
indicates the particular concerns that children and adolescence prioritize over others. 
Assessments of children’s judgments, evaluations, and attributions in differing contexts 
allow for an analysis of children’s understanding of multiple, simultaneous concerns 
within a given context. For example, when allocating resources to a poor or wealthy 
individual, young children report that it is okay to allocate resources equally and that it is 
okay to allocate resources equitably (Rizzo & Killen, 2016). These results suggest that, 
although young children may give priority to one concern over another in their 
allocations (e.g., by allocating resources equally between poor and wealthy individuals), 
they are still aware of multiple relevant concerns (e.g., by judging both equal and 
equitable allocations to be fair). Finally, reasoning assessments provide an open-ended 
opportunity for children to express the underlying reasons that motivated their judgments 
and behaviors. Thus, guided by the SRD perspective, the current project utilizes a 
combination of behavioral, judgment, and reasoning assessments in concert to garner a 
full understanding of how children navigate social conflicts.  
The following sections will now examine research on children’s developing 
conceptions of fairness regarding resource allocation and inclusion decisions. The 
sections are organized by the domains of concerns (moral, group, personal) and identify 
the critical gaps within the literature that the present study aims to address. 
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Conceptions of Fairness 
 Children’s developing conceptions of fairness are a fundamental component of 
their social and moral development. Concerns for fairness center around how individuals 
ought to be treated relative to others - making fairness inherently social - as well as how 
individuals ought to be treated based on their individual effort, abilities, and performance 
(i.e., their merit). Research has typically examined children’s developing conceptions of 
fairness in resource allocation or inclusion/exclusion contexts. Yet, no research to date 
has directly compared how children’s inclusion decisions are related to their resource 
allocation decisions. In light of this gap, researchers working from the SRD model have 
argued for the importance of integrating children’s conceptions of fairness regarding 
resource allocations and their conceptions of fairness when making inclusion decisions 
(Elenbaas & Killen, 2016; Killen, Elenbaas, Rizzo, & Rutland, 2016; Killen, Rutland, 
Rizzo, & McGuire, 2017). The following sub-sections will discuss and synthesize recent 
findings related to children’s conceptions of fairness in both resource allocation and 
inclusion contexts.  
 Moral concerns. Extensive research from the SDT and SRD theoretical models 
has documented children’s early emerging understanding of the moral principles for 
fairness, justice, rights, and ensuring others’ welfare. Although traditional theories of 
moral development argued that children did not begin to understand the moral concern 
for fairness until later in childhood or adolescence (Damon, 1977; Kohlberg, 1969; 
Piaget, 1932), research has since documented that children begin to understand the moral 
concerns for fairness as young as 3-years-old (see Killen & Smetana, 2015 for a review). 
Further, more recent research has begun to break down the various concerns for fairness 
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in resource allocation and inclusion contexts to examine how children’s understandings 
of the various fairness principles (e.g., equality, equity, merit, need, and inclusivity) 
develop. 
 In resource allocation contexts, children’s understanding of equality emerges 
early, and the roots of equality understanding are even evident in infants’ looking 
behavior (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013). 
Children also share resources equally amongst peers, particularly when the resources are 
gained collaboratively, (Melis, Altrichter, & Tomasello, 2013; Warneken, Lohse, Melis, 
& Tomasello, 2011), and judge equal allocations to be fair (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Rizzo 
& Killen, 2016; Schmidt et al., 2016). With age, however, children come to recognize 
that a strictly equal allocation may not always be fair. In contexts with preexisting 
inequalities between recipients (e.g., a poor recipient and a wealthy recipient), for 
example, children begin to allocate resources unequally – giving more to the previously 
disadvantaged recipient – to rectify the inequality. Additionally, by 6-years-old, children 
allocate resources meritoriously, giving more resources to individuals who worked hard 
than to those who were lazy (even when an equal allocation was possible), demonstrating 
a prioritization of merit over strict equality. Importantly, however, children’s underlying 
concerns for equity and merit emerge well before 5- to 6-years-old. Three- to 4-year-old 
children judge equitable and meritorious allocations to be fair, and allocate resources in 
line with these concerns when an equal allocation is not possible (Baumard, Mascaro, & 
Chevallier, 2011; Li, Spitzer, & Olson, 2014; Paulus, 2014). 
 Research on children’s developing inclusion and exclusion decisions also 
indicates children’s understanding of fairness, equality, and inclusion as important moral 
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principles. When asked explicitly about whether it is fair to exclude someone who does 
not fit a stereotype (e.g., not letting a girl play with trucks), beginning by 3- to 5- years-
old, children report that exclusion is unfair, and give moral reasons to justify their 
judgments (e.g., “The girl will feel bad”, “It’s not fair to not let her play just because 
she’s a girl”) (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). Further, by 9- to 10-years-old, children 
report that they would support a peer who wanted to deviate from gender stereotypes, and 
expected their peers to share in this support (Mulvey & Killen, 2015). Thus, in both 
resource allocation and inclusion contexts, children demonstrate an emerging concern for 
fairness as a moral principle. 
Group concerns. Researchers have also documented how children incorporate 
group concerns into their social decision making, including whom to include or exclude 
from a group and how resources should be allocated between individuals and groups. 
Young children self-segregate into gender groups (Mehta & Strough, 2009) and 
selectively include gender ingroup members in limited inclusion scenarios (Theimer, 
Killen, & Stangor, 2001; Mulvey & Killen, 2015). Further, young children preferentially 
allocate more resources to their gender ingroup than outgroup members (Dunham, Baron, 
& Carey, 2011; Renno & Shutts, 2015), and are more likely to rectify inequalities that 
disadvantage members of their ethnic/racial ingroup than outgroup (Elenbaas et al., 2016; 
Olson, Dweck, Spelke, & Banaji, 2011). These findings suggest that the concern for 
group membership plays an important role in children’s social decision making. 
Although it is important to note that children also reject explicit group based 
exclusion (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001; Killen et al., 2013), and that the developing 
awareness of the historical context between groups helps children to rectify longstanding 
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societal inequalities between groups (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016), it is clear that children’s 
incorporation of group concerns can lead to harmful consequences in many intergroup 
contexts. Thus, understanding both (1) how children weigh group and moral concerns 
when making social decisions and (2) how awareness of the wrongfulness of group 
biases, discrimination, and prejudice can lead children to reject unfair allocations and 
inclusion decisions is critical to addressing many of the conflicts that arise in early 
childhood. The present study aims to address this gap by experimentally examining 
children’s intra- and intergroup attitudes, as well as their inclusion decisions, in various 
resource allocation contexts. 
Gender as a particularly salient social category. Although research has 
documented children’s use of numerous group memberships when making allocation and 
inclusion decisions, the saliency of group membership is especially pronounced in young 
children’s use of gender group membership. An extensive body of research has 
documented that children view gender as a salient social category from early in childhood 
(Bigler & Liben, 2006; Levy & Killen, 2008; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006). 
Toddlers as young as 2-years-old demonstrate an awareness of gender norms, and are 
surprised by counter-stereotypic behavior (e.g., a female shaving her face, or a male 
vacuuming the house) (Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, & Eichstedt, 2002).  
Further, both adults and children themselves often reinforce gender as a salient 
social category; parents and teachers provide different toys and assign different chores on 
the basis of gender (Lytton & Romney, 1991), and peers self-segregate into gender 
groups early in development (Mehta & Strough, 2009). By adolescence, while children 
recognize that differential treatment of others based on their gender is unfair, in forced-
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choice inclusion scenarios, children and adolescence preferentially include gender 
ingroup members, and justify their inclusion decisions by referring to stereotypes about 
abilities and preferences (Mulvey & Killen, 2015). Thus, the current project used gender 
as an intergroup context to examine children’s resource allocation decisions and inclusion 
decisions throughout early and middle childhood. 
Personal/Psychological concerns. Research has also begun to document the 
various ways in which children’s concern for their own desires influences their social 
decisions, with particular attention being paid in regards to children’s resource allocation 
decisions. Research dating back to Piaget (1932) has suggested that children’s own desire 
for resources influences the degree to which they are willing to share with others (Almas 
et al., 2010; Blake et al., 2015; Damon, 1977; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; 
Shaw, DeScioli, & Olson, 2012). And, although there are many contexts in which 
children share their resources equally, particularly those in which resources are gathered 
collaboratively (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 
2011; Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011), there are also numerous contexts 
where children refuse to share their resources equally with others (Almas et al., 2010; 
Blake et al., 2015), suggesting that children’s concern for personal property and 
ownership may be in play from early in development (Friedman et al., 2013; Nancekivell 
& Friedman, 2017). Investigating how children evaluate the allocations of resources that 
have a direct bearing on their own desires and welfare is critical to understanding how 
children perceive the resource allocation decisions that they themselves experience.  
Developmental Mechanisms: Mental State Understanding 
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A growing body of research has begun to document how children’s developing 
social-cognitive abilities relate to their social inclusion and resource allocation decisions. 
Children’s theory of mind (ToM) competencies, in particular, have been linked to their 
moral development in many ways, and have been identified as a potential developmental 
mechanism for children’s social and moral development (Brown & Bigler, 2004, 2005; 
Killen et al., 2011; Smetana et al., 2012; Sodian et al., 2016). For example, children’s 
ToM competence has been found to relate to their willingness to challenge group 
decisions in stereotypic contexts (Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 2015), awareness of 
intergroup prejudice and discrimination (Brown & Bigler, 2004, 2005; McKown & 
Weinstein, 2003), and evaluations of resource allocations that disproportionately harm 
outgroup members (Mulvey, Buchheister, & McGrath, 2016).  
More specifically, recent research has demonstrated how children’s ToM 
capacities both constrain and enable children’s ability to make informed decisions in 
social and moral contexts. For example, Rizzo and Killen (2017) examined how 
children’s ToM competence related to their perceptions of merit in stereotype consistent 
and inconsistent contexts. Results revealed that, although most children held stereotypic 
expectations regarding their peers’ abilities, their ToM competence – assessed via a scale 
of multiple ToM assessments – was related to their ability to challenge these stereotypes 
when confronted with evidence that disconfirmed their stereotypes. These findings are 
also consistent with a previous study on how children’s ToM capacities related to their 
willingness to support peers who do not want to conform to gender stereotypes regarding 
play activities (Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 2015). Taken together, these findings 
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demonstrate the importance of investigating the role of children’s ToM capacities in their 
ability to resist intergroup biases.  
Although these experiments constitute important first steps to understanding how 
children’s developing social-cognitive understanding of others’ mental states can serve as 
a developmental mechanism for children’s ability to resist harmful intergroup prejudices, 
biases, and discrimination, several critical questions remain regarding this process. For 
example, much of this research has been conducted using third-person vignettes; it 
remains unknown how children respond to instances of intergroup biases and 
discrimination when children themselves are embedded within the discriminatory 
context. Further, more research is needed to fully understand the complex interrelations 
between children’s ToM capacities and their ability to challenge stereotypes across a 
range of contexts, stereotypes, and groups. 
Present Study 
Motivated by the gaps in the literature reviewed above, the present study was 
designed to examine how children coordinate moral, group, and personal concerns when 
evaluating resource allocations that they commonly experience in their daily lives, such 
as unequal allocations brought about by differing levels of merit (i.e. children being 
rewarded for their individual abilities and performance; e.g., grades, athletic group 
membership and competitions) and unequal allocations brought about by ingroup biases 
and prejudice (i.e. children receiving more than others due to their shared group 
membership; e.g., gender biases). The present study was also the first to directly 
investigate children’s evaluations of these two contexts when they are either advantaged 
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(received more resources than their peers) or disadvantaged (received fewer resources 
than their peers) by an allocation of resources.  
One way to investigate these questions is to create a task in which children, who 
are identified as part of a group, work on a project that requires effort and skill, and 
receive resources from an allocator based on either individual ability or group 
membership. This type of task enabled an assessment of whether children’s perceptions 
of allocations based on group membership differ from their perceptions of allocations 
based on ability. Further, this design allows for an analysis of how children’s evaluations 
of these different allocations differ based on whether they themselves are advantaged or 
disadvantaged by an unequal allocation. By investigating many different aspects of 
children’s evaluations and perceptions, such as whether the allocation is fair, how they 
will feel, and whether the allocations should be changed, the present study allowed for an 
in depth analysis of children’s developing conceptions of fairness. 
Children’s awareness of ingroup bias is often measured using third-person 
vignettes where children witness characters displaying an ingroup bias towards others 
(see Killen et al., 2013; Rutland & Killen, 2015 for reviews). Further, children’s own 
ingroup biases have been assessed by asking children to allocate resources to individuals 
who differ only by their group memberships (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Renno & 
Shutts, 2015). Research has examined children’s ingroup biases based on gender, 
racial/ethnic, and minimal (experimentally determined) group memberships. For 
example, in a minimal groups paradigm, children are asked to divide up resources 
between a member of their own group (the blue shirts) or a member of an outgroup (the 
red shirts); in these contexts, children give more resources to an ingroup member than an 
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outgroup member, revealing an ingroup bias (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011). In these 
situations, however, children are not in the recipient role (i.e. being the recipient of 
another individual’s biased allocation or inclusion decision). Less is known regarding 
children’s perceptions and evaluations of allocations based on ingroup biases when they 
themselves are the recipients. These types of analyses provide novel information 
regarding how children conceptualize different forms of unfairness or inequalities in 
resource allocation contexts.  
Children who are disadvantaged by an allocation likely have a drastically 
different perception of the allocation from those who are advantaged by it. Further, while 
there are numerous different causes of these disputes, two in particular – inequalities 
resulting from individual efforts and inequalities resulting from group biases – have 
broad implications for children’s conceptions of fairness. Thus, the present study aimed 
to examine how children perceive and evaluate allocation contexts that differ based on 
children’s own status within the allocation (whether they are advantaged or 
disadvantaged by the allocation) and the underlying motivation behind the allocation 
(whether resources are allocated based on individual effort and ability or based on 
ingroup biases). 
Aims of the Current Dissertation Project 
The present study had four primary aims: 
 Aim 1: Investigate how children’s status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) 
relates to their perceptions of individual and group based inequalities. The present 
study extended past research on children’s developing conceptions of fairness by 
examining how children’s perceptions of unequal allocations of resources are influenced 
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by: (1) the Type of Inequality, whether it was based on an individual (e.g. abilities) or 
group membership (e.g., gender) factor, and (2) their status within the allocation (whether 
they receive more or fewer resources than their peers do). To date, the majority of 
research on children’s moral development has examined participants’ allocation of 
resource decisions in one of two conditions: when the participant is an allocator (you 
have these stickers; how do you want to divide them up between you and X?) or the 
participant is a witness (this child gives more stickers to person X than to person Y; is 
this okay?) (see Killen & Smetana, 2015 for a review). What is not known is how 
children evaluate allocation decisions in which they themselves are recipients who are 
either advantaged or disadvantaged by someone else’s’ allocation. Further, although 
separate lines of research have investigated children’s allocations based on individual 
effort (e.g., merit) (Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2011; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 
2012; Rizzo et al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2016) and group factors (e.g., gender group 
membership) (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001; Mulvey et al., 2014), no research to 
date has directly compared children’s evaluations of resource allocation decisions in 
individual and group contexts. The benefit of this analysis is that it allows for an 
examination of how children perceive and evaluate two of the critical forms of unequal 
allocations that they experience in their daily lives.  
 Aim 2: Determine how children’s intra- and intergroup attitudes are related 
to their status within individual and group based inequalities, with age. The second 
aim of the present study was to extend past research on children’s intra- and intergroup 
attitudes. Intra-group attitudes refer to how individuals view their ingroup members, 
whereas intergroup attitudes refer to how individuals view their outgroup members. 
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Specifically, the present study examined children’s attributions of abilities for the 
relevant task and favorability towards ingroup (intra-group) and outgroup (intergroup) 
members, embedded within a resource allocation context. Most research focuses 
exclusively on intergroup attitudes (do children include or exclude someone from another 
group?). Yet, there are many contexts in which children reject their own ingroup 
members when they do not conform to the norms of the group (Rutland & Killen, 2017). 
Little research has examined how children’s evaluations of an ingroup member are 
influenced by their perceived abilities or competences. Research has documented that 
children exclude an ingroup member who deviates from group norms (Killen et al., 2013; 
Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 2015; Rizzo, Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2017), yet it remains 
unknown how children respond to ingroup members who vary on their abilities, 
particularly in a competitive context (e.g., competing in a puzzle competition to receive a 
prize). The present study was the first to examine how children evaluate ingroup 
members based on their performance at a task, which allowed for an analysis of new 
information regarding how children weigh the concerns for group functioning and group 
membership when they conflict. 
The present study was also the first to examine children’s intra- and intergroup 
attitudes and inclusion decisions embedded within the context of an unequal resource 
allocation. Given the frequency of resource disputes in early childhood, understanding 
how these disputes influence children’s intergroup attitudes is essential. While 
foundational research on intergroup attitudes argued that unequal status between groups 
can threaten intergroup harmony (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and more recent research has 
documented the role of expected shared interests and abilities in intergroup relations 
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(Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey & Killen, 2015), the present study was the first to 
experimentally investigate how children’s attributions of abilities, reported favorability, 
and inclusion decisions for both ingroup and outgroup peers are influenced by their 
advantaged or disadvantaged status within different resource allocation contexts.  
 Aim 3: Investigate how children’s perceptions of third-person inequalities 
are related to their previous experiences with inequalities. The present study was also 
the first to examine how children’s own experiences with inequalities relate to their 
responses to third-person inequalities. Past research has examined children’s conceptions 
of fairness in experimental contexts designed to control for children’s daily experiences. 
It is critical to know, however, how these daily experiences may shape children’s 
perceptions of subsequent contexts. A child who had just been the victim of a resource 
dispute (e.g., received fewer resources than their peers) may be particularly sensitive to 
the concern for equity, whereas children who were just rewarded for a good performance 
may be especially sensitive to concerns for merit. To understand fully how children 
weigh and coordinate multiple concerns throughout development, it is critical to 
understand how their daily experiences shape their perceptions of subsequent peer 
contexts. Despite this importance, however, no study to date has examined how 
children’s own experiences in resource allocation contexts influence their perceptions of 
third-person resource disputes. 
 Aim 4: Examine the bidirectional relationship between children’s ToM 
capacities and their responses to inequalities. Finally, the present study investigated 
the relationships between children’s developing ToM, their resource allocation decisions, 
and their inclusion decisions. Specifically, the present study expanded on past research 
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investigating how children’s ToM capacities relate their evaluations of inequalities (Li et 
al., 2017; Mulvey, Buchheister, & McGrath, 2016; Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, 
Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2010), by examining how children’s ToM capacities interact 
with their status within inequalities when children are evaluating the wrongfulness of the 
unequal resource allocation, and assessing the potential threats to others’ welfare as a 
result of the allocation. Further, this study was the first to examine how children’s ToM 
capacities are related to their intergroup attitudes and inclusion decisions in intergroup 
contexts.  
Finally, the present study was also designed to provide novel insights into how 
children’s perspective within a context relates to their ability to accurately identify 
others’ mental states. A burgeoning body of research in social psychology has 
documented how adults’ societal status – frequently defined in terms of SES – relates to 
their overall perspective taking ability, and the ability to identify others’ emotional states 
(Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010; Kraus et al., 2012). Specifically, Kraus, Côté, and Keltner 
(2010) found that adults from higher SES backgrounds performed worse on emotion 
attribution assessments compared to adults from lower SES backgrounds. No research to 
date, however, has investigated the developmental origins of this phenomenon, or 
investigated whether differences are specific to broader societal status, or if the link 
between status on mental state understanding can be manipulated experimentally. 
Study Design 
 General design and procedure. The central aims of the present study pertain to 
understanding children’s developing behavior, judgments, and reasoning in various 
resource allocation contexts. To achieve these aims, the present study utilized a 2 (Age 
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Group: 3-5, 6-8 years) X 2 (Status: Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X 2 (Type of Inequality: 
Individual, Group) between-subjects, experimental design. Participants were interviewed 
in one-on-one sessions with a trained research assistant. Participants heard a series of 
vignettes illustrated with pictures and drawings, displayed on a laptop computer and 
narrated by the research assistant. Following the implementation of the two between-
subjects manipulations (see below for details), all participants completed four identical 
tasks assessing their perceptions of inequalities, intra- and intergroup attitudes, ToM 
capacities, and evaluations of third-person inequalities. The full methodological details 
are outlined in Chapter III (Methodology). 
Status within the allocation. To examine how children’s status within an unequal 
resource allocation influences their perceptions of allocations, intergroup attitudes, and 
ToM capacities, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
Advantaged or Disadvantaged. Specifically, participants in the Advantaged conditions 
heard a vignette in which a peer gave more resources to participants’ ingroup than 
outgroup, whereas participants in the Disadvantaged conditions heard a vignette in which 
a peer gave fewer resources to participants’ ingroup than outgroup. 
Type of Inequality. To examine whether children’s perceptions of allocations, 
intergroup attitudes, and ToM capacities are influenced by the underlying reason for the 
unequal allocation of resources, participants were also randomly assigned to one of two 
Type of Inequality: Individual or Group. Specifically, children in the Individual 
conditions were told that the peer in charge of allocating the prizes did so based on 
participants’ performance on a puzzle task, whereas participants in the Group conditions 
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were told that the peer in charge of allocating the prizes did so based on shared group 
membership. 
Thus, there were a total of four experimental conditions in the present study: 
Individual-Advantaged (participants’ ingroups received more resources due to 
performance on a puzzle task), Individual-Disadvantaged (participants’ outgroups 
received more resources due to performance on a puzzle task), Group-Advantaged 
(participants’ ingroups received more resources due to shared group membership with the 
peer in charge of allocating the prizes), and Group-Disadvantaged (participants’ 
outgroups received more resources due to shared group membership with the peer in 
charge of allocating the prizes). 
Participants. To investigate the aims of the present study, children between the 
ages of 3- and 8-years-old (N = 176) were interviewed. Specifically, 13 3-year-olds (5 
female), 47 4-year-olds (29 female), 35 5-year-olds (17 female), 32 6-year-olds (14 
female), 34 7-year-olds (20 female), and 15 8-year-olds (6 female) were interviewed. 
Participants’ ethnicity was representative of the sampling population: 70% European 
American, 16% African American, 10% Latino/a, and 4% Asian American. The median 
annual household income was $91,918 (income data based on the median annual 
household income of the county in which the data was collected, see 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/annearundelcountymaryland/PST045217). 
Six additional participants (n = 2 3-year-olds, n = 3 4-year-olds, and n = 1 6-year-old) 
were interviewed but not included in the final analyses due to experimenter error (n = 1) 
or a failure to understand the key premises of the studies (determined by failing the 
memory checks; n = 5).  
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Justification for age range. The age range of 3- to 8-years-old was chosen based 
on extensive past research examining children’s developing conceptions of fairness 
regarding resource allocations and inclusion decisions. The younger boundary of the age 
range (3- to 5-years-old) was chosen based on past research indicating that children’s 
conceptions of fairness regarding resource allocation emerges between 3- and 5-years-old 
(Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2011; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Li, Spitzer, & 
Olson, 2014; Paulus, 2014; Rizzo et al., 2016; Rizzo & Killen, 2016; Schmidt et al., 
2016). Specifically, by 3- to 5-years-old, children demonstrate the concerns for merit and 
rectifying inequalities in their allocations, judgments of allocations, and reasoning for 
their allocations and judgments. Further, research indicates that children begin to 
incorporate the concerns for group functioning, group loyalty, and traditions/customs into 
their inclusion decisions and intergroup attitudes by 3- to 6-years-old (Cooley & Killen, 
2015; Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 2015). Finally, past research utilizing similar 
assessments and design has documented 3- to 5-year-old children’s ability to successfully 
understand and respond to the present methodology (Rizzo et al., 2016; Rizzo & Killen, 
2016; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016). 
The upper boundary of the age range (6- to 8-years-old) was similarly based on 
extensive past research on children’s conceptions of fairness. Specifically, research has 
documented significant development in children’s conceptions of inequalities during this 
period (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al., 2015; Rizzo & Killen, 2016). Further, 
children’s ability to coordinate the concern for merit with other, moral, concerns 
including others’ welfare (Rizzo et al., 2016) and rectifying inequalities (Damon, 1977) 
undergoes significant development between 6 and 8 years of age. 
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Finally, the age range was also chosen to assess the range of ToM competencies 
assessed in the present study. Wellman & Liu (2004) document significant development 
in children’s proficiency at Contents False-Belief tasks between 4 and 5 years of age, and 
Belief-Emotion tasks between 5 and 6 years of age. Thus, an age range of 3- to 8-years-
old captures the full range of children’s developing competencies at the ToM assessments 
assessed in present study, including a range where children can be expected to fail both 
assessments (3- to 4-years-old), pass the Contents False-Belief assessment but fail the 
Belief-Emotion assessment (5- to 6-years-old), and pass both assessments (7- to 8-years-
old). Importantly, all ToM analyses will control for participant age. 
Justification for gender as a social category. Gender was chosen as the group 
membership category for the present study based on extensive research documenting 
children’s understanding of gender as a social category. Research over the past 20 years 
has revealed that gender constitutes a salient social category early in childhood (Bigler & 
Liben, 2006; Horn & Sinno, 2014; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006) and plays a major 
role in social organization for young children; parents and teachers provide different toys 
and assign different chores on the basis of gender (Lytton & Romney, 1991), and peers 
self-segregate into gender groups from early in development (Mehta & Strough, 2009). 
Further, while children reject explicit exclusion and discrimination on the basis of gender 
(Conry-Murray, 2015; Conry-Murray & Turiel, 2012; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001), 
children have also been found to demonstrate an ingroup bias in their resource allocations 
and inclusion decisions (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Mehta & Strough, 2009; 
Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 2015; Renno & Shutts, 2015). 
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Procedure. All participants completed a series of four tasks in a fixed order: (1) 
Perceptions of Allocations, (2) Intra- and Intergroup Attitudes Task, (3) Theory of Mind 
Task, and (4) Third-person Inequalities Task. Importantly, the only differences between 
the four conditions (Individual-Advantaged, Individual-Disadvantaged, Group-
Advantaged, Group-Disadvantaged) came at the beginning of the Perceptions of 
Allocations Task, when children received their resources. Following the allocation of 
resources, all participants were assessed on an identical set of assessments. Questions 
relate to how children perceived and evaluated the four different resource allocation 
contexts. 
Perceptions of Allocations Task. The Perceptions of Allocations Task was 
designed to investigate how children’s status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) relates to 
their perceptions of individual and group based inequalities (Aim 1). Participants 
first completed a “Find the Difference” puzzle, and received resources along with other, 
virtual, peers based on either their performance on the puzzles (Individual) or their shared 
gender group membership with the peer allocating the resources (Group). Participants 
either received more (Advantaged) or fewer (Disadvantaged) resources than their peers. 
Following the experimental manipulation regarding how the resources were allocated, all 
participants were then asked a set of questions designed to assess their perceptions and 
evaluations of the allocation. 
Specifically, participants were assessed on their evaluations of the allocation in 
terms of their moral judgments and evaluations of their own and others’ welfare, their 
attributions regarding how an outgroup member might evaluate the inequality, and their 
evaluations of different ways of reallocating resources that would rectify the unequal 
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allocation (redistributing the resources equally, allocating new resources to the 
disadvantaged group). These assessments were designed to examine 1) children’s own 
evaluations of the allocation, 2) children’s expectations regarding how others will 
evaluate the allocation, and 3) how children think the allocation should be addressed, if at 
all (see Chapter III for the full list of assessments). 
Intra- and Intergroup Attitudes Task. The Intra- and Intergroup Attitudes Task 
was designed to determine how children’s intra- and intergroup attitudes are related 
to their status within individual and group based inequalities, with age (Aim 2). In 
this task, participants were assessed on their favorability towards an ingroup member and 
an outgroup member to examine how children’s intragroup and intergroup (respectively) 
attitudes are influenced by the abilities of their ingroup members in each of the resource 
allocation contexts. Further, participants were assessed on their attributions of abilities 
towards their ingroup and outgroup members, to determine how children’s perceptions of 
their peers’ abilities are related to the allocation contexts. Finally, participants were told 
that they can pick a partner for a new puzzle context and were asked whether they would 
rather have an ingroup member or an outgroup member on their team, in order to 
determine how children weigh their intra- and intergroup attitudes when making a forced-
choice inclusion decision. 
Third-person Inequalities Task. The Third-person Inequalities Task was 
designed to investigate how children’s perceptions of third-person inequalities are 
related to their previous experiences with inequalities (Aim 3). Following the initial 
resource allocation contexts, participants heard a short vignette about two characters, one 
of which has a lot of resources (wealthy) while the other has none (poor) (taken directly 
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from Rizzo & Killen, 2016). Following the vignette, participants were asked how they 
think a new set of resources should be allocated between the two characters, and judged 
whether other potential allocations (e.g., giving more to the wealthy character, giving 
more to the poor character, giving resources equally) are “Okay” or “Not Okay”. 
Theory of Mind Task. Finally, the Theory of Mind Task was designed to examine 
the bidirectional relationship between children’s ToM capacities and their responses 
to inequalities (Aim 4). Specifically, participants completed standard Contents False-
Belief and Belief-Emotion ToM assessments (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & 
Cooke, 1989; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004). These tasks 
were chosen based on past research documenting their role in children’s moral 
development (Killen et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 2015; Rizzo & 
Killen, 2017). 
Hypotheses 
 The present study was designed to test hypotheses, based on the research outlined 
above, regarding each of the four aims of the present study. This section details the 
primary hypotheses for each aim. 
 Aim 1 hypotheses. We predicted that, with age, children would differ in their 
judgments of the allocation based on their own status (advantaged, disadvantaged) as 
well as the Type of Inequality (individual, group). Specifically, we predicted that, 
although younger children (3- to 5-years-old) would be primarily concerned with their 
relative status when evaluating the allocations – judging advantageous allocations to be 
more positive than disadvantageous allocations – older children (6- to 8-years-old) would 
begin to consider the Type of Inequality when making their evaluations (see Table 1). For 
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example, we expected that younger children would evaluate allocations that advantage 
themselves positively – judging them to be fair – even when allocations are based on 
ingroup biases. We expected that older children, however, would be better able to 
recognize the unfairness of allocations based on ingroup biases, and would thus evaluate 
biased allocation negatively, even when children themselves were advantaged by the 
allocation. 
Table 1. Hypotheses regarding children’s developing evaluations of allocations. 
 Younger Older 
Participants’ Status Individual Group Individual Group 
Advantaged Positive Positive Positive Negative 
Disadvantaged Negative Negative Positive/Neutral Negative 
 
Further, we hypothesized a similar pattern of results to emerge regarding 
children’s own resource allocations. Specifically, we expected that, younger children 
would allocate a majority of the additional resources to themselves and their ingroup 
member (see Damon, 1977; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008), whereas older 
children would be more likely to rectify unequal allocations based on ingroup biases than 
those based on individual ability. In particular, we expected that older children would 
rectify ingroup biased allocations regardless of whether they themselves were advantaged 
or disadvantaged by the allocation. Thus, overall, we hypothesized that the ability to 
weigh multiple concerns (i.e. own desires, others’ welfare, equity, and the rejection of 
prejudice) would emerge by 6 to 8 years old, as evidenced by children’s judgments of, 
and allocations in response to, the experimental allocations of resources (see Table 2). 
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For example, we expected that younger children would allocate more resources to their 
ingroup, even when their group performed worse on the puzzle task (Individual-
Disadvantaged). We expected that older children, however, would be better able to 
recognize the concern for merit, and would thus allocate more resources to the group who 
performed better at the puzzle task, even if that meant giving more to the outgroup 
(Individual-Disadvantaged) 
 
Table 2. Hypotheses regarding children’s developing resource allocation decisions. 
 Younger Older 
Participants’ Status Individual Group Individual Group 
Advantaged Perpetuate Perpetuate Perpetuate Rectify 
Disadvantaged Rectify Rectify Perpetuate/Equal Rectify 
 
These hypotheses were based on two lines of past research. First, research 
suggests that the rejection of personally advantageous inequalities does not emerge until 
6- to 8-years-old (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al., 2015; Damon, 1977; Fehr, 
Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008). Second, although research suggests that children 
evaluate merit based inequalities to be fair (Rizzo et al., 2016) and gender based 
discrimination to be unfair (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001) by 3- to 5-years-old, 
research also suggests that children struggle to coordinate multiple concerns for fairness 
until 6- to 8-years-old (Damon, 1977; Rizzo et al., 2016).  
Alternatively, it is also possible that younger children would prioritize the Type of 
Inequality over their own status within the allocation. This possibility is supported by 
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recent research demonstrating that children reject unequal allocations that favor their 
classroom ingroup members (Cooley & Killen, 2015). The participants in Cooley & 
Killen (2015), however, did not stand to benefit from the allocation. Thus, we 
hypothesized that the first-person nature of the present design will increase the saliency 
of young children’s own desires. 
 Aim 2 hypotheses. We hypothesized that, with age, children’s intra- and 
intergroup attitudes would be increasingly based on their relative status within the 
allocation and the underlying reason for the allocation (individual ability, ingroup bias). 
Specifically, we expected younger children to favor their ingroup over their outgroup 
member regardless of condition, whereas we expected older children’s favorability 
judgments, attributions of abilities, and inclusion decisions to differ by context, 
suggesting an increasing concern for group functioning over group identity (Cooley & 
Killen, 2015; Killen et al., 2013; Rizzo, Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2017). In particular, 
in the Individual conditions, we expected that older children would be more favorable 
towards, attribute higher levels of ability, and be more likely to include peers who were 
advantaged by the allocation, due to their abilities. Based on research from SIT 
suggesting that intergroup conflict heightens outgroup dislike (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
Weisel & Böhm, 2015), and research from the SRD model suggesting that children revert 
to ingroup favoritism in forced-choice inclusion contexts (Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey & 
Killen, 2015), however, we expected that even older children would favor their ingroup 
members in the Group conditions. 
 Aim 3 hypotheses. We hypothesized that children’s responses to the third-person 
allocation task would relate to their status within the previous first-person allocation 
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context. Specifically, we hypothesized that children who were disadvantaged by the first-
person allocation context would be more likely than those who were advantaged by it to 
rectify the third-person inequality, as well as be more likely to positively evaluate 
attempts to rectify the inequality, and negatively evaluate perpetuating and equal 
allocations. 
 Aim 4 hypotheses. We have two separate sets of hypotheses regarding the 
bidirectional relationship between children’s ToM capacities and their perceptions of 
inequalities. All ToM hypotheses are controlling for age. 
 ToM and Perceptions of Allocations. We hypothesized that children’s ToM 
competencies would be related to their evaluations of the allocations. Specifically, we 
expected that children’s ToM competencies would relate to their perceptions of how 
outgroup members would view the allocation, such that children with more advanced 
ToM capacities would be better able to differentiate their own judgments and emotional 
reactions from their expectations of others’ judgments and emotional reactions. For 
example, we hypothesized that, for children who are advantaged by the allocation, those 
with more advanced ToM capacities will be more likely to recognize that a disadvantaged 
outgroup member would feel badly about the allocation than would those with less 
advanced ToM capacities. 
 These hypotheses are based on recent research investigating children’s 
evaluations of intergroup inequalities based on school membership (Mulvey, Buchheister, 
& McGrath, 2016). Mulvey et al., (2016) presented children with a resource inequality 
context with three potential recipients: the participants themselves, a school ingroup 
member, and a school outgroup member. The results indicated that children who passed a 
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Contents False-Belief ToM assessment evaluated inequalities to be more unfair, 
particularly when an outgroup member was disadvantaged, than did children who failed 
the ToM assessment. The present study looked to replicate and extend the results of 
Mulvey, Buchheister, and McGrath (2016) in three key ways. First, the present study 
examined gender, rather than school membership, as the intergroup variable of interest. 
Second, the present study examined children’s own allocations in response to the initial 
allocations, in addition to their evaluations. Finally, the present study examined the 
relation between children’s ToM capacities and evaluations of unequal allocations in both 
first- and third-person contexts. 
Experiences with Unequal Allocations and ToM. Our second set of hypotheses 
examined how children’s evaluations of moral scenarios relate to their ToM capacities. 
We hypothesized that children’s experiences with advantaged and disadvantaged status 
would influence their ToM capacities. Specifically, we hypothesized that children who 
experience disadvantageous allocations would be more likely to pass, controlling for age, 
the Contents False-Belief and Belief-Emotion ToM assessments than children who 
experienced advantageous allocations. 
 These hypotheses are based on research documenting the bidirectional 
relationship between children’s ToM capacities and their evaluations of morally relevant 
contexts. In particular, Killen et al., (2011) found that children reliably passed a standard 
Contents False-Belief task at a younger age than they reliably passed a similar Contents 
False-Belief task that was embedded into a moral context. Killen et al., (2011) interpreted 
this effect by arguing that the saliency of harm to the victim led children to misattribute 
intentionality to the accidental transgressor. That is, witnessing the harm to the victim in 
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the morally relevant scenario made it more difficult for children to accurately assess the 
mental states (i.e. intentions) of the accidental transgressor. Leslie, Knobe, and colleagues 
(Knobe, 2005; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006; Pettit & Knobe, 2009) have documented a 
similar phenomenon; children are more likely to misattribute intentionality when the 
outcome of an act is harmful. Thus, we hypothesized that children who witness harm to 
others (participants in the Advantaged conditions) would be less likely to accurately 
attribute mental states (i.e. less likely to pass the Contents False-Belief and Belief-
Emotion assessments) than would children who do not witness harm to others 




















Chapter II: Literature Review 
The moral principle of fairness is ubiquitous throughout the lifespan and appears 
to stem from a human orientation to cooperate and get along with others (Boehm, 2008; 
Damon, 1977; Gurven, 2004; Henrich, 2004; Tomasello, 2009). Issues of fairness pertain 
to multiple facets of social life, from the fair distribution of resources and opportunities, 
to decisions regarding whom to include and exclude from a group. Further, children’s 
conceptions of fairness are a central component of their social and moral development 
(Killen & Smetana, 2015; Turiel, 1983, 1998). Research in developmental science has 
documented children’s early emerging concern for fairness as a moral issue (Smetana, 
Jambon, & Ball, 2014), and children’s developing understanding of the complexities that 
come with issues of fairness in intergroup contexts (Killen & Rizzo, 2014). When 
deciding how to allocate resources, for example, children consider multiple factors, such 
as how deserving each recipient is (Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2011; Rizzo et al., 
2016; Schmidt et al., 2016), the current distribution of resources (Elenbaas et al., 2016; 
Paulus, 2014; Rizzo & Killen, 2016), the group memberships of the recipients (Cooley & 
Killen, 2015; Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Elenbaas et al., 2016; Rizzo & Killen, 
2017), the allocation norms of the group (Cooley & Killen, 2015; McGuire, Rutland, & 
Nesdale, 2015), and the resource being allocated when determining what is fair 
(Chernyak & Sobel, 2016; Rizzo et al., 2016). Children’s emerging and developing 
  34 
	 	
conceptions of fairness regarding resource allocation and inclusion decisions have been 
central to research on moral development.  
In fact, resource allocation contexts are an important context in which children 
develop and apply their conceptions of fairness. Disputes over resources constitute a 
majority of social conflicts in early childhood (Hay, 2006; Killen & Smetana, 2015; Ross, 
Tesla, Kenyon, & Lollis, 1990), providing a plethora of experiences from which children 
construct their understanding of the multiple concerns for fairness. Deciding how to 
allocate and share resources with peers is one avenue in which children commonly 
express their concern for fairness. Past research has found that children are deeply 
concerned with fairness, and will take resources away from undeserving others (Blake & 
Rand, 2010; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008), or even throw resources away (Blake 
& McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw & Olson, 2012), in order to maintain what they believe is fair. 
There are many contexts in which fairness is consistent with the concern for the 
equal treatment of all individuals, however, there are also contexts in which an equal 
allocations conflict with other fairness considerations. For example, when one person 
works hard to accomplish a goal while another person is lazy, dividing resources equally 
conflicts with dividing resources meritoriously. Further, it is often determined that, in 
order to maintain impartiality, certain factors, such as group membership or recipient 
identity, should not be relevant, because an unequal distribution on the basis of group 
membership would be deemed unfair. There are many contexts, however, in which 
context-specific concerns, such as recipient identity, group membership, group norms, 
and resource type, are not only relevant, but are in fact necessary for ensuring a fair 
distribution. For example, when allocating resources to members of historically 
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disadvantaged groups, recognizing the injustices committed to these groups is a critical 
first step in order to be able to address and rectify these past injustices (Elenbaas et al., 
2016). Thus, when considering the fair means of allocating resources, individuals need to 
consider the factors that might lead to a priority for certain concerns over strict equality, 
as well as context-specific factors that can influence what is deemed fair.  
The primary goal of this literature review is to demonstrate how children use 
different forms of moral, conventional, and personal reasoning when allocating resources, 
and that these concerns coexist from early in development. To address this aim, the 
following review contains three major sections. First, theoretical perspectives on 
individuals’ conceptions of fairness from developmental science will be reviewed. The 
aim of this section is to provide an account of the theoretical frameworks that have 
motivated research on conceptions of fairness and distributive justice thus far. This 
section will also provide a brief account of social domain theory, and will highlight the 
important theoretical distinctions between social domain theory and past theoretical 
accounts. Further, this section will provide the theoretical framework from which the 
existing literature on children’s developing conceptions of fairness will be interpreted. 
Second, a focused selection of the significant empirical work conducted on children’s 
emerging and developing conceptions of fairness regarding resource allocation will be 
discussed. This section will be subdivided into research on the moral principles of 
distributive justice (equality, equity, merit), the social-conventional, context-specific, 
concerns that children incorporate into their allocation decisions (group membership, 
group norms), and the personal concerns that children consider when determining how 
they want resources to be allocated (personal desires, ownership concerns, relationships, 
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and mental states). Third, the current literature will be discussed in terms of the 
limitations with an outline for several current and future directions for researchers to 
examine. Finally, a conclusion will summarize the main points of the literature review. 
Theoretical Accounts of Children’s Conceptions of Fairness 
 Early theoretical approaches. Research on distributive justice originated with 
Piaget’s (1932) account of children’s developing conceptions of fairness, which argued 
that children progressed through three general phases of development. Piaget’s goal was 
to determine whether children’s reasoning about fairness reflected the philosophical 
categories espoused by deontologists, most notably Kant (1785/1959). Crafting dilemmas 
that were relevant to the child’s world, Piaget (1932) interviewed over 500 children 
regarding their reasoning about a wide range of dilemmas that focused on fairness about 
punishment, stealing, dividing resources, cheating, and property damage. From these 
many data sets, Piaget concluded that children begin to understand concepts of 
distributive justice by middle childhood (8-10 years of age). Further, Piaget argued that 
children progressed through general stages of distributive justice understanding, 
beginning with the concern for equality. Children were then thought to develop the 
notions of merit and equity through interactions with peers. 
Expanding on Piaget’s (1932) account, Kohlberg (1969) examined moral 
development to a lifespan model. Although Kohlberg did not focus directly on resource 
allocation specifically, his work contributed the literature on moral development by 
further broadening the understanding of individuals’ developing conceptions of fairness 
throughout the lifespan. Further extending the theoretical work of Piaget (1932) and 
Kohlberg (1969), Damon’s (1977) theory of distributive justice followed a similar stage-
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like progression. Adopting Piaget’s (1932) interview methodology, Damon used a semi-
structured interview method to probe children’s reasoning about distribute justice to 
systematically test children’s evaluations of different claims to resources such as effort, 
merit, status, as well as friendship status. From his data, he concluded that children 
progressed through three levels of distributive justice reasoning, with two sub-levels 
within each level. In the first level (0-A), children define fairness as whatever they want 
to occur, with the only justification being their own desires or irrelevant factors (e.g., “I 
should get it because I want to have it”). In the second level (0-B), children define 
fairness still in line with their desires, but attempt to justify it using external criteria (e.g., 
“I should get it because I’m a girl”). These first two levels are similar to one another in 
that the underlying motive for fairness is self-interest, but are different in that in level 0-
B, children recognize that an external justification is needed, but fail to identify a 
legitimate justification, whereas in 0-A, children do not recognize the need for an 
external justification. Typically, children in these levels referenced predominantly 
irrelevant factors when judging the fairness of allocations to others. 
 Damon (1977) argued that children then advance to the third and fourth levels 
around 5- to 6-years-old. In the third level (1-A), children’s conception of fairness is 
linked to the notion of strict equality (e.g., “Everyone should get the same”), whereas in 
the fourth level (1-B), children’s conception of fairness is derived from reciprocity and a 
notion that people should be “paid back” for good or bad acts (e.g., “She should get the 
most because she made the most”). The shift from the first two stages to the third and 
fourth is noted in the move away from self-interest towards that of an objective principle; 
in level 1-A, children look to treat all individuals equally, whereas in level 1-B children 
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recognize that certain individuals are “deserving”, and this desert is based on reciprocity 
for previous actions. 
 Finally, Damon (1977) argued that children advance to the fifth and sixth levels 
around 7- to 8-years-old. In the fifth level (2-A), children understand that different 
individuals can have different - equally valid - justifications for their claims to a resource, 
but their attempts to compromise between the two competing claims are often poor (e.g., 
“She should get the most, but she could get some too”). In the final, sixth, level (2-B), 
children attempt to balance equality and reciprocity such that each of the claims are 
considered, but often only one is weighed over the other (e.g., “It would be fair if 
everyone got the same, but I would give the most to the kids that sold the most because 
that way they’ll all do better next time”). These final two levels are categorized by the 
ability to effectively consider multiple concerns. In level 2-A, fairness is defined by 
compromising between the two competing claims, whereas in 2-B it is defined as the 
direct resolution of it. 
 Damon (1977) argued that, with age, children progressed through each of these 
levels in a fairly consistent manner. He was, however, cautious about using the term 
“stage” (ultimately favoring the term, “level”) due to the fact that children were not 
entirely consistent in their reasoning, and did not always progress through the levels 
sequentially in his longitudinal study on their distributive justice reasoning (Damon, 
1977). Additionally, while he did provide a general outline for at what age children, on 
average, reached each developmental milestone he was careful to note that these ages 
were flexible and highly dependent upon individual and environmental differences. 
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While each of these theories provides different accounts of children’s social and 
moral development, all three of these theories suggest for a sequential ordering of 
developing moral concerns. In the domain of resource allocation, for example, the 
concern for the self was argued to develop first, followed closely by equality, and 
eventually by the concerns for merit and equity later in childhood. 
Social domain theory and the social reasoning developmental model. Another 
theoretical approach to children’s social and moral development is social domain theory 
(SDT; Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 1983). Contrary to the stage-like, 
sequential, developmental accounts put forth by Piaget and Damon, SDT argues that 
children are able to consider multiple forms of social and moral reasoning, which coexist 
from early in development. When reexamining the methodologies used by Piaget and 
Kohlberg, SDT researchers have found that complex scenarios (such as Kohlberg’s Heinz 
dilemma) can be categorized into different types of social considerations (moral, societal, 
psychological) from which children as young as 2- to 3-years-old can then reason about 
the moral concerns for fairness, justice, and others welfare, while also acknowledging the 
importance of conventional factors such as group norms, group functioning, and the role 
of authority (Killen & Smetana, 2015; Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 1983) and 
concerns for the self and personal autonomy (Nucci, 1981). Yet, while research from 
SDT has documented children’s concern for fairness as a moral issues, using resource 
allocation as a prototypic context in early childhood, little research from this perspective 
has specifically examined the factors that children consider when determining how to 
allocate resources. 
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Thus, SDT highlights the critical importance of examining the multiple social-contextual 
factors present in complex resource allocation vignettes. Examining when and how 
individual concerns emerge and develop, in addition to how they are coordinated with 
other concerns throughout development, provides for a more precise description of 
children’s early emerging conceptions of fairness. Further, it is important to understand 
how concerns for fairness interact with other, non-moral concerns in the domain of 
resource allocation. For example, when do moral considerations about fairness take 
priority over conventional ones such as group functioning or societal viewpoints about 
status hierarchies? When allocating resources it is necessary to investigate whether and 
when status hierarchies and prejudicial stereotypes take priority over fairness decisions 
and how the role of personal choice and autonomy is weighed into decisions about 
allocation of resources. Thus, central to a developmental approach is the goal of 
documenting the origins and age-related changes regarding how children evaluate and 
use multiple forms of reasoning to make decisions about the distribution of resources 
throughout development.  
Further expanding on this theoretical framework, the social reasoning 
developmental model (SRD; Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland & Killen, 2015) combined 
elements of SDT and social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to contextualize 
children’s understanding of social knowledge in an intergroup setting. According to the 
SRD model, throughout development, individuals take an active role in reasoning about 
moral, group, and personal concerns when making social decisions. Further, the SRD 
model argues that it is not only children’s understanding of each of these concerns that 
develops, but also their ability to integrate and coordinate multiple, potentially 
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conflicting, concerns when thinking and reasoning about their social world that 
undergoes significant development throughout childhood and adolescence. For example, 
while children’s understanding of merit and equity undergo their own distinct patterns of 
development (e.g., understanding that increased effort does not always lead to increased 
production and understanding how historical inequalities impact present day individuals 
and groups), children’s ability to coordinate between these concerns is also developing 
simultaneously (Rizzo & Killen, 2016; Rizzo et al., 2016).  
Moral Concerns for Fairness 
 Drawing from philosophical theories of distributive justice (Rawls, 1971), 
developmental scientists have examined several key principles of distributive justice: 
equality, equity, and merit. Equality refers to the concern for the equal, impartial 
treatment of individuals in any given context, regardless of individuals’ circumstances. 
Contrasting with strict equality, equity refers to the concern for the overall equal 
outcomes of all individuals, taking the current distribution into account. Although the 
term equity has been discussed in various ways in different literatures, for the purposes of 
this review, equity will be discussed specifically as the rectification of an inequality. 
Finally, merit refers to the concern for the deservedness of the recipients due to the effort 
or contribution each has made. The commons feature of each of these concerns is that 
they are impartial, generalizable, and are apply to the relative treatment of multiple 
individuals. Rawls (1971) discussed the application of these principles through the “veil 
of fairness”, such that they are judged to be fair regardless of the recipients, group norms, 
or resources involved. 
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Equality. The origins and development of children’s concern for equality in 
resource allocation have undergone extensive examination from multiple theoretical 
perspectives. In developmental science, Piaget (1932) and Damon (1977) emphasized the 
importance of equality understanding as a critical milestone in children’s social and 
moral development, finding that children prioritize equality over selfish desires by 
roughly 5-years-old. While these theorists emphasized the importance of equality 
understanding, they may have underestimated just how early this understanding emerges. 
Researchers investigating the origins of equality understanding in infancy have used 
violation of expectation (VoE) looking time measures to assess infants’ expectations 
regarding resource allocations. When presented with short allocation scenarios in which 
two puppets receive either the same number or a different number of resources, 15-
month-old, but not 12-month-old infants, looked reliably longer at unequal allocations, 
suggesting infants expect others’ to allocate resources equally (Schmidt & Sommerville, 
2011; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013). Further, 16-month-old, but not 10-
month-old, infants actively chose a puppet that they saw allocating equally over a puppet 
they saw allocating unequally (Geraci & Surian, 2011). The results of these studies on the 
developmental origins of equality understanding in infancy provide evidence of the early 
roots of fairness understanding. It is from these early expectations and preferences that 
children construct their conceptions of fairness, and develop the understanding of 
equality as a normative, moral concern.  
To investigate children’s understanding of equality as a normative, moral concern, 
researchers have used multiple methods, including behavioral allocations, judgments of 
allocations, and reasoning about allocations, to examine children’s developing 
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conceptions of equality throughout childhood. Converging evidence from multiple 
studies suggest that by at least 3-years-old children allocate resources equally to third 
parties and judge equal allocations to be fair (Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 
2010; Damon, 1977; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Rizzo et al., 2016; Rizzo & 
Killen, 2016; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). Further, children as young as 3-years-old 
will share mostly equally with a peer, even if they could easily take all of the resources 
for themselves (Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011) and choose to allocate 
resources equally amongst family members and strangers when resources are plentiful 
(Olson & Spelke, 2008). When presented with an inequality, children reject unequal 
allocations even when they benefit the self (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011) and will throw 
resources in the trash rather than favoring one person over another (Blake & Rand, 2010; 
Shaw & Olson, 2012). Altogether, these studies provide strong evidence for the claim 
that, by middle childhood, children have a firm grasp of the normative, moral concern for 
equality in resource allocation. 
Equity. While research to date has revealed that children care about equality from 
a young age, fewer studies have examined if children’s preference for equality extends to 
resource allocations in the context of preexisting inequalities, where the concern for 
equity arises. Assessing children’s resource allocations in the context of a preexisting 
inequality (where one recipient has more than another) provides an opportunity to 
examine if children’s concern for equal allocations extends to a context in which an equal 
allocation may be unfair. For example, it may be unfair to divide resources equally if the 
recipients have had an unequal access to resources in the past. 
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Recent research provides some evidence that preschool-age children recognize the 
concern for preexisting inequality. Li, Spitzer, & Olson, (2014) found that, when 
allocating one resource to an advantaged or disadvantaged recipient, 4- and 5-year-olds 
more frequently allocated the resource to the disadvantaged individual. Further, Paulus 
(2014) presented children with two allocation scenarios, one where they could share their 
resources with an individual who had very few resources, and the other where they could 
share with an individual who had a lot of resources already. Paulus (2014) found that 
children elected to share more resources with a poor individual than a wealthy one, 
suggesting that they are able to recognize the moral concern for equity. Without 
reasoning data, however, it is unclear whether participants in these studies allocated more 
frequently to the disadvantaged individual out of a concern for equity, or if they did so 
simply because they were unable to allocate resources equally. Given that young children 
have been documented to have a strong preference for allocating resources equally when 
possible, had children been given an even number of resources to allocate, it is possible 
that they would have preferred an equal allocation to an equitable one. A paradigm 
assessing children’s conceptions of fairness with an equal number of resources, along 
with obtaining judgment data, is needed to properly address at what point in development 
children begin to favor equitable allocations over equal allocations of resources. 
In another study, Rizzo & Killen (2016) presented 3- to 8-year-old children with a 
vignette about a wealthy recipient and a poor recipient and assessed their allocations of 6 
resources, their judgments of equal, equitable, and unequitable allocations, and their 
reasoning for their allocations and judgments. This study revealed unique developmental 
patterns in children’s allocations, judgments, and reasoning regarding equity and 
  45 
	 	
equality. The youngest age group, 3- to 4-year-olds allocated resources equally, judged 
equal allocations to be fair, and primarily reasoned about notions of equality in their 
verbal justifications. The developmental roots of equity understanding, however, were 
documented in these young children; 3- to 4-year-old children judged equitable 
allocations more positively than unequitable allocations. This suggests that by 3- to 4-
years-old, children are incorporating the concern for equity into their conceptions of 
fairness, and are not simply judging all unequal allocations to be similarly unfair. With 
age, children’s understanding of equity continued to develop; 5- to 6-years-old children 
allocated a majority of the resources to the disadvantaged resources, and judged both 
equal and equitable allocations to be fair. Further, by 7- to 8-years-old, children’s 
understanding of the prescriptive concern for equity began to influence their judgments of 
equality, with these oldest children judging equitable allocations more positively than 
equal allocations, and no longer reporting equal allocations to be fair. 
Taken together, these results suggest that children’s understanding of equity 
emerge early, by at least 3- to 4-years-old, in children’s judgments about equitable 
allocations and their allocations when equality is not an option. With age, children 
continue to develop a more mature understanding of equity, recognizing that it is 
prescriptive, and are able to flexibly apply it in complex contexts with multiple 
competing claims.  
  Merit. The existing literature on merit has examined when children understand 
merit to be a legitimate reason for deviating from equality. The concern for merit arises in 
contexts where individuals work to acquire resources or opportunities. When one 
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individual works harder, or accomplishes more, that individual is then thought to have a 
legitimate claim to receiving more resources.  
 Similar to notions of equity, foundational research investigated merit in complex 
scenarios in which multiple concerns for fairness were contrasted against one another. 
More recent research, however, has challenged this late emergence by assessing 
children’s allocations and judgments in contexts in which the concern for merit is 
isolated. Baumard, Mascaro, and Chevallier (2012) presented children with a vignette in 
which one character worked hard to bake cookies, while the other decided to go outside 
to play. They found that children were more likely to allocate a bigger cookie to the 
hardworking character, and gave more cookies to the hard working character when 
allocating three cookies. Similar to the methodological approach of Li, Spitzer, and Olson 
(2014), however, children in this study were also never given the opportunity to allocate 
resources equally. Given children’s documented concern for equality in early childhood, 
it is possible that had children been given an even number of cookies, they would have 
allocated the cookies equally between the two characters. Children may had allocated 
meritoriously because they were trying to make the best of a bad situation (being forced 
to give more to someone), rather than because they view merit as a moral principle. 
 Rizzo et al. (2016) presented 3- to 8-year-old children with a similar vignette, in 
which one character worked hard while another was lazy, but asked children to allocate 6 
resources between the two characters, allowing for an equal allocation. To address 
children’s normative, prescriptive understanding of merit, Rizzo et al. (2016) further 
assessed children’s moral judgments of meritorious, equal, and non-meritorious 
allocations. These results revealed that children as young as 3-years-old allocated 
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resources meritoriously, and judged both meritorious and equal allocations to be fair. 
This early emergence of merit understanding, however, does not negate the importance of 
later development; children’s meritorious giving increased with age, and interacted with 
the type of resource being allocated (see below). Older children also judged equal 
allocations to be less ok with age, suggesting that the normative, prescriptive 
understanding of merit continues to develop, and influences children’s judgment of equal 
allocations. These findings suggest that children’s early understanding of merit provides 
the roots for later development of merit understanding, which incorporates multiple 
context-specific factors such as resource type and the permissibility of allocating 
resources equally. 
 In sum, children’s developing understanding of the distributive justice principles 
of equality, equity, and merit appears to reflect a coexisting, context dependent, 
understanding of fairness. That is, from as young as 3-years-old, children recognize the 
concern for equality, equity, and merit, and are able to apply them in specific contexts. 
The results of these studies suggest that children understand that, with all else being 
equal, resources should be allocated equally amongst the recipients. When concerns for 
equity or merit arise, however, children recognize that deviations from equality can be 
fair. With age, children develop a more sophisticated understanding of each of these 
concerns, are able to apply them flexibly in more complex contexts, and recognize the 
prescriptive nature of these concerns, judging alternative allocations to be unfair. 
Group Concerns  
 While the previous section discussed the impartial principles central to 
distributive justice, a full understanding of fairness means considering the context-
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specific factors relevant to an allocation, including understanding the group-level 
concerns that children face when allocating resources (Sen, 2009). Thus far, two major 
group factors on children’s developing conceptions of fairness can be identified from the 
literature: 1) Concerns regarding the group membership of the recipients receiving the 
resources and 2) concerns regarding the group norms guiding allocations in a given 
context. Beginning with allocations to those with close social relations and shared group 
membership, the first section will discuss research suggesting that children incorporate to 
whom they are allocating resources to into their allocation decisions. The following 
section will then discuss how group- and generic-level norms influence children’s 
allocation decisions. Group norms, such as competitive versus cooperative group 
contexts, provide important information regarding which principles of distributive justice 
are prioritized in a given context. This section will close with a brief discussion of 
cultural norms as a context to examine the influence of allocation norms.  
 Group membership. The concern for group membership is a major, developing, 
concern in children’s social decision making throughout childhood (Killen, Elenbaas, 
Rizzo, & Rutland, 2016; Killen & Rutland, 2011). Not surprisingly, then, numerous 
studies have documented how even young children preferentially allocate to ingroup over 
outgroup members (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Paulus, 
2014; Renno & Shutts, 2015; Spielman, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). To assess the 
concern for group membership at the most basic level, Dunham et al. (2011) randomly 
assigned 5-year-olds to minimal groups by having them choose a colored coin from 
behind an experimenter’s back and put on that color t-shirt. Participants were asked to 
allocate 5 resources to two recipients (one ingroup, one outgroup). Using this minimal 
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manipulation of group membership, participants were marginally more likely to favor 
their ingroup member than an outgroup member. These results suggest that, when given 
an odd number of resources to allocate, children as young a 5-years-old consider factors 
such as group membership, even when the concern for group membership is as minimal 
as being assigned to a t-shirt color group. 
 Olson and Spelke (2008) expanded on these findings by investigating the highly 
sailent, and more ecologically relevant, concerns for group membership by assessing 
children’s allocations to family, friends, and strangers. They found that, when there were 
not enough resources for all of the recipients, children favored family over strangers and 
friends over strangers in their allocations. No differences, however, were found between 
children’s allocations to family and friends. Importantly, though, children opted for an 
equal allocation when there were enough resources for all recipients. These results 
suggest that, while group membership, family and friend groups in particular, is a major 
concern for children when deciding whom to allocate resources to, this concern is 
coordinated with other concerns, such as the distributive justice principle of equality. 
Findings by Cooley and Killen (2015) further support this claim (see below). 
 Stereotypes and prejudice. While there are, at times, legitimate reasons to give 
partial or differential treatment to certain recipients, such as concerns for the self, 
reciprocity, collaboration, and - at times - group membership, there are other cases where 
such differential treatment is contradictory to the notion of fairness. Specifically, when 
partial treatment is given on the basis of racial, gender, religious, or other group 
memberships. Race and gender are known to influence adults’ resource allocations 
(Schwartz, Struch, & Bilsky, 1990; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999; Stepanikova, Triplett, & 
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Simpson, 2011), and research in developmental science is beginning to trace the origins 
of these effects. For example, in Dunham et al. (2011), while the minimal group 
assignment did influence children’s allocation decisions, they also documented a strong 
effect for children’s use of gender group membership in their allocations; by 
manipulating the gender of the recipients in the same design, they found that a majority 
of children allocated more resources to their gender ingroup. 
 Renno & Shutts (2015) expanded on the findings of Dunham et al. (2011) to 
assess both race and gender based allocations, and to determine if these results may be 
attributable to the fact that participants were forced into an unequal allocation (giving 5 
resources to 2 recipients). They found that children as young as 3-years-old preferentially 
allocated resources to individuals of their same race and gender, even when an equal 
allocation was possible. Thus, instances of prejudice and bias are found across both 
gender and racial lines. 
The investigation of racial based prejudice in resource allocation has yielded 
several key insights into children’s developing resource allocation behavior. Replicating 
procedures used by Sigelman and Waitzman (1991) to investigate children’s emerging 
concern for equality, equity, and merit, McGillicuddy-De Lisi, Daly, and Neal (2006) 
manipulated the race of the recipients to determine how racial-group membership impacts 
7- and 9-year-old children’s developing conceptions of fairness. They fond that, when 
allocating on the basis of merit, children gave more resources to a hardworking Black 
child, than to a hard working White child. When allocating on the basis of equity, 
however, children gave more resources to a disadvantaged White child than to a 
disadvantaged Black child. McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al. (2006) argued that these results 
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are consistent with work on aversive racism, citing that children respond more strongly to 
scenarios that are counter to their expectations (i.e. a hardworking Black child, a 
disadvantaged White child). 
 Following-up on these findings, Olson, Dweck, Spelke, and Banaji (2011) 
investigated children’s responses to patterns of racially based inequalities. Children were 
presented with series of images depicting social group (e.g., Black individuals, White 
individuals) inequalities, and were asked to allocate resources to new members of these 
groups. This study found that 3.5- to 7.5-year-olds perpetuated the inequality regardless 
of the race of the disadvantaged group, whereas 7.5- to 11.5-year-olds perpetuated the 
inequality when White or Asian groups were disadvantaged, but rectified the inequality 
when Black groups were disadvantaged. These results diverge from the McGillicuddy-De 
Lisi et al. (2006) findings in that, in this context, disadvantaged Black recipients received 
more resources than disadvantaged White or Asian recipients. An overall convergence, 
however, is the use of racial group membership in children’s allocations of resources. 
 In a final series of studies, Elenbaas and colleagues (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016; 
Elenbaas, Rizzo, Cooley, & Killen, 2016) expanded on McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al. 
(2006) and Olson et al. (2011) by examining children’s developing responses to racially 
based inequalities on a societal level. These studies assessed 5- to 6- and 10- to 11-year-
old children’s coordination of equality, equity, as well as the racial group membership of 
the recipients across allocation and evaluation measures. For each of the following 
studies, participants witnessed images of groups of children who attended either poor or 
rich schools (Elenbaas et al., 2016) or hospitals (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016). These studies 
revealed that, with age, children judged inequalities in the distribution of medical 
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supplies more negatively, and were more likely to rectify such inequalities when African-
American groups were disadvantaged. When European-American groups were 
disadvantaged, however, children opted for equal allocations.  
In the context of inequalities in school supplies Elenbaas et al., (2016), younger 
European-American children were more likely to evaluate inequalities disadvantaging 
African-American schools as “ok” than inequalities disadvantaging European-American 
schools. Further, both African- and European-American 10- to 11-year-olds were more 
likely to say that an inequality disadvantaging African-American schools was “ok” than 
inequalities disadvantaging European-American schools. Finally, across both hospital and 
school contexts, older children were more likely to explicitly reason about the race of the 
recipient in their allocations and evaluations. 
Group norms. Children’s understanding of group norms has also been found to 
influence how children allocate resources. To examine the role of group allocation norms 
in children’s and adolescents’ social decision making, Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, 
and Hitti (2013) told 9- and 13-year-olds vignettes about gender based groups who either 
have an equal allocation norm (“we share equally”) or an unequal allocation norm (“we 
take more for ourselves”). Participants were then told about a member of the ingroup that 
wants to deviate from the norm (e.g., an individual in the ingroup with an equal allocation 
norm who wants to allocate unequally) and a member of the outgroup who matches the 
ingroup norm (e.g., an individual in the outgroup with an unequal allocation norm who 
wants to allocate equally), and were asked to choose who they would want to include into 
the group. The younger children overwhelmingly supported including the outgroup 
member who supported the equal allocation over the ingroup member who supported the 
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unequal allocation. Older children, however, were less likely to support including the 
outgroup member, suggesting that the concern for group norms increases with age. 
Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, and Killen (2014) expanded on these findings, 
demonstrating that older children were also less likely to support an equal ingroup 
deviant’s decision to allocate resources unequally. 
 Cooley and Killen (2015) further extended the methodologies used by Killen et 
al., (2013) and Mulvey et al. (2014), by adapting it for use in younger children. Children 
ages 3- to 6-years-old were told about peer group members who deviated from either 
equal or unequal group norms. In this study, rather than gender groups, naturalistic 
classroom groups were used (classroom color). While most children gave negative 
evaluations of the deviant who wanted to allocate resources unequally, participants who 
did have positive evaluations of the deviant reasoned about the concerns for group 
functioning and the benefits to the group, suggesting a concern for the group norm. 
Further, with age, children were able to recognize that their evaluation of the deviant may 
differ from the groups’ evaluation; while older (4.5- to 6-years) and younger (3- to 4.5-
years) children both evaluated unequal allocators negatively, older children, but not 
younger children, recognized that the group may view them fairly because it would mean 
more resources for the group.  
  In these studies, however, the group norm was at the level of each specific group, 
rather than a broader, intergroup level norm – often called “generic” level norms. That is, 
in these contexts each group maintained its own allocation norm as part of its identity, 
and the overall generic norm was equality. How might the results differ in a context 
where the explicit generic norm was competitive or meritocratic? Recent work by 
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McGuire, Rutland, & Nesdale, (2015) looked to address this claim by investigating how 
children resolve conflicts between the norms for ingroup-favoritism and equality, when 
the generic level norm was either cooperative or competitive. Results suggest that generic 
level norms regarding resource allocations have a particularly strong influence on 
children’s social judgments. 
 Supporting the findings of McGuire, Rutland, & Nesdale (2015), DeJesus, 
Rhodes, and Kinzler, (2014) assessed 4- to 9-year-old children’s expectations and 
evaluations of different allocations in the context of intergroup competition over scarce 
resources. With age, children in this study reported that, although equal allocations to the 
ingroup and the outgroup more positively than allocations that benefited the group, such 
allocations were also less likely. As one participant commented, “people don’t do that for 
real”. While the results of this study appear to suggest that children are not concerned 
with notions of intergroup equality, it is important to note that these results are in the 
context of an explicit intergroup competition over scarce resources. As discussed above, 
Olson and Spelke (2008) demonstrated that children allocate resources equally between 
even friends/family and strangers in a non-competitive context when resources are 
plentiful. Together, these studies demonstrate the critical influence of group norms on 
children’s resource allocations; competitive group norms increase the likelihood and 
evaluation of unequal, beneficial allocations relative to cooperative or neutral group 
norms.  
Personal/Psychological Concerns 
 Research has begun to suggest that to whom the resources are being allocated 
influences individuals’ allocations and conceptions of fairness. The roots of this 
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incorporation appear in research with infants, which suggests that infants preferentially 
allocate treats to individuals with whom they hold more positive social-evaluations of but 
extend far beyond this in childhood (Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011; Hamlin, 
2013; Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Moore, 2009). Importantly, children allocation decisions 
in 1st person and 3rd person allocation contexts yield drastically different results, 
providing strong evidence that children pay attention to who the recipients are, especially 
when they themselves might be involved in the allocation. Further, children consider both 
collaboration and reciprocity when deciding how to allocate resources. Finally, children 
consider factors such as group membership and stereotypes when allocating resources, 
often favoring members of their ingroups, or along stereotypic lines, providing a 
challenge to notions of fairness. 
 The role of the self as a recipient. Differences in children’s 1st and 3rd party 
allocations may provide the strongest evidence to date that children incorporate whom is 
receiving the resources into their developing resource allocation decisions. As discussed 
in the equality section above, children demonstrate a robust preference for equal 
allocations of resources in 3rd party allocation contexts. It is also the case, however, that 
young children preferentially keep more resources for themselves than they share with a 
peer in windfall, Dictator Game-type scenarios (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; 
Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010; Kogut, 2012). While these 
findings are often interpreted as indicating a prioritization of self-interest over fairness, 
this interpretation may not generalize to children’s real life allocation behaviors and 
conceptions of fairness.  
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In the classic Dictator Game, for example, an experimenter leads a child to a table 
and gives them a set of resources. The participant is then told that they can give however 
many resources to a peer as they choose, with different versions varying whether the peer 
is aware of the allocation, can later reciprocate with the participant, or can reject the 
allocation (Ultimatum Game). Given that children are attuned to ownership cues by early 
childhood (Friedman et al., 2013; Kim & Kalish, 2009; Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 
2011), from the child’s perspective, it appears as though the experimenter is transferring 
the ownership of the resources from the experimenter to the child, and is then offering the 
possibility of a further transfer of ownership to the confederate or peer. While the 
concern for equality in resource allocation is present in the allocation paradigm, it is 
unclear why it is the only factor, and further, why children who opt to share some, but not 
an equal portion, of the resources are prioritizing self-interest over fairness. The resources 
are, after all, given to the participant by the experimenter; had the experimenter wanted 
the participant to allocate them equally, why wouldn’t they have done this themselves? 
What claim does the other recipient have to the resources? Thus, we argue that children’s 
allocation of more resources to the self in windfall, Dictator Game paradigms reflects a 
coordination of concerns for the ownership of their own resources, as well as concerns 
for the claims (e.g., reciprocity, relationships, etc.; see below) of the other recipient, 
rather than a strict prioritization of self-interest over fairness. 
To this point, Fehr et al. (2008) assessed the developing coordination between 
children’s concern for the self and their concern for others in an allocation paradigm 
using a modified Dictator Game. In this paradigm, children chose between two potential 
allocations of sweets between themselves and a partner. In the sharing trials, children 
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could choose between an allocation of 1 resource to both them and their partner, and an 
allocation of 2 resources to themselves and 0 resources to their partner – assessing a 
context in which children can give a resource to another at a cost to themselves. In the 
prosocial trials, children chose between an allocation of 1 resource to themselves and 1 to 
their partner, and 1 resource for themself and 0 resources to their partner – assessing a 
context in which children can give a resource to another at no cost to themselves. The 
results of this study revealed that the majority (91%) of 3- to 4-year-old children opted 
for the selfish allocation in the sharing trials and did not differ from chance in the 
prosocial trials – meaning that even when there was no cost to the participant, children 
still chose the allocation that disadvantaged the other roughly half of the time. With age, 
however, the tendency to not share decreased; 78% of 5- to 6-year-olds, and 55% of 7- to 
8-year-olds chose the selfish option in the sharing condition. The results of this 1st party 
Dictator-type game provide strong evidence that children are concerned with who the 
recipients are, especially when they are a potential recipient, and are also aware of the 
other recipient when deciding how resources should be allocated. 
 Children’s concern for the self as a recipient is not just present in Dictator-type 
games. Kanngiesser and Warneken (2012) investigated how children incorporate the 
concern for the self in a merit based allocation paradigm in which children completed a 
“fishing” task in parallel with a puppet (controlled by an experimenter). In this study, an 
experimenter manipulated the number of fish caught by the puppet such that it was either 
more or less than the number of fish caught by the child. Consistent with research 
documenting an early emerging concern for merit, children allocated more resources to 
themselves than to the puppet when they had caught more fish. When the puppet was 
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more meritorious, however, children then allocated the rewards more equally. That is, 
even in a context in which resources were earned (as opposed to just given windfall), 
children incorporated the concern for the self as a recipient into their conceptions of 
fairness. 
 A final piece of evidence for children’s concern for the self as a recipient comes 
from Blake's and McAuliffe's (2011) investigation of children’s responses to 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. Participants, 3- to 8-years-old, were 
matched with an unfamiliar, similar age, peer and were presented with several potential 
allocations. In the advantageous allocations, participant would receive 4 candies and their 
partner would receive 1. In the disadvantageous allocations, participants would receive 1 
candy and their partner would receive 5. Critically, participants could either accept or 
reject the allocations; if they accepted, each recipient would receive their designated 
resources, if they rejected, both recipients would get nothing. The results revealed that, 
while children rejected disadvantageous allocations a majority of the time, it was not 
until 7- to 8-years-old that children reliably rejected advantageous allocations. That is, 
when younger children stood to gain from an inequality, they accepted it, but when they 
were disadvantaged by an inequality, they rejected it, opting instead for neither party to 
receive resources. Differences by participants’ relative position in the allocation thus 
supports the idea that children consider whom the recipients are when deciding whether 
or not to accept an allocation. Taken together, children demonstrate a concern for who the 
recipients are when allocating resources, and the ability to coordinate concerns for the 
self with concerns for equity and merit, for examples, develops throughout childhood. 
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 Mental state knowledge. A final consideration that influences children’s 
developing conceptions of fairness regarding resource allocation is their recognition of 
the mental states of the recipients. For example, an emerging body of research is 
beginning to document children’s understanding of the intentions behind a recipients 
claim (e.g., whether they genuinely need the resources they claim they do, or whether 
they are simply lying to get more resources) (Li, Rizzo, Burkholder, & Killen, 2017; 
Rizzo, Li, Burkholder, & Killen, 2017; Schmidt et al., 2016). More generally, children’s 
ability to accurately identify the mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) of others, in 
part by recognizing how they differ from their own, has been linked to children’s moral 
development in many ways. 
 Children’s developing theory of mind (ToM) capacities have their roots early in 
infancy, and continue to develop throughout childhood (Sodian et al., 2016; Wellman & 
Liu, 2004; Woodward, 2009). Traditional approaches to studying children’s ToM 
capacities have documented an age-related progression in children’s ability to recognize 
others’ mental states, progressing from understanding others’ desires, to their beliefs, 
and, in late childhood, their emotions (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Recent research has 
further documented the inter-relationship between young children’s ToM capacities and 
their moral judgments (Fu, Xiao, Killen, & Lee, 2014; Smetana et al., 2012). Using a 
longitudinal design, Smetana and colleagues (2012) documented the bidirectional 
relationship between children’s ToM capacities and their responses to moral scenarios. 
That is, children’s ToM responses predicted their moral judgments at a later date and 
children’s moral judgments predicted their ToM development. 
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 Supporting these findings, Killen and colleagues (2011) documented how 
children’s ability to accurately identify the mental states of an accidental transgressor 
related to their evaluations of the accidental transgression. In this study, children were 
told a short vignette in which a protagonist accidentally throws away another character’s 
cupcake, which was hidden in a paper bag. Children were then assessed on an embedded, 
morally relevant false-contents ToM (MoToM) assessment and a standard, non-
embedded, false-contents ToM assessment. Children who passed the MoToM assessment 
(indicating that they were able to accurately indicate that the protagonist did not know 
that the cupcake was inside the bag) were better able to recognize the accidental nature of 
the transgression than were children who failed the MoToM assessment. Interestingly, 
Killen and colleagues (2011) also found that, although children passed the standard ToM 
assessment at similar ages to previous research, it was not until later in development that 
they were able to pass the MoToM assessment (also see Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006). 
Thus, the results of this study suggests a bidirectional relationship between children’s 
ToM and moral judgments – children’s ToM capacities influence their moral judgments 
in a given scenario, and children’s ToM capacities appear to be influenced by moral 
concerns. 
 Further, a small but growing body of research has begun to examine the 
relationship between children’s ToM capacities and their developing conceptions of 
fairness. Mulvey, Buchheister, and McGrath (2016) presented children with a series of 
intergroup (school group) inequalities in which children themselves, children’s ingroup 
members, and children’s outgroup members received either more or fewer resources than 
the other recipients. In this study, children’s evaluations of the inequalities were related 
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to their ability to pass a false-contents ToM assessment. Children with more advanced 
ToM capacities reported the inequality to be more wrong, particularly when it was an 
outgroup member who was disadvantaged by the inequality, than did children with less 
advanced ToM capacities. These results suggest that children’s ToM capacities are 
related to their ability to recognize the harm caused by the inequality. 
 In another study, Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen (2015) examined how children’s ToM 
capacities were related to their support of a peer who wanted to challenge gender 
stereotypic expectations regarding what toys to play with. In this study, children who 
passed a false-contents ToM assessment were more likely expect others’ to challenge, 
and were more likely to support those who challenge, gender stereotypes than were those 
who failed the assessment. Thus, children’s ToM capacities appear to be linked to their 
ability to recognize that individuals’ mental states are specific to them, and do not 
necessarily always conform to societal expectations based on group membership.  
 Finally, only one study to our knowledge has examined how children’s ToM 
capacities relate to their resource allocation decisions in intergroup contexts. Rizzo and 
Killen (2017) presented 3- to 8-year-old children with highly gender stereotyped 
allocation contexts (sewing dolls, building monster trucks) in which one character 
worked hard and did a great job, while the other character was explicitly lazy and did not 
work hard. The gender of the meritorious child was experimentally manipulated across 
two conditions. In the stereotype-consistent trials, a female character did better at sewing 
dolls than a male character, or a male character did better at building trucks. In the 
stereotype-inconsistent trials, however, the opposite was true. After hearing the vignettes, 
children were then assessed on a belief-emotion ToM assessment. The results indicated 
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that children’s allocations differed in the stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent contexts and as a function of their ToM capacities. Children who passed the 
belief-emotion ToM assessment were more likely to allocate based on merit, rather than 
on gender stereotypes, than were children who failed the ToM assessment. 
 Thus, these studies suggest that ToM competence is related to children’s 
conceptions of fairness in two important ways. First, children’s ToM competence is 
related to their ability to recognize the harmful consequences of an unfair allocation. 
Second, children’s ToM competence is related to their ability to recognize that 
individuals do not always conform to stereotypic expectations based on group 
membership. By recognizing that individuals hold their own mental states, and do not 
always conform to stereotypic expectations, children with more advanced ToM capacities 
are thus better able to recognize heterogeneity within groups, which is critical to 
resolving intergroup conflicts fairly. 
Current Directions and Conclusions 
 The preceding section reviewed and discussed the literature on children’s 
developing resource allocations and conceptions of fairness. Principles of distributive 
justice (equality, equity, merit) reflect impartial and context-independent concerns for the 
relative treatment of multiple individuals (Rawls, 1971), and context-specific factors 
(resources, recipients, group norms), by contrast, reflect the important contextual 
concerns central to ensuring fairness (Sen, 2009). Though many of the studies 
investigating children’s understanding of these concepts are framed within the literature 
on developmental science, several critical gaps remain in our understanding of children’s 
developing conceptions of fairness regarding resource allocation. 
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 The emergence and development of concerns for resource allocation. The 
emergence and development of specific concerns for resource allocation has remained a 
central focus of research on children’s resource allocation behavior for several decades. 
Despite this persistent focus, much is still unknown regarding when and how many 
concerns for fairness emerge and develop. While the distributive justice principles 
(equality, equity, merit) have received extensive examination in this light, due to the 
more narrowed age-ranges used to assess children’s concern for context-specific factors, 
less is known about how these factors emerge and develop throughout childhood. 
 The developmental trajectory for children’s concern for the distributive justice 
principles of equality, equity, and merit is beginning to become fairly well understood. 
Evidence for the roots of these concerns are demonstrated in infants’ expectations and 
preferences for allocations (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; 
Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013), inform judgments of allocations in early 
childhood (Blake et al., 2015; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016; Rizzo et al., 2016; Rizzo & 
Killen, 2016), guide allocations by middle childhood (Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; 
Li, Spitzer, & Olson, 2014; Rizzo et al., 2016; Rizzo & Killen, 2016), and are flexibly 
coordinated with multiple concerns by middle- to late-childhood (Damon, 1977; Elenbaas 
et al., 2016; Rizzo et al., 2016; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). What remains unknown, 
however, is if this general pattern of development is similar for group and personal 
concerns. Research on these factors has typically examined narrow age-ranges, using a 
diverse set of methodologies, which does not allow for a clear developmental analysis. 
Thus, the present study looks to examine how group and personal factors emerge and 
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develop throughout childhood to determine if the general developmental pattern of 
expectations to judgments to allocations to coordination holds true.  
 Additionally, in regards to the development of each specific concern, it remains 
unknown what cues children are using to determine when a given concern is relevant. For 
example, in the context of merit, studies to date have used vignettes in which the effort 
and the productivity of the characters are matched, such that the hard working character 
is also the more productive character. One study by Olson, Banaji, Dweck, and Spelke 
(2006) did vary the effort and production of the characters, such that the hard working 
character was at times unsuccessful, however, this study confounded these cues with 
luck. A systematic design that isolates children’s concern for effort and production, 
without introducing additional concerns such as luck, is needed to determine what cues 
children are using to guide their application of the moral concerns discussed above. 
Coexistence and weighing of concerns for resource allocation. In addition to 
how claims emerge and develop individually, it is also critical to know how children are 
able to weigh competing concerns in flexible, context-specific ways. While research has 
focused on the consideration of certain combinations of competing concerns (e.g., 
equality, equity, and merit), revealing that children’s ability to flexibly consider these 
concerns arises around 6- to 8-years-old, children’s ability to consider other sets of 
competing concerns remains unknown. There are several key areas where understanding 
the development of children’s ability to consider multiple concerns has important societal 
implications. 
First, understanding children’s ability to simultaneously consider moral, group, 
and personal concerns is critical to understanding how children deal with the 
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complexities of the resource disputes that they face throughout their daily lives. For 
example, there are many instances where prejudice and ingroup bias have been found to 
factor into children’s resource allocations. Children allocate more resources to gender- 
and racial-ingroup members than outgroup members from as young as 3-years-old 
(Renno & Shutts, 2015). Understanding the development of these factors is central to 
reducing children’s use of them in allocation contexts. Additionally, research should be 
mindful of ways in which stereotypes and bias can indirectly influence resource 
allocations in complex contexts with multiple concerns. McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al. 
(2006) argued that racial/ethnic stereotypes about merit and need influenced children’s 
allocations in merit and equity based contexts. Rizzo and Killen (2017) also found that 
gender stereotypes about merit influenced children’s resource allocations. Thus, 
investigating how stereotypes about different groups influence children’s conceptions of 
other concerns for fairness is of principle importance. Stereotypes about certain groups 
may also influence individual’s conceptions about what is “necessary”, which could in 
turn lead to harmful allocation practices for those groups due to the denial of necessary 
resources. 
 Taken together, the results of the studies on these topics described in the present 
review provide strong support for the claim that, from early in development, children are 
able to reason about multiple concerns for fairness in resource allocations. Children’s 
early emerging concern for the distributive justice principles of equality, equity, and 
merit evidence their awareness of several impartial and generalizable fairness principles. 
Further, their incorporation of multiple context-specific factors, such as the identity of the 
recipients, the norms of the allocation context, and the resources being allocated into 
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children’s allocation decisions suggest that these early emerging conceptions of fairness 
are applied flexibly, and depend highly on the context of the allocation. 
 Thus, the current dissertation project extends past research by investigating how 
children weigh moral, group, and personal concerns when they themselves are recipients 
in an unequal allocation context. This study also provides novel information regarding 
how children think and reason about the fairness of unequal allocations, particularly how 
children consider the underlying reason behind the allocation (whether resources were 
allocated by individual abilities or by ingroup biases). Further, this study expands our 
understanding of the social-cognitive mechanisms involved in children’s developing 
conceptions of fairness by investigating the role of children’s ToM capacities in their 
evaluations and perceptions of the allocations. Overall, the results of this study will 
provide important insights into how children evaluate and perceive unequal resource 









Chapter III: Methodology 
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 This dissertation project aimed to examine how children perceive and evaluate 
various inequality contexts based on 1) their Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) and 2) 
the Type of Inequality (Individual, Group). This chapter will describe the sample, design, 
procedure, assessments, and data analytics procedures to be used to investigate these 
aims.  
Participants 
To investigate the aims of the present study, children between the ages of 3- and 
8-years-old (N = 176) were interviewed. Specifically, 13 3-year-olds (5 female), 47 4-
year-olds (29 female), 35 5-year-olds (17 female), 32 6-year-olds (14 female), 34 7-year-
olds (20 female), and 15 8-year-olds (6 female) were interviewed. Participants’ ethnicity 
was representative of the sampling population: 70% European American, 16% African 
American, 10% Latino/a, and 4% Asian American. The median annual household income 
was $91,918 (income data based on the median annual household income of the county in 
which the data was collected, see 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/annearundelcountymaryland/PST045217). 
Six additional participants (n = 2 3-year-olds, n = 3 4-year-olds, and n = 1 6-year-old) 
were interviewed but not included in the final analyses due to experimenter error (n = 1) 
or a failure to understand the key premises of the studies (determined by failing the 
memory checks; n = 5).  
 Power analyses. G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) was used to 
conduct the power analyses for the present study. As detailed in the data analytic plan 
(see below), the highest level planned analysis for the present study is a 2 (Theory of 
Mind: Pass, Fail) X 2 (Status: Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X 2 (Type of Inequality: 
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Individual, Group) ANCOVA predicting participants’ responses on one dependent 
variable, with age as a covariate. For example, assessing whether children’s evaluation of 
others’ welfare relates to their ToM competence (controlling for age), Status, and Type of 
Inequality. Follow-up ANOVAs will be conducted to interpret any significant 3-way 
interactions. In order to detect medium effects (f = .25) at an acceptable power (.80 or 
greater), with α = .05, numerator df = 3, and 8 groups, power analyses indicate that a 
sample of 176 participants would be appropriate.  
 Recruitment plan. Participants were recruited through their school. Recruitment 
efforts targeted preschools and elementary schools serving ethnically/racially and 
economically representative families in Maryland (Anne Arundel, Montgomery, Prince 
George’s counties). Research assistants contacted school principals and directors with 
information about the study and an invitation to participate. Schools that agree to 
participate then coordinated with the Research Coordinator to schedule dates for consent 
form distribution and data collection. All children attending a participating school – 
within the age range (3- to 8-years-old) – were given a parental consent form to return. 
All children who returned a completed parental consent form were given the opportunity 
to participate in the study. Children with significant developmental delays or disorders – 
as indicated by a school administrator, director, or teacher – were offered the opportunity 
to participate, but their data was not collected or included in the analyses.  
 All research assistants who collected data for this project passed the CITI training 
for ethical treatment of human subjects and a State of Maryland Police background 
check. Training in the ethical treatment of participants was also provided in the lab as 
part of the preparation before the data collection phase of the project. 
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 Consent and assent. Permission to conduct the study was obtained from all 
school principals/directors. Informed parental consent was confirmed through the return 
of parental consent forms (see Appendix A). Included on the parental consent form, 
parents had the option to opt-in to have their child’s interview video recorded for data 
coding, educational and training purposes, and to be presented at academic conferences. 
Thirty-seven percent of parents consented to having their child’s interview video 
recorded. Child assent was confirmed at the time of the interview; children were asked, 
“Would you like to play some games and answer some questions with me?” Children 
who agreed were interviewed. Children who did not wish to participate were asked up to 
two additional times at later dates. 
Design 
 The dissertation project utilized a 2 (Age: Younger, Older) X 2 (Status: 
Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X 2 (Type of Inequality: Group, Individual) between-
subjects design. All participants completed four tasks in a fixed order: (1) the Perceptions 
of Allocations Task (developed for the current project based on past research; Rizzo, et 
al., 2016, Rizzo & Killen, 2016, 2017), (2) the Intra- and Intergroup Attitudes Task 
(developed based on past research; Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rizzo & Killen, 2017; Rizzo, 
Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2017), (3) the Theory of Mind Assessment Task (Contents 
False-Belief and Belief Emotions ToM assessments; Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, 
& Cooke, 1989; Rizzo & Killen, 2017; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman & 
Liu, 2004), and (4) the Third-person Inequalities Task (Rizzo & Killen, 2016). The 
between-subject manipulations of status and Type of Inequality occurred at the onset of 
the Perceptions of Allocations Task. Following the critical manipulations, all participants 
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completed identical assessments throughout the remainder of the interview. The full 
protocol is available in Appendix C. 
 The first between-subjects factor regards children’s status within the allocation: 
Advantaged or Disadvantaged. To manipulate children’s status within the allocation, 
participants were randomly assigned to the Advantaged (received more prizes than the 
other group did) or Disadvantaged (received fewer prizes than the other group did). This 
factor was adapted from past research that has successfully assessed children’s responses 
to being experimentally advantaged or disadvantaged by an inequality (Blake & 
McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al., 2015).  
 The second between-subjects factor was the underlying reason for the allocation 
that children were presented with: Individual or Group. To begin with, all participants 
were told three key premises: (1) they will be divided into boys’ and girls’ groups, (2) 
they will complete puzzle activities, and (3) an age-matched peer will determine how 
prizes are given out. In the Individual conditions, participants were told that the 
allocation was the result of differing performance on the puzzle task, such that the peer 
would give more prizes to whichever group did better at the puzzles. In the Group 
conditions, participants were told that the allocation was the result of a gender-ingroup 
bias, such that the peer would give more prizes to their gender ingroup. This factor was 
based on past research documenting 3- to 8-year-old children’s developing concern for 
merit as an individual factor leading to unequal allocations (Rizzo et al., 2016; 
Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012) and evaluations of intergroup discrimination on the 
basis of gender (Conry-Murray, 2015; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). Notably, to 
control for any perceptions of differential ability or performance on the puzzle tasks, 
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participants in the Group conditions were told that both groups performed equally on the 
puzzle activities. 
 Thus, the present study utilized four between-subjects conditions: Individual-
Advantaged, Individual-Disadvantaged, Group-Advantaged, and Group-Disadvantaged. 
In summary, in the Individual-Advantaged condition, participants were told that the peer 
gave their group more prizes because they did a better job at the puzzle activities. In the 
Individual-Disadvantaged condition, participants were told that the peer gave the other 
group more prizes because they did a better job at the puzzle activities. In the Group-
Advantaged condition, participants were told that the peer gave their group more prizes 
because they are in their gender ingroup. And in the Group-Disadvantaged condition, 
participants were told that the peer gave the other group more prizes because they are in 
their gender ingroup. 
 Following the presentation of the between-subjects manipulations all participants 
completed 4 identical tasks. In the Perceptions of Allocations Task, participants were 
assessed on their evaluations of the allocation, expectations of own and others’ welfare, 
and their evaluations of different prize allocations. In the Intra- and Intergroup Attitudes 
Task, participants reported on their favorability and perception of abilities for ingroup 
and outgroup members, as well as a forced-choice inclusion question about whom they 
would like to work with in the future. In the Theory of Mind Assessment Task, 
participants completed standard Contents False-Belief and Belief-Emotion ToM 
assessments (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989; Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Finally, in the Third-person Inequalities Task, 
participants heard a vignette about an unrelated, third party inequality between two 
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characters, and allocated, and evaluated allocations of, resources to those two characters 
(Rizzo & Killen, 2016). 
Procedure 
 Trained research assistants – blind to the hypotheses of the study – interviewed 
participants individually in a quiet space at their school. Participants were seated at a 
table and informed that they would hear some stories and play some games on a laptop 
computer. The research assistant then informed the participant that they would be asked 
several questions about what they think about the games and the characters in the games, 
that there are no “right” or “wrong” answers, that all responses are anonymous, and that 
they can stop at any time. The protocol was administered using Microsoft Office 
PowerPoint 2013 (see Appendix C for the full protocol). Prior to beginning the 
experiment, participants were trained on how to use the 6-point Likert-type scale used 
throughout the protocol. Participants received a brief debriefing at the end of the protocol 
specific to their condition (see below for details). Following the interview, participants 
were escorted back to their classrooms. Interviews lasted between 18-26 minutes to 
complete. Participants did not receive any form of direct compensation for their 
participation; in-game prizes (see below) were awarded to participants, but these in-game 
prizes did not translate to any form of compensation or reward outside the confines of the 
experimental paradigm. 
Measures 
 Participants completed a series of assessments within each task. The assessments 
in the Perceptions of Allocations Task were developed based on recent research 
examining children’s developing conceptions of fairness in resource allocation contexts 
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(e.g., Elenbaas et al., 2016; Mulvey, Buchheister, & McGrath, 2016; Olson & Spelke, 
2008; Rizzo et al., 2016; Rizzo & Killen, 2016; Schmidt et al., 2016; see Killen, 
Elenbaas, Rizzo, & Rutland, 2016 for a review). The assessments in the Intra- and 
Intergroup Attitudes Task were based on research on children’s intergroup attitudes and 
inclusion decisions (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey et al., 2014). The 
assessments in the Theory of Mind Task were taken directly from past research on 
children’s ToM development (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004). And the assessments in the 
Third-person Inequalities Task were taken directly from past research on 3- to 8-year-
olds conceptions of inequalities (Rizzo & Killen, 2016). The following sections provide 
the details for each task. 
 Perceptions of Allocations Task. Participants were told that they have been 
chosen to join an online puzzle club, where they can complete puzzles with other children 
to earn prizes for their groups. Participants were then introduced to their ingroup member 
(gender ingroup) and two outgroup members (gender outgroup). Gender was selected as 
the group category for the present study based on past research indicating that gender is a 
highly salient social category for children at these ages (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Horn & 
Sinno, 2014; Mulvey et al., 2014; Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 2015; Ruble, Martin, & 
Berenbaum, 2006). 
 Research assistants then told participants that everyone would be completing the 
same “Find the Differences” puzzles (see Figure 1). Participants were then given training 
on how to complete the puzzles, and subsequently completed their first puzzle. Given 
older children’s greater degree of familiarity with the “Find the Difference” puzzles, 
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younger children (and older children who indicated that they were not familiar with the 
puzzles) were given an elaborated introduction to the puzzles in which the experimenter 
walked through several practice instances with the participant until they demonstrated 
that they understood the premise of the puzzles. To control for actual performance on the 
puzzles, research assistants waited for participants to find 3 (of the possible 10) 
differences in the puzzle and then ended the activity saying, “Great job! You found 3 
differences!” After completing their first puzzle, participants were then shown how well 
everyone did at the puzzles. In the Individual-Advantaged condition, participants were 
told that their group won because they found more differences, whereas in the Individual-
Disadvantaged condition, participants were told that the other group won because they 
found more differences. To ensure that the Type of Inequality manipulation was salient, 
participants in both of the Group conditions (Group-Advantaged, Group-Disadvantaged) 
were told that both groups won because they both found the same number of differences. 
This ensured that children in the Group conditions did not falsely attribute the inequality 
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Figure 1. One of the “Find the Differences” puzzles that participants completed. Participants indicated 
differences by pointing or verbally stating the 3 (of the 10) differences that exist between the two pictures. 
 After hearing how each group performed on the puzzles, participants were 
introduced to the peer, Alex, who was in charge of giving out the prizes. In the Individual 
conditions, participants were told, “Alex says that she/he doesn’t think it should matter 
whether you’re in the girls’ or boys’ group. She/he says that she/he is going to give more 
prizes to the winners”. In the Group conditions, participants were told, “Alex says that 
she/he doesn’t think the prizes should be given out based on how everyone does on the 
puzzles. She/he says that she/he is a girl/boy, so she’ll/he’ll probably just give more to 
the girls/boys. Participants were then shown an animation (via PowerPoint) of Alex 
allocating the prizes accordingly. This procedure (puzzle completion, performance reveal, 
Alex’s stated allocation plan, and actual allocation) was then repeated once more (a total 
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of two times). This replication ensured that participants understood both of the salient 
manipulations, and that Alex’s allocations were systematic, rather than a one-time 
occurrence.  
Participants were then assessed on two memory questions to confirm their 
understanding of the premises and manipulations: (1) “Can you tell me who did a better 
job on the puzzles? Did your group win, the girls’/boys’ group win, or did both groups 
win and find the same number of differences?” and (2) “Can you tell me who has more 
prizes? Does your group have more, the girls’/boys’ group has more, or do both groups 
have the same number?” Participants who failed the memory check were retold the 
vignette from the end of the second replication (where the relevant information is 
revealed) and were reassessed on the memory checks up to two additional times. 
Participants who failed the memory checks all three times were excluded from data 
analyses.  
Dependent measures. All participants, regardless of condition, then completed a 
set of assessments in a fixed order (see Table 3). Children were assessed on their (1) 
Judgment of the Allocation (“How OK or not OK do you think it is that some kids got 
more prizes than others?”), (2) Reasoning for Judgment of Allocation (“Why do you 
think it is OK/not OK?”), (3) Evaluation of Emotional Reaction to the Allocation (“How 
good or bad do you feel about getting X prizes?”), (4) Perception of Control (“Was there 
anything that the girls/boys in the [disadvantaged group] could have done to get more 
prizes?”), (5) Reasoning for Perception of Control (if yes, “What could you/they have 
done?”; if no, “Why not?”), (6) Perceptions of Others’ Emotional Reaction to the 
Allocation (“How good or bad does [member of outgroup] feel about getting Y prizes?”), 
  77 
	 	
(7) Perceptions of the Outgroup’s Judgment (“How OK or not OK does [outgroup 
member] think it is that some kids got more prizes than others?”), and (8) Reasoning for 
Perceptions of the Outgroup’s Judgment (“Why does she/he think it is OK/not OK?”).  
Participants were then told about a peer who wants to collect up all of the prizes 
and distribute them equally, and were asked about their (9) Judgment of an Equal 
Redistribution (“How OK or not OK do you think it would be to collect up all of the 
prizes and give everyone the same number?”), (10) Reasoning for their Judgment of an 
Equal Redistribution (“Why do you think it is OK/not OK?”), and (11) Expectations 
Regarding the Identity of the Redistributor (“Do you think whoever suggested this is in 
the girls’ group, the boys’ group, or are you not sure?”).  
Finally, participants were told that the redistribution did not take place, but that 
there were 8 new prizes to allocate. Participants were assessed on their (12) Judgment of 
Perpetuating Allocation (“You could give more to the [advantaged group] because they 
got more prizes before. How OK or not OK would that be?”), (13) Judgment of 
Rectifying Allocation (“Or you could give more to the [disadvantaged group] because 
they got fewer prizes before. How OK or not OK would that be?”), (14) Judgment of 
Equal Allocation (“Or you could give everyone the same number because it’s equal. How 
OK or not OK would that be?”), (15) Own Allocation (“Can you show me how you think 
the prizes should be given out?”), and (16) Reasoning for Own Allocation (“Why do you 
want to give them out this way?”). 
 
 
Table 3. List of dependent measures included in the Perceptions of Inequalities Task. 
Task Name Scale 
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 1) Judgment of the Allocation Likert-type 1-6 
 2) Reasoning for Judgment of the Allocation Open ended 
 3) Evaluation of Emotional Reaction to the Allocation Likert-type 1-6 
 4) Perceptions of Control Categorical 
 5) Reasoning for Perceptions of Control Open ended 
 6) Perceptions of Others’ Emotional Reaction to the Allocation Likert-type 1-6 
 7) Perceptions of Outgroup Judgment Likert-type 1-6 
 8) Reasoning for Perceptions of Outgroup Judgment Open ended 
 9) Judgment of Equal Redistribution Likert-type 1-6 
 10) Reasoning for Judgment of Equal Redistribution Open ended 
 11) Expectations Regarding the Identity of the Redistributor Categorical 
 12) Judgment of Perpetuating Allocation Likert-type 1-6 
 13) Judgment of Rectifying Allocation Likert-type 1-6 
 14) Judgment of Equal Allocation Likert-type 1-6 
 15) Own Allocation Categorical 
 16) Reasoning for Own Allocation Open ended 
 
 Intra- and Intergroup Attitudes Task. Participants were then assessed on their 
favorability, perceptions of abilities, and inclusion decision regarding an ingroup and 
outgroup member.  
 Dependent measures. Participants were asked a series of questions assessing their 
intra- and intergroup attitudes (see Table 4). Specifically, they were asked for their (1) 
Ingroup Favorability (“How much do you want to be friends with [ingroup member]?”) 
and (2) Attributions of Ingroup Member’s Ability (“How good or bad do you think 
[ingroup member] is at doing puzzles?”). Next, participants were asked identical 
questions about an outgroup member from the puzzles: (3) Outgroup Favorability (“How 
much do you want to be friends with [outgroup member]?”) and (4) Attributions of 
Outgroup Member’s Ability (“How good or bad do you think [outgroup member] is at 
doing puzzles?”). Finally, participants were assessed on their (5) Inclusion Decision (“If 
you were picking new partners for a puzzle competition, and you could only pick on 
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partner, who would you pick: [ingroup member] or [outgroup member]?”) and (6) 
Reasoning for Inclusion Decision (“Why do you want to pick them?”). 
 
Table 4. List of dependent measures included in the Intra- and Intergroup Attitudes Task. 
Task Name Scale 
 1) Ingroup Favorability Likert-type 1-6 
 2) Attribution of Ingroup Member’s Abilities Likert-type 1-6 
 3) Outgroup Favorability Likert-type 1-6 
 4) Attribution of Outgroup Member’s Abilities Likert-type 1-6 
 5) Inclusion Decision Categorical 
 6) Reasoning for Inclusion Decision  Open ended 
 
Theory of Mind Task. Next, participants completed two standard ToM 
assessments: Contents False-Belief and Belief-Emotion (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, 
Andrews, & Cooke, 1989; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Contents False-Belief. Participants were shown an image of a Crayon box and 
were asked what they think is inside. The contents of the box was then revealed to be 
crackers, not crayons. Then, participants were introduced to a character, Maddy, who had 
never seen inside the box. Two memory checks will be given: (1) “What is inside the 
Crayon box right now?” and (2) “Has Maddy seen inside this box?” If a participant failed 
a memory check, the entire vignette was reread and they were reassessed on both 
memory questions up to two additional times. If a participant failed either memory check 
on the third rendition, they were coded as failing the assessment. Participants then 
responded to the target question: “What does Maddy think is inside the Crayon box? 
Crackers or Crayons?” To pass the assessment, participants needed to say, “Crayons”. 
Other responses (e.g., “Crackers”) were coded as failing the assessment. 
  80 
	 	
Belief-Emotion. Participants were shown an image of a Legos box and were 
introduced to a character, Jackie. Participants were asked what they thought was inside 
the Legos box (or what was supposed to be inside the Legos box). Once the participant 
said, “Legos”, the research assistant then continued the vignette by saying, “Well, Jackie 
hears you say this, and she says, ‘Oh good, because I love Legos. Legos are so much fun 
to play with. I’m glad it isn’t rocks because I really do not like rocks. Rocks are not fun 
to play with at all.’” The vignette then continued with Jackie leaving the scene to go 
outside to play, and the research assistant then revealed that the box actually contains 
rocks, not Legos. A memory check was then be given: “What toy does Jackie like to play 
with: Legos or Rocks?” If a participant missed the memory check, the entire vignette was 
reread to the participant and the memory check was reassessed up to two additional 
times. If a participant failed the memory check on the third rendition, they were coded as 
failing the assessment.  
Finally, the vignette continued with Jackie returning and participants were 
assessed on the two target questions: (1) “Let’s give Jackie this box. How does Jackie 
feel right when we give her the box, before she can open it up: Happy or sad?” and (2) 
“And how does Jackie feel after she looks inside the box: Happy or sad?” To pass the 
assessment participants must have responded “Happy” to the first target question and 
“Sad” to the second target question. Participants who missed either or both of the target 
questions were coded as failing the assessment. 
 Third-person Inequalities Task. Finally, participants heard a short vignette 
about two characters, one of which had a lot of resources while the other had none (see 
Table 5; assessments taken directly from Rizzo & Killen, 2016). To control for 
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perceptions of merit, both characters were described as working hard and finding 3 
resources. Two memory checks were given to ensure that participants understood the 
premises of the story: (1) “When they went out to find [resources], did Nathan find more, 
did Todd find more, or did they find the same number?” and (2) “Can you tell me who 
has more [resources] right now?” If a participant failed a memory check, the entire 
vignette was reread and they were reassessed on both memory questions up to two 
additional times. If a participant failed either memory check on the third rendition, the 
interview concluded and participants were escorted back to their classrooms. In these 
cases, no data was collected for children’s responses to the Third-person Inequalities 
Task. 
 Dependent measures. Following the vignette, participants were assessed on their 
(1) Judgment of Perpetuating Allocation (“You could give more to Todd because he has 
more [resources]. How OK or not OK would that be?”), (2) Judgment of Rectifying 
Allocation (“Or you could give more to Nathan because he has fewer [resources]. How 
OK or not OK would that be?”), (3) Judgment of Equal Allocation (“Or you could give 
Nathan and Todd the same amount because it’s equal. How OK or not OK would that 
be?”), (4) Own Allocation (“Can you show me how you think the [resources] should be 
given out?”), and (5) Reasoning for Own Allocation (“Why do you think they should be 
given out like that?”). 
Table 5. List of dependent measures included in the Third-person Inequalities Task. 
Assessment Name Scale 
 1) Judgment of Perpetuating Allocation Likert-type 1-6 
 2) Judgment of Rectifying Allocation Likert-type 1-6 
 3) Judgment of Equal Allocation Likert-type 1-6 
 4) Own Allocation Categorical 
 5) Reasoning for Own Allocation Open ended 
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Data Coding and Reliability 
Judgment, evaluation of welfare, favorability, and attribution of ability 
assessments were scored on a 6-point Likert-type scale from 1 = Really [not 
OK/bad/don’t want to] to 6 = Really [OK/good/want to]. The Perceptions of Control 
Over the Inequality assessment was coded as either “Yes” or “No”. The Attribution of 
Equal Redistribution Probe was coded as “Girls’ Group”, “Boys’ Group”, or “Not Sure”. 
Inclusion decisions were coded as “Ingroup member” or “Outgroup member”. 
Participants’ allocations were coded as “More to [disadvantaged]”, “More to 
[advantaged]”, or “Equal”. Reasoning assessments were content coded for analyses (see 
below for details).  
Reasoning coding. Participants’ responses to reasoning assessments were coded 
for analyses into conceptual categories based on the three domains detailed in social 
domain theory (Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 1983) and expanded upon in the 
SRD model (Killen & Rutland, 2011). Three coding schemes were developed; each 
coding scheme reflecting the specific concerns participants were hypothesized to 
reference for each given question.  
The first coding scheme was used to code participants’ references in the 
Reasoning for Judgment of the Allocation, Reasoning for Perceptions of Outgroup 
Judgment, Reasoning for Judgment of Equal Redistribution, Reasoning for Own 
Allocation, and Reasoning for Own Allocation in the Third-person Inequalities Task 
assessments. The coding categories for these assessments included: Equity/Equality (i.e., 
appeals to the principles of equity or equality, including appeals to the equitable/equal 
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treatment of others and the equitable/equal division of resources; e.g., “It’s not OK that 
some kids have more than others”, “I want to give everyone the same number”), Merit 
(i.e., appeals to the characters’ effort or performance, or to the concept of deservedness; 
e.g., “We did a better job than they did”), Others’ Mental States (i.e., appeals to others’ 
welfare, emotions, desires, or preferences; e.g., “She’ll feel sad”, “She just wants more”), 
and Own Mental States (i.e., appeals to participants’ own welfare, emotions, desires, or 
preferences; e.g., “I just want more”, “I’d feel bad”). 
The second coding scheme was used to code participants’ references in the 
Reasoning for Perceptions of Control assessment. The coding categories for this 
assessment included: Structural Biases (i.e., appeals to structural biases inherent in the 
allocation; e.g., “They tried, but still didn’t get enough”, “The boy doesn’t give to the 
girls”), Merit (i.e., appeals to the characters’ effort or performance, or to the concept of 
deservedness; e.g., “They did a better job”, “He didn’t even try”), and Protests (i.e., 
references to protesting the allocation by either appealing to a higher authority or to the 
outgroup; e.g., “Tell the teacher that he’s not being fair”; “Ask the boys to share”). 
The third coding scheme was used to code participants’ references in the 
Inclusion Decision Reasoning assessment. The coding categories for this assessment 
included: Ingroup Membership (i.e., appeals to the concern for ingroup membership or 
ingroup loyalty; e.g., “He’s on the boys team with me”, “Girls are the best”, “I want to 
pick a boy to be my partner”). Ability (i.e., appeals to the characters’ competence, effort, 
or abilities; e.g., “She’s really good at the puzzles”, “He stinks at these games!”), Benefits 
of Diversity (i.e., appeals to the benefits of diversity and inclusion, including references 
to “trying out” new partners and learning from others who are different; e.g., “ ‘cause 
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she’s on the girls’ team, and I’m on the boys’”, “It’s good to switch it up”, “Maybe he 
could help me with the puzzles”), and Personal Concerns and Personal Relationships 
(i.e., appeals to participants’ personal preferences or desires, and appeals to maintaining 
or establishing relationships not related to ingroup membership or appeals to diversity; 
e.g., “I like working with him”, “She’s my best friend”). 
For all reasoning assessments, if participants’ responses did not fit into one of the 
coding categories, their responses were coded as Other/Undifferentiated. Participants’ 
responses for each category were coded as 1 (full reference), 0.5 (partial reference), or 0 
(no reference). Two research assistants, blind to the hypotheses of the study, conducted 
the coding. On the basis of 25% of the interviews (n = 46), Cohen’s κ = .92 for inter-rater 
reliability.  
Debriefing 
At the conclusion of the experimental paradigm, participants in the 
Disadvantaged conditions were debriefed to ensure that no participants felt badly about 
the potentially upsetting allocations. For the debriefing, the character who allocated the 
resources in the Perceptions of Allocations Task returned and provided a message to 
participants. Participants in the Individual-Disadvantaged conditions were told that the 
allocating character made a mistake in the beginning, and were given 6 more prizes to 
rectify the mistake. Participants in the Group-Disadvantaged conditions were similarly 
told that the allocating character realized that they shouldn’t have given more prizes to 
others just because they’re a girl/boy, and participants received 6 more prizes to make up 
for the initial allocation. 
Data Analytic Plan 
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The following sections will detail the three data analytic models that were used to 
analyze participants’ responses on the various assessments in the present study. Initial 
analyses tested for differences by participant gender. No significant differences by 
participant gender were found, and thus gender was excluded from all future analyses. 
This approach is consistent with past research, which has not documented significant 
effects for participant gender in these types of assessments. 
Judgments, evaluations, and attributions. To test hypotheses regarding 
participants’ judgments, evaluations and attributions (all coded on a continuous 6-point 
Likert-Type scale) Univariate and Repeated Measures ANOVAs and ANCOVAs were 
conducted. Specifically, analyses testing for Age by Status by Type of Inequality effects 
and interactions were conducted using 2 (Age: Younger, Older) X 2 (Status: Advantaged, 
Disadvantaged) X 2 (Type of Inequality: Individual, Group) ANOVAs. Analyses testing 
for ToM by Status by Type of Inequality effects and interactions were conducted using 2 
(ToM: Pass, Fail) X 2 (Status: Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X 2 (Type of Inequality: 
Individual, Group) ANCOVAs, with participants’ age as a covariate. 
Reasoning. To test hypotheses regarding participants reasoning data, Repeated 
Measures ANOVAs with participant’s judgments and decisions as the predictor variables 
and the reasoning categories as the outcome variables were conducted. For analyses 
assessing how participants’ reasoning relates to their various judgments (scored on a 6-
point Likert-type scale), participants’ judgments were first dichotomized (e.g., “Okay”, 
“Not Okay”). Then, for each reasoning assessment, analyses were conducted on the three 
most frequently referenced reasoning categories. This data analytic procedure is 
consistent with other studies analyzing children’s reasoning data (see Killen & Smetana, 
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2015; Wainryb & Recchia, 2014). Specifically, the use of mixed effects ANOVAs for 
examining between- and within-subjects effects is a widely used approach due to the way 
the data are coded (1: full reference, 0.5: partial reference, 0: no reference). Other 
models, namely logistic and loglinear regressions, are not appropriate for this type of 
analysis plan, and may confound the coding scheme with seemingly “missing” data (see 
Posada & Wainryb, 2008 for a full explanation of this data analytic approach). 
Allocation and inclusion decisions. To test hypotheses regarding participants’ 
allocation and inclusion decisions in each of the four allocation contexts, generalized 
linear models with a binomial probability distribution and a logit link function were 
conducted. For each model, main effects for Age, Status, and Type of Inequality were 
tested first, followed by analyses examining interactions between the main effects. Wald 
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Chapter IV: Results 
 The results of the present study are conceptually organized into subsections 
corresponding to each of the four primary aims. The first section of results will address 
Aim 1: How children’s status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) relates to their perceptions of 
individual and group based inequalities. The next section will address Aim 2: How 
children’s intra- and intergroup attitudes are related to their status within individual and 
group based inequalities. The following section will address Aim 3: How children’s 
perceptions of third-person inequalities are related to their previous experiences with 
inequalities. The final section will address Aim 4: Examining the bidirectional 
relationship between children’s ToM capacities and their responses to inequalities. 
 
Aim 1: Investigate how children’s status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) relates to 
their perceptions of individual and group based inequalities. 
 
Judgment of the Allocation. To test hypotheses regarding children’s judgments 
of the inequality, an Age (Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X 
Type of Inequality (Individual, Group) Univariate ANOVA was conducted with 
children’s Judgment of the Inequality as the dependent variable (see Figure 2). A main 
effect for Status was found, F(1,167) = 14.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .081; children who were 
advantaged by the inequality judged it to be more fair than those who were disadvantaged 
by it. A main effect for Type of Inequality was also found, F(1,167) = 7.37, p = .007, ηp2 
= .042; children evaluated individually based inequalities to be more fair than group 
  88 
	 	
based inequalities. A main effect for Age was not found (p = .061). There were also no 
significant interactions between the variables (all ps > .20). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were partially supported; children’s judgments of the 
inequalities were related to their status and the type of inequality. Specifically, 
advantaged children judged the inequalities more positively than did disadvantaged 
children. Further, individual inequalities were judged more positively than group based 




Figure 2. Children’s judgment of the inequality by Age (Younger, Older), Status 
(Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, Individual). Scale: 1 = 
“Really Not Okay” to 6 = “Really Okay”. Bars represent the standard error of the means. 
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Reasoning for Judgment of Allocation. In order to determine how children’s 
judgment of the inequality was related to their reasoning, children were first split into two 
groups based on their judgment of the inequality (Not Okay, Okay). Overall, 97 children 
reported that the inequality was “Not Okay” and 78 children reported that the inequality 
was “Okay”. Initial descriptive analyses revealed that 36% of children referenced Equity, 
14% of children referenced Merit, 6% of children referenced Others’ Mental States, 27% 
of children referenced their Own Mental States, and 17% of responses were non-codable. 
Reasoning categories that were referenced greater than 10% of the time were included in 
further analyses (Equity, Merit, Own Mental States). 
 To test hypotheses regarding children’s reasoning for their judgments of the 
inequality, a Judgment (Not Okay, Okay) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type 
of Inequality (Group, Individual) X Reasoning (Equality, Merit, Own Mental States) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted (see Figure 3). A main 
effect for Reasoning was found, F(2,334) = 9.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .055; children were more 
likely to reference Equity (p < .001) and their Own Mental States (p = .005) than Merit. 
No difference was found between children’s references Equity and their Own Mental 
States (p = .62). 
 A an interaction between Reasoning by Judgment was also found, F(2,334) = 
21.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .11; children who judged the inequality to be “Not Okay” were 
more likely to reference Equity than were children who judged the inequality to be 
“Okay” (p < .001), whereas children who judged the inequality to be “Okay” were more 
likely to reference their Own Mental States than were children who judged the inequality 
to be “Not Okay” (p < .001). No difference was found for children’s references to Merit 
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(p = .82). Finally, this interaction was further explained by a Reasoning by Judgment by 
Status interaction, F(2,334) = 3.66, p = .027, ηp2 = .021; for children who judged the 
inequality to be “Not Okay”, children who were disadvantaged by the inequality were 
more likely to reference their Own Mental States than were children who were 
advantaged by the inequality (p = .015). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were partially confirmed; children’s judgment of the 
inequality and their status were related to their reasoning for their judgments. Children 
who judged the inequality to be “Not OK” primarily reasoned about Equity, whereas 
children who judged the inequality to be “OK” primarily reasoned about their Own 
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Figure 3. Proportion of children referencing Equity, Merit, and their Own Mental States 
when reasoning about their judgment of the inequality by Judgment (Not Okay, Okay), 
Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, Individual).  
 
 Evaluation of Emotional Reaction to the Allocation. To test hypotheses 
regarding children’s evaluation of their own welfare, an Age (Younger, Older) X Status 
(Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality (Group, Individual) Univariate 
ANOVA was conducted with children’s Evaluation of Own Welfare as the dependent 
variable (see Figure 4). A main effect for Status was found, F(1,165) = 114.79, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .41; children who were advantaged by the inequality reported feeling more 
positively than did those who were disadvantaged by it. A main effect for Type of 
Inequality was also found, F(1,165) = 10.80, p = .001, ηp2 = .061; children reported 
feeling more positively following an individually based inequality than a group based 
inequality. 
 These effects were explained by an Age by Status interaction, F(1,165) = 5.64, p 
= .019, ηp2 = .033; younger children who were advantaged by the inequality reported 
feeling more positively than did older children who were advantaged by it (p = .011), 
whereas no difference was found for children who were disadvantaged by the inequality. 
Finally, these effects were further explained by an Age by Status by Type of Inequality 
interaction, F(1,165) = 3.99, p = .047, ηp2 = .024; younger children reported feeling more 
positively when they were disadvantaged by an individually based inequality than when 
they were disadvantaged by a group based inequality (p = .013), whereas older children 
reported feeling more positively when they were advantaged by an individually based 
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inequality than when they were advantaged by a group based inequality (p = .012). 
Younger children also reported feeling more positively when they were advantaged by a 
group based inequality than did older children (p = .002). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were supported; children’s evaluations of their own welfare 
following an inequality were related to their age, status within the inequality, and the type 
of inequality. Children who were advantaged by the inequality reported feeling better 
than children who were disadvantaged by it, but children’s positive feelings regarding 
their advantage decreased with age. Further, children generally reported feeling more 
positively following individual than group inequalities. 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Children’s reported welfare following the inequality by Age (Younger, Older), 
Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, Individual). Scale: 
1 = “Really Bad” to 6 = “Really Good”. Bars represent the standard error of the means. 
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 Perceptions of Others’ Emotional Reaction to the Allocation. To test 
hypotheses regarding children’s perception of their outgroup member’s welfare, an Age 
(Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality (Group, 
Individual) Univariate ANOVA was conducted with children’s Perception of Outgroup 
Member’s Welfare as the dependent variable (see Figure 5). A main effect for Status was 
found, F(1,166) = 210.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. Children who were disadvantaged by the 
inequality expected their advantaged outgroup member to feel more positively than 
children who were advantaged by the inequality expected their disadvantaged outgroup 
member to feel. No other effects or interactions were found (all ps > .09). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were partially supported, children’s perceptions of an 
outgroup member’s welfare was related to their status. Children who were advantaged by 
the inequality reported that their disadvantaged outgroup member would feel worse than 
children who were disadvantaged by the inequality reported that their advantaged 













Figure 5. Children’s expected outgroup member’s welfare following the inequality by 
Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality 
(Group, Individual). Scale: 1 = “Really Bad” to 6 = “Really Good”. Bars represent the 
standard error of the means. 
 
 Perception of Outgroup Judgment of the Allocation. To test hypotheses 
regarding children’s perception of their outgroup member’s judgment of the inequality, 
an Age (Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality 
(Group, Individual) Univariate ANOVA was conducted with children’s Perception of 
Outgroup Member’s Judgment of the Inequality as the dependent variable (see Figure 6). 
A main effect for Status was found, F(1,166) = 19.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. Children who 
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were disadvantaged by the inequality expected their advantaged outgroup member to 
judge the inequality more positively than children who were advantaged by the inequality 
expected their disadvantaged outgroup member to judge it. No other effects or 
interactions were found (all ps > .09). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were partially supported; children who were advantaged by 
the inequality reported that their disadvantaged outgroup member would judge it more 
negatively than children who were disadvantaged by the inequality reported that their 
advantaged outgroup member would judge it. No effects were found for participants’ age 




Figure 6. Children’s expected outgroup member’s judgment of the inequality by Age 
(Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, 
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Individual). Scale: 1 = “Really Not Okay” to 6 = “Really Okay”. Bars represent the 
standard error of the means. 
 
Perceptions of Control. To test hypotheses regarding children’s perceptions of 
whether or not there was anything that the disadvantaged characters could have done to 
get more resources, X2 tests were conducted to test for effects of Age, Status, and the 
Type of Inequality (see Figure 7). Counter to our hypotheses, no effects were found for 
Age (p = .080), Status (p = .82), or Type of Inequality (p = .065). Nor were there any 
significant interactions (all ps > .12). 
Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of children indicating that there was something that the 
disadvantaged group could have done differently by Age (Younger, Older), Status 
(Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, Individual).  
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 Reasoning for Perceptions of Control. Initial descriptive analyses revealed that 
12.5% of children referenced Structural Biases, 57% of children referenced Merit, and 
11% of participants referenced Protesting the Allocation. To test for differences in 
children’s reasoning for their perceptions of control, participants were split into two 
groups: children who reported that there was nothing that the disadvantaged group could 
have done (“No Control”; coded as 0) and children who reported that there was 
something that the disadvantaged group could have done (“Control”; coded as 1).  
 To test hypotheses regarding children’s reasoning for their perceptions of control, 
an Age (Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality 
(Group, Individual) X Perception of Control (No Control, Control) X Reasoning 
(Structural Biases, Merit, Protest) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted (see Figure 8).  
 A main effect for Reasoning was found, F(2,310) = 37.23, ηp2 = .19; children 
were more likely to reference Merit than Structural Biases (p < .001) and Protest (p < 
.001). No differences were found between children’s references to Structural Biases and 
Protest (p = .12). 
 An Age X Reasoning interaction was found, F(2,310) = 3.00, p = .05, ηp2 = .019; 
with age, children were more likely to reference Structural Biases (p < .001). No age 
differences were found for children’s references to Merit (p = .23) or Protest (p = .28). 
 A Status X Reasoning interaction was found F(2,310) = 3.23, p = .041, ηp2 = .020; 
children who were themselves advantaged by the inequality were more likely to reference 
Merit (saying that the disadvantaged group should have worked harder) than were 
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children who were disadvantaged by the inequality (p = .029). No status differences were 
found for references to Structural Biases (p = .17) or Protest (p = .44). 
 A Type of Inequality X Reasoning interaction was found F(2,310) = 13.75, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .081; children were more likely to reference Merit in the individual than in the 
group condition (p = .001), whereas they were more likely to reference Structural Biases 
in the group than in the individual condition (p < .001). No difference was found for 
children’s references to Protest (p = .54) 
 A Perception of Control X Reasoning interaction was found F(2,310) = 28.43, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .16; children who reported that there was nothing that the disadvantaged group 
could have done were more likely to reference Structural Biases than were children who 
reported that there was something that the disadvantaged group could have done (p < 
.001). On the other hand, children who did report that there was something that could 
have been done were more likely to reference Merit compared to those who said there 
was nothing that could have been done (p < .001). Interestingly, there were no differences 
for children’s references to Protest (p = .13). 
 A Type of Inequality X Perception of Control X Reasoning interaction was found, 
F(2,310) = 5.26, p = .006, ηp2 = .033; in the group condition, children who reported that 
there was nothing that the disadvantaged group could have done were more likely to 
reference Structural Biases than were children who reported that there was something that 
the disadvantaged group could have done (p < .001), whereas children who did report that 
there was something that could have been done were more likely to reference Merit 
compared to those who said there was nothing that could have been done (p < .001). In 
the individual condition, however, children who reported that there was something that 
  99 
	 	
could have been done were more likely to reference Merit compared to those who said 
there was nothing that could have been done (p < .001), but no differences were found for 
references to Structural Biases (p = .36) or Protest (p =.51). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were supported; children’s age, status, the type of 
inequality, and whether or not the perceived the disadvantaged characters to have control 
over whether or not the received resources all related to children’s reasoning. Overall, 
children were primarily focused on Merit, particularly when they themselves were 
advantaged by the inequality, when they were in the individual condition, and when they 
reported that there was something that could have been done. Importantly, children’s 
references to Structural Biases also increased with age, and were primarily referenced 
when saying that there was nothing that could have been done in the group condition. 
Interestingly, participants’ references to protesting the inequality remained relatively 
















Figure 8. Proportion of children referencing Structural Biases, Merit, and Protesting 
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Control), Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of 
Inequality (Group, Individual). 
 
 Perceptions of Control Recoded. The Perceptions of Control assessment was 
designed to capture participant’s assessment of whether or not there was anything that the 
disadvantaged group could have done in the activity to receive more resources – 
determining if children were able to identify the critical difference between the individual 
and group conditions. To test this assumption, participants Perceptions of Control 
responses were recoded to better address this question. Specifically, participants who 
indicated that the disadvantaged group should have protested the allocation – while 
demonstrating an impressive degree of ingenuity – may have misunderstood the premise 
of the assessment. Thus, participants who referenced Protest were recoded as saying that 
there was nothing that the disadvantaged group could have done. Following this recode, 
analyses revealed a significant effect for Type of Inequality, Likelihood Ratio X2 (1) = 
6.99, p = .008; children were more likely to identify that there was something that could 
have been done in the individual than in the group condition.  
 An Age X Type of Inequality interaction was also found, Likelihood Ratio X2 (1) 
= 5.41, p = .02; older, but not younger, children were more likely to identify that there 
was something that could have been done in the individual than in the group condition. 
 A Status X Type of Inequality interaction was also found, Likelihood Ratio X2 (1) 
= 4.34, p = .037; advantaged, but not disadvantaged, children were more likely to identify 
that there was something that could have been done in the individual than in the group 
condition. 
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 Thus, by recoding the assessment to fit with the intention of the assessment, our 
hypotheses were supported; children’s age, status, and the type of the inequality all 
related to whether or not children expected that there was something that the 
disadvantaged group could have done. Consistent with our hypotheses, children were 
more likely to say that there was something that the disadvantaged group could have done 
to get more resources in the individual than in the group condition, and this increased 
with age and was evident for advantaged, but not disadvantaged, children. 
Judgment of Equal Redistribution. To test hypotheses regarding children’s 
judgments of redistributing the resources following an unequal allocation, an Age 
(Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality (Group, 
Individual) X Attributions of Redistribution Strategy (Disadvantaged, Unsure, 
Advantaged) Univariate ANOVA was conducted with children’s Judgment of 
Redistribution as the dependent variable (see Table 6). A main effect for Status was 
found, F(1,149) = 23.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .138; children who were disadvantaged by the 
inequality judged redistribution to be more fair than those who were advantaged by it. A 
main effect for Attribution of Redistribution Strategy was also found, F(2,149) = 8.64, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .10; children who attributed the redistribution strategy to the disadvantaged 
character judged redistribution less positively than did those who attributed it to the 
advantaged character (p = .005 ) and those who were unsure (p < .001). 
 An Age X Type of Inequality interaction was also found, F(1,149) = 5.61, p = 
.019, ηp2 = .036; older children were more positive than younger children were about 
redistribution following a group based inequality (p = .005), whereas no age differences 
  103 
	 	
were found for judgments of redistributing the resources following an individual 
inequality (p = .68). 
 An Age X Attribution of Redistribution Strategy interaction was also found, 
F(2,149) = 3.83, p = .024, ηp2 = .049; older children who attributed the redistribution 
strategy to the disadvantaged character were more positive about redistribution than were 
younger children who attributed the redistribution strategy to the disadvantaged character 
(p = .036), whereas no age-related differences were found for children who were unsure 
(p = .22) and children who attributed it to the advantaged character (p = .11). 
 Finally, a Status X Attribution of Redistribution Strategy interaction was found, 
F(2,149) = 8.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Advantaged children were less positive about 
redistributing the resources when they attributed it to the disadvantaged character 
compared to when they were unsure (p < .001) and when they attributed it to the 
advantaged character (p < .001). No differences were found for children who were 
disadvantaged (all ps > .9). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were supported; children’s judgment of redistributing 
resources following an unequal allocation were related to their age, status, the type of 
inequality, and who they attributed the redistribution strategy to. With age, children 
recognized the particular importance of redistributing resources following a group based 
inequality and were more positive about redistribution when they expected the suggestion 
to come from a disadvantaged character. Further, children who were advantaged by the 
inequality were more positive about redistributing the resources when they attributed the 
suggestion to a fellow advantaged peer – or were unsure – than when they attributed the 
suggestion to a disadvantaged character. 
  104 
	 	
 
Table 6. Means and standard deviations for children’s judgment of redistributing 
resources by Attributions of Redistribution Strategy (Advantaged, Disadvantaged, 
Unsure), Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of 
Inequality (Individual, Group). 
   Attributions of Redistribution Strategy 
   Disadvantaged Unsure Advantaged 
Age Status Type of 
Inequality 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Younger Disadvantaged Group 5.20 (1.69) 5.75 (0.71) 5.00 (1.28) 
  Individual 6.00 (0.00) 6.00 (0.00) 6.00 (0.00) 
 Advantaged Group 1.00 (0.00) 5.60 (1.06) 4.50 (2.11) 
  Individual 3.71 (1.80) 5.60 (1.27) 4.89 (1.76) 
Older Disadvantaged Group 6.00 (0.00) 5.73 (0.65) 5.80 (0.45) 
  Individual 5.71 (0.49) 6.00 (0.00) 5.50 (1.00) 
 Advantaged Group 4.33 (2.08) 5.08 (1.85) 6.00 (0.00) 
  Individual 3.63 (1.92) 4.57 (2.44) 6.00 (0.00) 
 
Reasoning for Judgment of Equal Redistribution. Initial descriptive analyses 
revealed that 61% of children referenced Equity, 7% of children referenced Merit, 10% 
of children referenced Others’ Mental States, 10% of children referenced their Own 
Mental States, and 12.5% of children’s responses were non-codable. Reasoning 
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categories that were referenced greater than 10% of the time were included in further 
analyses (Equity, Others’ Mental states, Own Mental States). 
 To test hypotheses regarding children’s reasoning for their judgments of 
redistributing the resources following an inequality, an Age (Younger, Older) X Status 
(Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality (Group, Individual) X Reasoning 
(Equity, Others’ Mental states, Own Mental States) ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the last factor was conducted (see Figure 9). A main effect for Reasoning was found, 
F(2,336) = 88.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .346; children were more likely to reference Equity than 
Others’ Mental States (p < .001) and their Own Mental States (p < .001). No difference 
was found between Others’ Mental states and their Own Mental States (p > .9). A Status 
X Reasoning interaction was also found, F(2,336) = 5.88, p = .003, ηp2 = .034; 
disadvantaged children were more likely to reference Equity than were advantaged 
children (p = .003), whereas no difference was found for children’s references to Others’ 














Figure 9. Proportion of children referencing Equity, Others’ Mental States, and their 
Own Mental States when reasoning about their judgment of redistribution by Age 
(Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, 
Individual). 
 
Expectations Regarding the Identity of the Redistributor. Initial analyses were 
conducted to determine whom children expected to be the advocate for redistributing the 
resources: the disadvantaged peer or the advantaged peer (see Figure 10). X2 tests 
revealed a main effect for Status, Likelihood Ratio X2 (2) = 6.47, p = 0.039; children who 
were disadvantaged by the inequality were more likely to expect that the disadvantaged 
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the inequality were more likely to expect that the advantaged peer suggested 
redistributing the resources.  
An Age X Status interaction was also found, Likelihood Ratio X2 (2) = 9.64, p = 
.008; for younger children, those who were disadvantaged by the inequality were more 
likely to report that the disadvantaged were more likely to expect that the disadvantaged 
peer suggested redistributing the resources, whereas children who were advantaged by 
the inequality were more likely to expect that the advantaged peer suggested 
redistributing the resources. Older children, however, did not differ in their expectations 
based on their own status.  
Finally, a Status X Type of Inequality interaction was also found, Likelihood 
Ratio X2 (2) = 7.68, p = .021; for children who were advantaged by the inequality, those 
who were advantaged by a group based inequality were less likely report that the 
disadvantaged peer suggested redistributing the resources, whereas those who were 
advantaged by an individual inequality were more likely to report that the disadvantaged 
peer suggested redistributing the resources. No differences were found for children who 
were disadvantaged by the inequality.  
 Thus, overall, our hypotheses were confirmed; children’s own status was related 
to whom they expected to advocate for redistributing the resources. Younger, but not 
older, children expected their status ingroup member to advocate for redistribution. 
Further, children who were advantaged by a group based inequality were less likely to 
attribute this to the disadvantaged peer, whereas children who were advantaged by an 
individual inequality were more likely to attribute this to the disadvantaged peer. 
 




Figure 10. Proportion of children reporting whom the expected to suggest that the 
resources be redistributed by Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, 
Disadvantaged), Type of Inequality (Group, Individual). 
 
Judgments of Perpetuating, Rectifying, and Equal Allocations. To test 
hypotheses regarding children’s judgments of the three allocation strategies 
(Perpetuating, Rectifying, Equal), an Age (Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, 
Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality (Group, Individual) X Allocation Strategy 
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last factor (see Figure 11). A main effect for Allocation Strategy was found, F(2,330) = 
42.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .21; children evaluated equal allocations more positively than 
perpetuating (p < .001) and rectifying (p = .05) allocations, and evaluated rectifying 
allocations more positively than perpetuating (p < .001). 
 An Age X Allocation Strategy interaction was also found, F(2,330) = 3.69, p = 
.026, ηp2 = .022; children judged the perpetuating allocation more negatively with age (p 
= .004), but did not differ in their judgments of the rectifying (p = .44) and equal 
allocation (p = .77). A Status X Allocation Strategy interaction was also found, F(2,330) 
= 23.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. Disadvantaged children judged the rectifying (p < .001) and 
equal (p < .001) allocations more positively than perpetuating allocations, and did not 
differ between the rectifying and equal allocations (p > .9). Advantaged children, on the 
other hand, judged the equal allocation more positively than the rectifying (p < .001) and 
perpetuating (p < .001) allocations, and did not differ between the rectifying and 
perpetuating allocations (p > .9). 
 Finally, a Status X Type of Inequality X Allocation Strategy interaction was also 
found, F(2,330) = 4.08, p = .018, ηp2 = .024. In the group condition, children who were 
disadvantaged by the inequality judged rectifying (p < .001) and equal (p < .001) 
allocations more positively than perpetuating allocations, and did not differ in their 
judgments of equal and rectifying allocations (p > .9), whereas children who were 
advantaged by the group based inequality did not differ in their judgments of the 
allocations (all ps > .69). In the Individual condition, by contrast, children who were 
disadvantaged by the inequality judged rectifying (p < .001) and equal (p < .001) 
allocations more positively than perpetuating allocations, and did not differ in their 
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judgments of equal and rectifying allocations (p > .9), whereas children who were 
advantaged by the individual inequality judged equal allocations to be more positive than 
rectifying (p < .001) and perpetuating (p < .001) allocations, and did not differ in their 
judgments of rectifying and perpetuating allocations (p > .9). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were supported; children’s judgments of perpetuating, 
rectifying, and equal allocations were related to their age, status within the inequality, and 
the type of inequality. Children were generally more positive about equal than rectifying 
and perpetuating allocations, and were generally more positive about rectifying than 
perpetuating allocations. With age, children also became less positive about perpetuating 
allocations. Further, disadvantaged children did not differ in their judgments of equal and 
rectifying allocations – judging both more positively than perpetuating allocations – 
whereas advantaged children favored equal allocations, judging them more positively 
than both rectifying and perpetuating allocations. Finally, in a group based inequality 
context, disadvantaged children favored rectifying and equal allocations over 
perpetuating allocations, while advantaged children were relatively neutral on their 
judgments of all three allocations. In the individual inequality context, however, while 
disadvantaged children remained consistent in their positive judgments of rectifying and 
equal allocations, advantaged children reported an increased judgment for equal 









Figure 11. Children’s judgment of the Perpetuating, Equal, and Rectifying allocations by 
Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality 
(Group, Individual). Scale: 1 = “Really Not Okay” to 6 = “Really Okay”. Bars represent 
the standard error of the means. 
 
Own Allocation. To test hypotheses regarding children’s own allocations of 
resources, X2 tests were conducted to determine differences in children’s chosen 
allocation strategy (see Figure 12). Results revealed a significant effect for Age, 
Likelihood Ratio X2 (2) = 15.58, p < .001; younger children were more likely than older 
children to choose the perpetuation strategy, whereas older children were more likely 
than younger children to choose the equal strategy. A main effect was also found for 
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Status, Likelihood Ratio X2 (2) = 50.22, p < .001; advantaged children were more likely 
than disadvantaged children to chose the perpetuation strategy, whereas disadvantaged 
children were more likely than advantaged children to chose the rectify strategy. No 
effect was found for Type of Inequality (p = .063). 
 An Age X Status interaction was also found, Likelihood Ratio X2 (2) = 12.09, p = 
.02; for children who were advantaged by the inequality, younger children were more 
likely than older children to choose the perpetuation strategy, whereas older children 
were more likely than younger children to choose the equal strategy. No differences were 
found, however, for children who were disadvantaged by the inequality. 
 An Age X Type of Inequality interaction was also found, Likelihood Ratio X2 (2) 
= 12.36, p = .002; for children in the individual condition, younger children were more 
likely than older children to choose the perpetuation strategy, whereas older children 
were more likely than younger children to choose the equal strategy. No differences were 
found, however, for children in the group condition. 
 Finally, a Status X Type of Inequality interaction was also found, Likelihood 
Ratio X2 (2) = 7.94, p = .019; for children who were advantaged by the inequality, 
children in the group condition were more likely to choose the rectify strategy then were 
children in the individual condition, whereas children in the individual condition were 
more likely to choose the perpetuate strategy than were children in the group condition. 
No differences were found, however, for children who were disadvantaged by the 
inequality. 
 Thus, our hypotheses were supported; children’s resource allocation decisions in 
response to an inequality were related to their age, status within the inequality, and the 
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type of inequality. With age, children were less likely to choose the perpetuating 
allocation strategy and were more likely to choose the equal allocation option. Children 
who were advantaged by the allocation were also more likely to choose to perpetuate it, 
whereas those who were disadvantaged were more likely to choose to rectify it. 
Importantly, interactions between the variables were also found. With age, advantaged 
children were more likely to favor the equal – rather than perpetuating – allocation 
strategy, and similar age-related findings were found for children in the individual 
conditions, though no age-related effects were found for disadvantaged children or those 
in the group condition. Finally, advantaged children were more likely to choose to rectify 
a group based inequality than an individual one, whereas they were more likely to choose 
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Figure 12. Proportion of children choosing the Perpetuating, Equal, and Rectifying 
allocations by Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of 
Inequality (Group, Individual). 
 
 Reasoning for Own Allocation. Initial descriptive analyses revealed that 52% of 
children referenced Equity, 7% of children referenced Merit, 10% of children referenced 
Others’ Mental states, 20% of children referenced their Own Mental States, and 11% of 
responses were non-codable. Reasoning categories that were referenced greater than 10% 
of the time were included in further analyses (Equity, Merit, Own Mental States). 
 To test hypotheses regarding children’s reasoning for their resource allocation 
decisions, an Age (Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of 
Inequality (Group, Individual) X Allocation Strategy (Rectify, Equal, Perpetuate) X 
Reasoning (Equity, Merit, Own Mental States) ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
last factor was conducted (see Figure 13). A main effect for Reasoning was found, 
F(2,304) = 9.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .061; children were more likely to reference Equity than 
Merit (p < .001) and their Own Mental States (p < .001). No difference was found 
between Merit and their Own Mental States (p > .9). 
An Age X Reasoning interaction was also found, F(2,304) = 4.58, p = .011, ηp2 = 
.029; younger children were more likely to reference Equity than Merit (p = .04), but did 
not differ in their references to Equity and their Own Mental States (p > .9) or Merit and 
their Own Mental States (p = .79). Older children, on the other hand, were more likely to 
reference Equity than Merit (p < .001) and their Own Mental States (p < .001), but did 
not differ in their references to Merit and their Own Mental States. 
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A Type of Inequality X Reasoning interaction was also found, F(2,304) = 6.39, p 
= .002, ηp2 = .04; children were more likely to reference Equity in the group than 
individual condition (p = .001), whereas children were more likely to reference Merit in 
the individual than group condition (p < .001), and were equally likely to reference their 
Own Mental States in the group and individual conditions (p = .89). 
 An Allocation Strategy X Reasoning interaction was also found, F(4,304) = 7.16, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .086; children were more likely to reference Equity if they chose to rectify 
(p = .002) or allocate resources equally (p < .001) than if they chose to perpetuate, and 
were equally likely to reference Equity if they rectified or allocated equally (p > .9). 
Children were more likely to reference Merit if they chose to perpetuate the inequality 
than if they chose to rectify (p = .046) or allocate equally (p < .001), and were more 
likely to reference Merit if they chose to rectify than if they chose to allocate equally (p = 
.002). No differences were found for children’s references to their Own Mental States (all 
ps > .48).  
Finally, a marginal Age X Type of Inequality X Reasoning interaction was found, 
F(2,304) = 2.79, p = .063, ηp2 = .018. Although the interaction was not significant, post-
hoc tests were conducted to test hypothesized effects regarding younger children’s early 
reliance on their Own Mental States and older children’s increasing concern for Merit. 
Post-hoc tests indeed revealed that, in the individual condition, although younger children 
did not differ in their references to Equity, Merit, and their Own Mental States (all ps > 
.9), older children in the individual condition did differ, being more likely to reference 
either Equity (p = .045) or Merit (p = .044) than their Own Mental States. No difference 
was found between older children’s references to Equity or Merit (p = .97). Interestingly, 
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in the group condition both younger and older children were more likely to reference 
Equity than Merit (ps < .001) and their Own Mental States (ps < .02). Neither younger or 
older children differed in their references to Merit and their Own Mental States (ps > .11) 
in the group condition. 
 Thus, our hypotheses were partially supported; children’s reasoning for their 
allocation strategies was related to their age, the type of inequality, and their own 
allocation decision. Overall children were more likely to reference Equity than Merit or 
their Own Mental States, and this pattern increased with age and was particularly evident 
when children rectified or allocated equally. Yet, children’s references to Merit were also 
pronounced at times, notably when justifying their decision to perpetuate the inequality 
and, with age, in the individual condition. Overall, children’s references to their Own 
Mental States constituted a consistent minority of children’s responses. Notably, 
however, children’s own Status did not have a significant impact on their verbal 














Figure 13. Proportion of children referencing Equity, Merit, and Own Mental States 
when reasoning about their Allocation by Allocation Strategy (Perpetuate, Equal, 
Rectify), Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of 
Inequality (Group, Individual).  
 
Aim 2: Determine how different resource allocation contexts influence children’s 
intra- and intergroup attitudes, with age. 
 
Ingroup/Outgroup Favorability. To test hypotheses regarding children’s 
favorability towards their ingroup and outgroup members, an Age (Younger, Older) X 
Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality (Group, Individual) X Group 
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(see Figure 14). A main effect for Group was found, F(1,165) = 63.84, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.28; children were more favorable towards their ingroup member than they were towards 
their outgroup member. 
 Thus, our hypotheses were partially supported; children were more favorable 
towards their ingroup than their outgroup members. No effects were found for children’s 




Figure 14. Children’s reported favorability towards ingroup and outgroup members by 
Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality 
(Group, Individual). Scale: 1 = “Really Bad” to 6 = “Really Good”. Bars represent the 
standard error of the means. 
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Attribution of Ingroup/Outgroup Members’ Abilities. To test hypotheses 
regarding children’s attributions of abilities towards their ingroup and outgroup members, 
an Age (Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality 
(Group, Individual) X Group (Ingroup, Outgroup) ANOVA was conducted with repeated 
measures on the last factor (see Figure 15). A main effect for Group was found, F(1,163) 
= 54.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .25; children attributed higher levels of ability to their ingroup 
than to their outgroup member. 
 An Age X Group interaction was also found, F(1,163) = 7.61, p = .006, ηp2 = 
.045; with age, children attributed higher levels of ability to their outgroup members (p < 
.001). No differences, however, were found for children’s attributions of abilities to their 
ingroup members (p = .68). 
 A Status X Group interaction was also found, F(1,163) = 15.04, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.084; children who were disadvantaged by the inequality attributed higher levels of 
ability to their advantaged outgroup member than children who were advantaged by the 
inequality attributed to their disadvantaged outgroup member (p < .001). Interestingly, 
however, advantaged children attributed the same level of ability to their advantaged 
ingroup member as disadvantaged children attributed to their disadvantaged ingroup 
member (p = .80). 
 A Status X Type of Inequality X Group interaction was also found, F(1,163) = 
16.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .093. Children who were advantaged by the inequality attributed 
higher levels of ability to their disadvantaged outgroup members in the group than in the 
individual condition (p = .018). Interestingly, no differences were found for advantaged 
children’s attributions of abilities towards their ingroup members (p = .095), or for 
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disadvantaged children’s attributions to ingroup (p = .16) or outgroup (p = .060) 
members.  
 Thus, our hypotheses were supported; children’s age, status, and the type of 
inequality related to their attributions of abilities to ingroup and outgroup members. 
Children were generally positive regarding their ingroup member’s abilities (even those 
who were disadvantaged by an individual inequality). Children attributed higher levels of 
ability to outgroup members with age, and when the outgroup member demonstrated their 




Figure 15. Children’s expectations of ability for ingroup and outgroup members by Age 
(Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, 
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Individual). Scale: 1 = “Really Bad” to 6 = “Really Good”. Bars represent the standard 
error of the means. 
 
Inclusion Decision. To test hypotheses regarding children’s inclusion decisions, a 
generalized linear model was conducted with children’s inclusion decision as the 
dependent variable and Age, Status, and Type of Inequality as the predictor variables (see 
Figure 16). The overall model was significant Likelihood Ratio X2 (7) = 21.88, p = .003. 
An Age X Status interaction was found, Wald X2 (1) = 5.85, p = .016, as well as a Status 
X Type of Inequality interaction, Wald X2 (1) = 5.67, p = .017. These interactions were 
further explained by an Age X Status X Type of Inequality interaction, Wald X2 (1) = 
4.26, p = .039. Children who were disadvantaged by an individual inequality were more 
likely to include their outgroup member with age (p < .001). Age related changes were 
not found, however, for children who were advantaged by the individual inequality, 
disadvantaged by a group based inequality, or advantaged by a group based inequality 













Figure 16. Proportion of children choosing to include their outgroup member. 
 
Reasoning for Inclusion Decision. In order to determine how children’s 
inclusion decisions related to their reasoning, children were first split into two groups 
based on whom they decided to include (Ingroup, Outgroup). Overall, 113 children chose 
to include their ingroup member and 59 children chose to include their outgroup member. 
Initial descriptive analyses revealed that 23% of children referenced Group Membership, 
24% of children referenced Ability, 17% of children referenced Benefits of Diversity, 
22% of children referenced Personal Concerns and Relationships, and 14% of responses 
were non-codable. Reasoning categories that were referenced greater than 10% of the 
time were included in further analyses (Group Membership, Ability, Benefits of 
Diversity, and Personal Concerns and Relationships). 
 To test hypotheses regarding children’s reasoning for their inclusion decisions, an 
Inclusion Decision (Ingroup, Outgroup) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type 
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of Inequality (Group, Individual) X Reasoning (Group Membership, Ability, Benefits of 
Diversity, and Personal Concerns and Relationships) ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the last factor was conducted (see Figure 17). An Inclusion Decision by Reasoning 
interaction was found, F(3,492) = 23.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .13; children were more likely to 
reference Group Membership when including an ingroup than an outgroup member (p < 
.001), and were more likely to reference the Benefits of Diversity when including an 
outgroup than an ingroup member (p < .001). References to Ability and Personal 
Concerns and Relationships did not differ as a factor of children’s inclusion decision (ps 
> .19). 
 A Type of Inequality by Reasoning interaction was also found, F(3,492) = 2.65, p 
= .048, ηp2 = .016; children were more likely to reference Ability in the individual than 
group condition (p = .02). No differences were found, however, for the other reasoning 
categories (all ps > .11). 
 Finally, an Inclusion Decision by Status by Reasoning interaction was found, 
F(3,492) = 3.19, p = .023, ηp2 = .019; for children who were disadvantaged, those who 
chose to include their ingroup peer were more likely to reference Group Membership (p = 
.001) and Personal Concerns and Relationships (p = .021) compared to those who chose 
to include their outgroup peer, whereas children who chose to include their outgroup peer 
were more likely to reference the Benefits of Diversity (p < .001) compared to those who 
chose to include their ingroup peer. No differences were found for disadvantaged 
children’s references to Ability. Interestingly, for children who were advantaged by the 
inequality, children who included their ingroup peer were more likely to reference both 
Group Membership (p = .006) and Ability (p = .013) than were those who included their 
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outgroup peer, whereas children who included their outgroup peer were more likely to 
reference the Benefits of Diversity (p < .001). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were supported; children’s inclusion decision, status, and 
the type of inequality were all related to how children reasoned about their inclusion 
decision. Overall, children were more likely to reference Ability in the individual than 
group condition. Interestingly, children’s status also played a major role in whom they 
decided to include; children who were disadvantaged focused on Group Membership and 
Personal Concerns and Relationships when including an ingroup member, but focused 
more on the Benefits of Diversity when including an outgroup member – these children 
did not reference Ability as a major concern when deciding whom to include. By 
contrast, children who were advantaged focused on Group Membership and Ability when 
including their ingroup member, but reasoned about the Benefits of Diversity when 
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Figure 17. Proportion of children referencing Group Membership, Ability, Benefits of 
Diversity, and Personal Concerns and Relationships by their Inclusion Decision (Ingroup, 
Outgroup), Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of 
Inequality (Group, Individual). 
 
Aim 3: Investigate how children’s previous experiences with advantaged and 
disadvantaged status in individual- and group based inequalities relate to their 
perceptions of third-person inequalities.  
 
Judgment of Perpetuating Allocation (Third-Person). To test hypotheses 
regarding children’s judgments of allocations that perpetuate a third-person inequality an 
Age (Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality 
(Group, Individual) ANOVA was conducted with children’s judgments of the 
perpetuating allocation as the dependent variable (see Figure 18). A main effect for Age 
was found, F(1,157) = 13.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .079; children’s judgments of perpetuating 
allocations became more negative with age. No other effects were found (all ps > .20). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were partially supported; children’s age was related to their 










Figure 18. Children’s judgment of the perpetuating allocation by Age (Younger, Older), 
Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, Individual). Scale: 
1 = “Really Not Okay” to 6 = “Really Okay”. Bars represent the standard error of the 
means. 
 
Judgment of Rectifying Allocation (Third-Person). To test hypotheses 
regarding children’s judgments of allocations that rectify a third-person inequality an Age 
(Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality (Group, 
Individual) ANOVA was conducted with children’s judgments of the rectifying 
allocation as the dependent variable (see Figure 19). A main effect for Age was found, 
F(1,157) = 8.69, p = .004, ηp2 = .052; children’s judgments of rectifying allocations 
became more positive with age. A main effect for Status was also found, F(1,157) = 4.31, 
p = .04, ηp2 = .027; children who were previously disadvantaged by an inequality judged 
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rectifying the third-person inequality more positively than did children who were 
previously advantaged by an inequality. An Age X Status interaction was also found, 
F(1,157) = 4.01, p = .047, ηp2 = .025; children who were previously advantaged by an 
inequality judged rectifying the third-person inequality more positively with age (p < 
.001). No differences were found for children who were previously disadvantaged (p = 
.53). 
 Thus our hypotheses were partially supported; children’s judgments of allocations 
that rectify a third-person inequality were related to their age and status in a previous 
inequality context. With age, children who were advantaged by the previous inequality 




Figure 19. Children’s judgment of the rectifying allocation by Age (Younger, Older), 
Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, Individual). Scale: 
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1 = “Really Not Okay” to 6 = “Really Okay”. Bars represent the standard error of the 
means. 
 
Judgment of Equal Allocation (Third-Person). To test hypotheses regarding 
children’s judgments of equal allocations in response to a third-person inequality an Age 
(Younger, Older) X Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality (Group, 
Individual) ANOVA was conducted with children’s judgments of the equal allocation as 
the dependent variable (see Figure 20). An Age X Status X Type of Inequality interaction 
was found, F(1,155) = 4.527, p = .035, ηp2 = .028. Older children who were advantaged 
by a group based inequality judged the equal allocation less positively than did older 
children who were advantaged by an individual inequality (p = .05). No other differences 
were found (all ps > .25). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were supported; children’s judgments of an equal allocation 
in response to a third-person inequality were related to their age, status in a previous 













Figure 20. Children’s judgment of the equal allocation by Age (Younger, Older), Status 
(Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, Individual). Scale: 1 = 
“Really Not Okay” to 6 = “Really Okay”. Bars represent the standard error of the means. 
 
Own Allocation (Third-Person). To test hypotheses regarding children’s 
resource allocations in response to a third-person inequality, X2 tests were conducted to 
determine differences in children’s chosen allocation strategy by Age, Status, and Type 
of Inequality (see Figure 21). A significant effect for Age was found, Likelihood Ratio X2 
(2) = 20.74, p < .001; younger children were more likely to perpetuate the inequality, 
whereas older children were more likely to rectify the allocation.  
 An Age X Status interaction was also found, Likelihood Ratio X2 (2) = 16.08, p < 
.001; for children who were advantaged by a previous inequality, younger children were 
more likely to perpetuate the inequality (p < .001), whereas older children were more 
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likely to rectify the allocation. No differences were found for children who were 
disadvantaged by the inequality (p > .05). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were partially supported; children’s resource allocations in 





Figure 21. Proportion of children choosing the Perpetuating, Equal, and Rectifying 
allocations by Age (Younger, Older), Status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of 
Inequality (Group, Individual). 
 
Aim 4: Investigate the bidirectional relationship between children’s ToM capacities 
and their responses to inequalities, controlling for age. 
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 Theory of Mind Descriptives. Children’s performance on the ToM assessments 
was used to code their ToM competence into three levels, consistent with past research 
(Sobel & Austerweil, 2016; Wellman & Liu, 2004): Level 1 (failed both FB and BE), 
Level 2 (passed FB but failed BE), Level 3 (passed both FB and BE) (see Table 6).  
 Overall, 35 children were coded as Level 1, 29 children were coded as Level 2, 
and 107 children were coded as Level 3. To allow for analysis of how children’s ability 
to represent others’ emotional states based on their belief states, specifically, these ToM 
levels were collapsed into two: Less Advanced ToM (Level 1 and Level 2; failed FB 
and/or BE), More Advanced ToM (Level 3; passed both FB and BE). Overall, 64 
children were coded as “Less Advanced” and 107 children were coded as “More 
Advanced.” Splitting participants into “Less Advanced ToM” and “More Advanced 
ToM” groups based on their performance on the ToM has been successfully used to 
examine developmental changes in children’s social and moral development (Chalik, 
Rivera, & Rhodes, 2014; Killen et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 
2015). All analyses assessing the effect of ToM were conducted with raw age 
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Table 6. Proportion of children at each age at each level of ToM competence. 
  ToM Competence 
Age in Years n Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
3 year olds 12 .33 .25 .42 
4 year olds 44 .48 .16 .36 
5 year olds 34 .24 .24 .53 
6 year olds 32 .03 .13 .84 
7 year olds 34 .03 .09 .88 
8 year olds 15 .00 .27 .73 
 
Judgment of Perpetuating, Rectifying, and Equal Allocations (First-Person). 
To test hypotheses regarding children’s judgments of the three allocation strategies 
(Perpetuating, Rectifying, Equal), a ToM (Less Advanced, More Advanced) X Status 
(Advantaged, Disadvantaged) X Type of Inequality (Group, Individual) X Allocation 
Strategy (Perpetuating, Rectifying, Equal) ANOVA was conducted with repeated 
measures on the last factor (see Table 7).  
 A Status X Allocation Strategy interaction was found, F(2,324) = 19.15, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .11. Disadvantaged children judged the rectifying (p < .001) and equal (p < .001) 
allocations more positively than perpetuating allocations, and did not differ between the 
rectifying and equal allocations (p > .9). Advantaged children, on the other hand, judged 
the equal allocation more positively than the rectifying (p < .001) and perpetuating (p = 
.001) allocations, and did not differ between the rectifying and perpetuating allocations (p 
> .9). 
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 A Status X Type of Inequality X Allocation Strategy interaction was also found, 
F(2,324) = 4.47, p = .012, ηp2 = .027. In the group condition, perpetuating allocations 
were judged more positively by disadvantaged than advantaged participants (p < .001) 
and rectifying allocations were judged more positively by advantaged than disadvantaged 
participants (p = .043), but no differences were found for equal allocations (p = .073). In 
the Individual condition, however, while rectifying allocations were judged more 
positively by disadvantaged than advantaged children (p < .001), no differences were 
found for perpetuating (p = .13) or equal allocations (p = .46). 
 Finally, a ToM X Type of Inequality X Allocation Strategy interaction was also 
found, F(2,324) = 3.00, p = .05, ηp2 = .018. Children with less advanced ToM judged 
equal allocations more positively than perpetuating allocations for both group (p < .001) 
and individual (p = .041) inequalities, but did not distinguish between rectifying and 
equal, or between rectifying and perpetuating allocations (all ps > .06). Children with 
more advanced ToM, however, did distinguish between the allocation strategies; in the 
individual condition, children with more advanced ToM judged equal allocations more 
positively than rectifying (p = .015) and perpetuating allocations (p < .001), and judged 
rectifying allocations more positively than perpetuating allocations (p = .015). In the 
group condition, children with more advanced ToM judged equal (p < .001) and 
rectifying (p < .001) allocations more positively than perpetuating allocations, and did not 
distinguish between equal and rectifying allocations (p > .90). 
 Thus, our hypotheses were supported; children’s ToM was related to their ability 
to distinguish between the various allocations in response to the inequality. Children with 
less advanced ToM only differed in their judgments of equal and perpetuating 
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allocations, whereas children with more advanced ToM differed in their judgments of all 
three allocations, and also considered the type of inequality in their judgments. 
 
Table 7. Means and standard deviations for children’s judgments of the perpetuating, 
equal, and rectifying allocations by ToM (Less Advanced, More Advanced), Status 
(Advantaged, Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Individual, Group). 
   Allocation Strategy 






ToM Status Type of 
Inequality 




Disadvantaged Group 2.00 (1.58) 5.11 (1.05) 3.78 (2.33) 
 Individual 2.92 (2.31) 4.08 (2.35) 4.92 (1.68) 
Advantaged Group 3.95 (1.99) 4.59 (1.74) 3.64 (1.97) 




Disadvantaged Group 1.91 (1.36) 4.70 (1.74) 5.15 (1.44) 
 Individual 2.59 (1.40) 4.91 (1.54) 4.91 (1.19) 
Advantaged Group 3.62 (2.06) 3.69 (2.00) 3.54 (2.12) 
 Individual 2.88 (1.88) 5.08 (1.47) 3.27 (1.97) 
 
 
Inclusion Decision. To test hypotheses regarding children’s inclusion decisions, a 
generalized linear model was conducted with children’s inclusion decision as the 
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dependent variable and ToM, Status, and Type of Inequality as the predictor variables 
(see Figure 22). The overall model was significant Likelihood Ratio X2 (7) = 28.17, p < 
.001. A ToM X Status interaction, Wald X2 (1) = 10.38, p = .001; [lower = -1.18; upper = 
-.385] Wald X2 (1) = 14.92, p < .001, and a Status X Type of Inequality interaction, Wald 
X2 (1) = 6.07, p = .014; [lower = -1.01; upper = -0.34] Wald X2 (1) = 15.50, p < .001, 
were found. These interactions were explained by a ToM X Status X Type of Inequality 
interaction, Wald X2 (1) = 4.68, p = .031; [lower = 0.059; upper = 1.20] Wald X2 (1) = 
4.68, p = .031. With increasing ToM competence, children who were disadvantaged by 
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Figure 22. Proportion of children who chose to include their gender ingroup or outgroup 
member by ToM (Less Advanced, More Advanced), Status (Advantaged, 
Disadvantaged), and Type of Inequality (Group, Individual). 
 Effect of Status on Theory of Mind. To test the hypothesis that children’s status 
in the previous inequality would relate to their performance on the ToM assessments, 
generalized linear models with a binomial probability distribution and a logit link 
function were conducted for each of the ToM assessments with Status and Type of 
Inequality as the predictor variables, and Age (calculated as a continuous variable) as a 
covariate. 
 False-Belief. The first model tested the hypothesis that participants’ with 
disadvantaged status would be more likely to pass the FB ToM assessment than would 
participants with advantaged status, controlling for age. The overall model was 
significant (Likelihood Ratio X2(2, N = 172) = 42.68, p < .001). Consistent with our 
hypothesis, results indicated a significant main effect for Status (Wald X2 = 5.50, df = 1, p 
= .019; B = -1.11; 95% CI [-2.03, -.18]). Participants with disadvantaged status (M = .88) 
were more likely to pass the FB ToM assessment than were participants with advantaged 
status (M = .73). The covariate (Age) was also significant in the full model (p < .001). 
Belief-Emotion. The first model tested the hypothesis that participants’ with 
disadvantaged status would be more likely to pass the FB ToM assessment than would 
participants with advantaged status, controlling for age. The overall model was 
significant (Likelihood Ratio X2(2, N = 172) = 13.81, p = .001). Our hypothesis was not 
supported, a main effect for status was not found (p = .076). The covariate (Age) was 
significant in the full model (p = .002). 
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Chapter V: Discussion 
 The present study provided novel findings regarding children’s conceptions of 
fairness and the role of status in responses to inequalities. Specifically, the present study 
documented how 3- to 8-year-old children’s status within an inequality (whether they 
received more or fewer resources than their peers) as well as the underlying motivation 
for the allocation (indivdidually or group based) have a significant influence on the way 
in which children allocate resources and interpret social inequalities. These are issues that 
children experience in their daily lives. 
 Overall, the findings support our social reasoning developmental (SRD) model, 
which asserts that children’s judgments about fairness include intergroup (e.g., group 
identity), as well as psychological knowledge (e.g., mental state knowledge), 
considerations (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Killen, Rutland, Rizzo, & McGuire, 2017; 
Rutland & Killen, 2015; Rizzo & Killen, 2016). In particular, we found support for the 
SRD driven hypotheses that children’s evaluations and responses to social contexts entail 
a coordination of moral (equity, equality, others’ welfare, wrongfulness of 
discrimination), group (stereotypes, group functioning), and psychological (theory of 
mind) factors. Children’s understanding for the moral concern for equity and equality 
was demonstrated in their judgments of the allocations, as well as their decisions to 
rectify unfair allocations that were based on gender discrimination.  
 At the same time, children also considered group concerns. For instance, the 
finding that advantaged children were more positive about redistribution when they 
expected it to come from a fellow – advantaged – ingroup member supports and extends 
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the SRD model by demonstrating how children’s desire to remain loyal to their ingroup 
relates to their evaluations of their ingroup members’ actions.  
 Finally, and perhaps most pronounced, the robust differences based on children’s 
status within the context provides evidence for the SRD model in that children’s 
psychological knowledge permeated their thinking and behavior. Children experiencing a 
disadvantaged status, for example, were more likely to pass theory of mind assessments 
than were children in an advantaged status. 
The subsequent sections discuss how the present results bear on the literature, 
extend our understanding of children’s developing conceptions of fairness and equality, 
and provide a basis for future research directions. Across four aims, the present study 
investigated the role of status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) and the type of inequality 
(Individual, Group) in terms of children’s perceptions of inequalities (Aim 1), intra- and 
intergroup attitudes (Aim 2), responses to third-person inequalities (Aim 3), and their 
ToM capacities (Aim 4).  
 
Aim 1: Investigate how children’s status (Advantaged, Disadvantaged) relates to 
their perceptions of individual and group based inequalities. 
 
 Perceptions of the allocations. Consistent with our hypotheses, children’s 
judgments of the inequalities were related to their status within the inequality and the 
type of inequality. Children who were disadvantaged by the inequality judged it to be 
more unfair than children who were advantaged by it. However, both advantaged and 
disadvantaged children judged group based inequalities to be more unfair than 
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individually based inequalities. These results provide the first evidence that children 
incorporate the source of an inequality when evaluating the fairness of the allocation. 
That is, although past research has documented children’s developing concern for 
equality, and aversion to inequalities (Rizzo & Killen, 2018; Schmidt et al., 2018; Shaw 
& Olson, 2012), the present results are the first to document that children incorporate the 
underlying reason for why resources are being allocated unequally when evaluating the 
fairness of the allocation. These findings indicate that 3- to 8-year-old children 
differentiate between inequalities based on intergroup factors, such as gender 
discrimination, and individual factors, such as individual performance.  
Further, the present study is the first to document that children’s judgments and 
behavior do not just differ across these allocation contexts, but also depend on their 
perspective within the context. Children who were disadvantaged by the inequality 
judged it to be significantly more unfair than children who were advantaged. These 
results highlight the importance for research to consider children’s perspective within a 
morally-relevant context when assessing their moral development. Past research has 
typically investigated children’s moral evaluations in third-person contexts, given that a 
critical feature of moral judgments is that they are both generalizable (apply across 
contexts) and impersonal (apply to all individuals). However, the present results suggest 
that children’s perspective within a context can have a significant influence over how 
they perceive that context, and the factors that they prioritize when evaluating and 
responding to it. Thus, it is important for future research to continue to assess children’s 
evaluations of morally-relevant contexts from a range of perspectives. 
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Interestingly, children who judged the inequality to be unfair primarily reasoned 
about the moral concern for equity, suggesting that their negative evaluation of the 
allocation stemmed from their concern for ensuring that all recipients receive their fair 
share. By contrast, children who judged the inequality to be okay primarily referenced 
their own personal desire for more resources (e.g., “It’s okay because I think we wanted 
them more”). These results suggest that children are actively reasoning about a range of 
concerns when evaluating an allocation, and that the concerns that children focus on are 
highly related to their judgment of the allocation as fair or unfair. 
Finally, children’s evaluation of their own welfare following the allocations 
provides critical evidence regarding children’s emotional reactions to discrimination. 
Younger children, in particular, reported feeling worse when they were disadvantaged 
due to their group membership than when they were disadvantaged due to their individual 
performance. These results support research documenting how discrimination based on 
group membership is especially harmful to young children’s wellbeing, even when 
compared to other forms of intra-personal exclusion, such as exclusion based on personal 
traits (e.g., shyness) (Park & Killen, 2010; Killen, Elenbaas, Rizzo, & Rutland, 2016). 
Interestingly, older children also reported feeling better when they were advantaged by an 
individual allocation than when they were advantaged due to their gender. These results 
provide further evidence that, with age, children attend to the reason why they are 
receiving more or fewer resources than their peers, and feel more positively when they 
earn the resources than when they receive resources unfairly. These findings contribute to 
research on the relationship between children’s moral judgments and their expectations 
regarding how transgressors will feel following a transgression (Killen & Malti, 2015; 
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Malti & Krettenauer, 2013) by providing novel insight into how children themselves feel 
when being advantaged by an ingroup member’s potential transgression. 
 Expectations of outgroup members’ perceptions. We hypothesized that 
children’s expectations of others’ welfare and judgments of the inequality would change 
with age and be related to their status and the type of inequality. Surprisingly, children’s 
perceptions of their outgroup member’s welfare and judgment of the inequality were only 
significantly linked to their status. Children who were advantaged by the inequality 
recognized that their (disadvantaged) outgroup member would feel worse, and judged the 
inequality to be more unfair, compared to children who were disadvantaged by the 
inequality expected their (advantaged) outgroup member to feel. These results were 
especially interesting given that children incorporated the type of inequality into their 
own judgments and welfare. Although it may be surprising that children incorporated the 
type of inequality into their own, but not their expectation of others’, judgments and 
welfare, past research has also documented how children struggle to understand the 
nuance in others’ perceptions of transgressions (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Elenbaas & 
Killen, 2016; Li et al., 2017). These results suggest that, particularly in salient intergroup 
contexts, children may continue to struggle to fully understand the perspective of their 
outgroup peers. 
 Perceptions of control. An important component of understanding children’s 
perceptions of intergroup discrimination is children’s ability to recognize when someone 
is being treated differently due to a factor that they can control (e.g., their effort or 
performance on an activity), or a factor that is beyond their control (e.g., their gender 
group membership). Consistent with our hypotheses, the results indicated that, with age, 
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children were more likely to report that the disadvantaged group had no control over the 
group based than individually based allocation. Thus, consistent with children’s 
judgments and reasoning about the inequality, by 6- to 8-years-old, children were able to 
recognize that, while there is something that they can do to avoid being disadvantaged by 
an individually based inequality, there was little that they could do to resist gender based 
biases and discrimination. Further, children’s reasoning supported this assessment; 
children explicitly reasoned about trying harder at the puzzles when reasoning about what 
they could do following an individual allocation (e.g., “The boys should have just tried 
harder”), and reasoned about structural biases when reasoning about why nothing could 
be done in the gender based context (e.g., “He just gave everything to the boys, it didn’t 
even matter what we did”). 
 These results provide the first evidence that, by 6- to 8-years-old, children are 
actively thinking about what can – and conversely what cannot – be done following a 
potential transgression. Research suggests that children begin to understand the concept 
of free will and agency early in childhood, and that providing children with the 
perception of choice can help them act prosocially in peer contexts (Chernyak & Kushnir, 
2017; Nucci, 1981). Thus, the present results extend the extant literature on the role of 
children’s perceptions of choice and agency in morally relevant contexts by documenting 
how children consider the causal factors associated with a potential transgression (e.g., 
whether an unequal allocation occurred due to individual abilities or gender biases), and 
incorporate this into their perceptions regarding what can be done – if anything – to 
address the transgression. Future research should continue to investigate the role of 
agency in children’s responses to moral transgressions by, for example, examining how 
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children’s perceptions of agency relate to their willingness to intervene on another peer’s 
behalf, particularly when they perceive them to have little agency over the situation. 
 It is also important to note that approximately 11% of children spontaneously 
indicated that the disadvantaged group should protest the allocation by either appealing to 
the advantaged group, or by reporting the unfair allocation to a teacher or other authority 
figure. These results contribute to a recent line of research documenting 3- to 5-year-old 
children’s willingness to spontaneously protest conventional, and especially moral, 
transgressions (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008; Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 
2011), by extending our understanding of how – and in what contexts – children protest 
allocations that they perceive to be unfair. 
 Judgments of redistribution. Although previous research has indicated that 
children prefer equal allocations and voice an aversion to unequal allocations (Rizzo & 
Killen, 2016; Rizzo et al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2016; Shaw & Olson, 2012), no study to 
date has examined children’s perceptions of redistributing resources following an unequal 
allocation (which entails actively taking resources from one group to give to another). 
Understanding children’s developing perceptions of redistribution is critical to 
understanding how children evaluate different strategies for rectifying inequalities, and 
provide a theoretical insight into how children incorporate issues related to ownership 
and resource transition into their conceptions of fairness. Consistent with our hypotheses, 
we found that children’s judgments of redistribution were linked to their age, status 
within the inequality, the type of inequality, and whom they thought suggested the 
redistribution. Younger children were positive about redistribution regardless of whether 
they were redistributing earned resources (individual condition) or resources that were 
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obtained due to ingroup biases (group condition). Older children, by contrast, were more 
positive about redistributing resources following gender based than individually based 
allocations. These results suggest that, younger children’s concern for equality may 
outweigh their concern for personal ownership (see Friedman, Van de Vondervoort, 
Defeyter, & Neary, 2013), but, with age, children consider personal ownership over 
resources – along with how those resources were acquired – when reasoning about 
redistribution.  
 Importantly, children’s judgments of redistribution were also linked to their 
expectations of who suggested the redistribution. Children who were themselves 
advantaged by the allocation were more positive about redistribution when they 
perceived a fellow (advantaged) ingroup member – as opposed to a disadvantaged 
outgroup member – to be the one who suggested redistributing the resources. This result, 
in particular, has implications for our understanding of how children resolve peer 
conflicts in their daily lives. Calls to rectify unfair allocations are seemingly more 
effective when they are perceived to be coming from the children who are advantaged by 
the unfair allocation. These results are also interesting when linked to research 
documenting that, with age, children expect their fellow ingroup members to attempt to 
advantage their ingroup, even if they themselves would prefer to act fairly (Cooley & 
Killen, 2015; Rizzo, Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2017). Overall, although children may 
be less likely to expect their ingroup member to want to rectify an unequal allocation that 
favors their group, these instances may be especially helpful for reducing intergroup 
discrimination, and future research should thus examine how to facilitate these types of 
interactions. 
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 Judgments of perpetuating, rectifying, and equal allocations. Consistent with 
our hypotheses, children’s judgments of perpetuating, rectifying, and equal allocations 
were related to their age, status, and the type of inequality. When the allocation was 
based on gender biases, disadvantaged children rated equal and rectifying allocations 
positively and perpetuating allocations negatively, whereas advantaged children were 
relatively neutral on all three allocation strategies, though their judgments of perpetuating 
allocations decreased slightly with age. When the allocation was based on individual 
abilities, however, although disadvantaged children remained consistent in their positive 
judgments of equal and rectifying allocations, advantaged children judged equal 
allocations to be the only fair means of allocating the new set of resources. 
 These results provide an important conceptual contribution to our understanding 
of children’s developing concern for equality and equity. Past research has documented 
that, in the context of preexisting inequalities, children’s evaluations of rectifying 
allocations increases with age, whereas, with age, children evaluate equal allocations to 
be unfair (Rizzo & Killen, 2016). The present study provides support for the former, 
particularly when children were advantaged by the allocation, but children’s judgments of 
equal allocations were more nuanced. Children who were advantaged by the inequality 
were more positive about equal allocations when the inequality was established due to 
individual effort than when it was established by gender biases. This suggests that, when 
older children were advantaged by an individually based inequality, they perceived the 
allocation of new resources to be relatively independent of the initial allocation, judging 
equal allocations to be more positive than both rectifying and perpetuating allocations. 
Contrastingly, when children were advantaged by a gender based inequality, older 
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children remained relatively neutral about all three allocations. These results suggest that 
children’s understanding of how to respond appropriately to instances of gender based 
discrimination that advantage them is still developing during this period. Future research 
should extend the age range of the present study to investigate how older children and 
adolescents evaluate the various responses to gender based inequalities, particularly when 
they are advantaged by them. 
 Own allocations. Children’s own behavioral allocations following an inequality 
provide an important insight into how children respond to the various types of resource 
disputes that they experience in their daily lives. Supporting our hypotheses, children in 
the present study allocated resources differently based on their status within the 
allocation, as well as the type of inequality, and these allocations also changed with age. 
Notably, decisions to perpetuate the inequality decreased with age, whereas equal 
allocations increased. This trend was especially true for children who were advantaged by 
the inequality, suggesting that, with age, children come to recognize the unfairness of 
perpetuating inequalities that disadvantage their outgroup peers. Supporting this account, 
children primarily reasoned about equity and equality when justifying their decision to 
allocate equally or to rectify the inequality. 
 Children’s allocation decisions, and their reasoning about those decisions, were 
also related to whether they had witnessed an individually- or group based allocation; 
advantaged children were more likely to rectify the inequality when it was brought about 
by ingroup bias and were more likely to perpetuate the inequality when it was brought 
about by individual performance. With age, children also became more likely to reason 
about the concern for equity in the group context, whereas they were more likely to 
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reason about Merit in the individual context. These results suggest that, especially with 
age, children become better able to incorporate how an inequality was established into 
their responses to the inequality. Overall, what appears to be happening is that, with age, 
children who were advantaged by the group inequality begin to recognize the unfairness 
of the allocation, and increasingly focus on equity when deciding to rectify the inequality, 
and children who were advantaged by the individual inequality view the subsequent 
allocation of resources as a novel context, and allocate equally in response. In this latter 
context, children frequently mentioned how they had already received their share of the 
resources for “winning” the activity, and believed that this new allocation should be 
conducted equally, to reflect the fact that no one has performed better or worse for these 
new resources. 
 Summary for Aim 1. Across a range of assessments, the present study revealed 
critical differences in how children perceive of, and respond to, inequalities based on 
participants’ status within the inequality, as well as whether the inequality was brought 
about by individual performance or gender discrimination. Children’s status, in 
particular, was related to every aspect of children’s perceptions and responses to the 
inequalities; compared to children who were advantaged by the inequality, disadvantaged 
children evaluated the inequalities more negatively, felt worse following them, perceived 
themselves to have less control, were more positive about attempts to redistribute the 
resources and rectify the inequality, and were more likely to actively rectify the 
inequality themselves when given the opportunity. These results punctuate the 
importance of considering children’s own perspective within a context when assessing 
their social and moral development. 
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 Additionally, the present study provides novel insight into how children 
incorporate the origins of an inequality (whether it was brought about by individual or 
group factors) into their perceptions and responses. Particularly with age, children 
evaluated gender based inequalities to be more unfair, more personally harmful, and more 
important to redistribute and rectify than inequalities based on disparate levels of 
performance on an activity. Interestingly, although children were across the board 
negative about gender based inequalities, there were many ways in which children 
actively supported inequalities that were the result of differing levels of merit. Older 
children reported feeling especially positive when they were advantaged by the individual 
allocation, and children explicitly reasoned about the moral concern for merit when 
justifying their judgments of the inequalities, reasoning about their perceptions of control, 
and explaining their own allocation. Thus, the present study provides the first piece of 
evidence that, by 3- to 8-years-old, children are actively incorporating the origins of an 
inequality into their perceptions of, and responses to, the inequality context. 
  
Aim 2: Determine how different resource allocation contexts influence children’s 
intra- and intergroup attitudes, with age. 
 The previous section reviewed and discussed children’s perceptions of, and 
responses to, resource inequalities. This section will review and discuss how children’s 
experiences in those resource allocation contexts influence their intergroup attitudes (i.e., 
children’s reported favorability and attributions of abilities to ingroup and outgroup 
members) and inclusion decisions. An analysis of how children’s experiences with 
inequalities relate to their future intergroup attitudes and inclusion decisions is critical, 
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especially given that children frequently move between multiple activities throughout 
their daily lives. Thus, understanding how experiences in one context might relate to 
children’s actions in a separate context is necessary for understanding the complexities of 
children’s social and moral development.  
Consistent with our hypotheses, children’s intragroup attitudes, inclusion 
decisions, and reasoning for their inclusion decisions reflected age related changes, as 
well as differences by participants’ status and the type of inequality. Although children 
were generally more favorable towards ingroup members than outgroup members 
regardless of condition, children’s attributions of ability to ingroup and outgroup 
members varied across conditions. With age, children attributed higher levels of ability to 
outgroup members, and this was especially true when outgroup members performed well 
on the activities in the individual condition.  
Supporting these results, children were also more likely to choose to include the 
outgroup peer who performed well on the activities in the individual condition. These 
results are especially important given research indicating children’s robust tendency to 
self-segregate into gender groups (Mehta & Stough, 2009; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 
2006) and preferentially include gender ingroup members (Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey & 
Killen, 2015). In the present study, children included their ingroup peer 66% of the time, 
supporting the extant literature on children’s desire to primarily interact with their gender 
ingroup peers. Of particular importance, however, older children who witnessed an 
outgroup member performing well at the activities preferentially included that gender 
outgroup peer an overwhelming 79% of the time, and explicitly reasoned about their 
outgroup peer’s ability when reasoning about their inclusion decision.  
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Especially given children’s strong preference for including gender ingroup peers 
in most contexts, finding contexts in which children actively want to reach across gender 
group boundaries to include outgroup peers has promising implications for children’s 
intergroup attitudes. While past research has documented other contexts in which 
children will include gender outgroup peers, much of this research is with older children 
or adolescence, and occurs in contexts where children are including an outgroup peer 
over an ingroup peer who espouses explicitly immoral views (e.g., wanting to 
discriminate against outgroup peers) or a desire to act counter to ingroup norms (e.g., by 
refusing to wear an ingroup identifier or uniform) (Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey & Killen, 
2015; Rizzo, Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2017). The results of the present study suggest 
that highlighting the exemplary performances of children’s gender outgroup peers may 
lead to increasingly positive intergroup attitudes and constructive intergroup interactions. 
Interestingly, children’s reasoning for their inclusion decision also reflected 
important differences regarding how children’s status frames the way they think about 
inclusion decisions; children who were advantaged by the inequality focused more on 
their peers ability and group memberships (e.g., selecting peers based on whom the 
expect to help their future team win; “she’s the best at these things!”), whereas children 
who were disadvantaged by the inequality focused on personal relationships and group 
membership when including their ingroup peers (e.g., “we’re already best friends”). 
Summary for Aim 2. The second aim of the present study was to investigate how 
children’s experiences with inequalities relate to their intergroup attitudes and inclusion 
decisions. The present study yielded important insight into a potential mechanism to 
support positive intergroup attitudes and relationships. Specifically, providing children 
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with direct evidence of an outgroup member’s ability increased children’s attributions of 
abilities, and desire to include, a gender outgroup peer. These results highlight the 
importance of establishing constructive intergroup contexts in which children are 
encouraged to affiliate and work with peers from different group memberships. 
These results also provided strong support for the SRD model, in that children’s 
intergroup attitudes and inclusion decisions reflected a mix of moral, group, and 
personal/psychological concerns. In the inclusion context, children’s group concerns had 
a drastic impact on their intergroup attitudes and inclusion decisions – children were 
more favorable to ingroup than outgroup members, attributed higher levels of abilities to 
ingroup members in general, and – in all but one context – preferentially included their 
ingroup member. Children’s explicit references to their peers’ gender group memberships 
also supports the SRD model’s hypothesis that children are actively reasoning about 
group concerns while making important social inclusion decisions. Evidence was also 
found to suggest that children were considering moral (e.g., by asserting that peers should 
be included or not based on their abilities, not their group membership) and personal 
(e.g., by referencing the personal relationships that they had established) concerns when 
making inclusion decisions. 
 
Aim 3: Investigate how children’s previous experiences with advantaged and 
disadvantaged status relate to their perceptions of third-person inequalities.  
 Consistent with the previous aim’s focus on how children generalize from their 
experiences in one context to their judgments and behavior in a separate context, this 
section will examine how children’s firsthand experiences with inequalities relate to their 
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judgments and behavior in a third-person allocation context. Specifically, this section will 
examine how children’s status within an inequality relates to their judgments of various 
allocation strategies, as well as their own allocation, in a third-person inequality context 
(where children observe an inequality between two recipients and have no personal claim 
to the resources). 
Research on children’s developing responses to inequalities, including the results 
presented above, has begun to provide a clear picture of how children think resources 
should be allocated in response to inequalities (Elenbaas et al., 2016; Rizzo & Killen, 
2016; Schmidt et al., 2017; Paulus, 2014). No research to date, however, has investigated 
how children’s own experiences in resource allocation contexts relate to their subsequent 
allocation decisions in separate contexts. Supporting our hypothesis that children’s status 
within an inequality context would relate to their allocation decisions in a separate, third-
person, allocation decision, the present study documented how children who were 
previously disadvantaged by an inequality were more likely to rectify a third-person 
inequality, and evaluated allocations that rectified the inequality more positively, with 
age. Interestingly, however, differences were not found for children’s judgments of equal 
and perpetuating allocations. This may be due to the fact that even young children 
recognized the wrongfulness of perpetuating an inequality, and that older children were 
hesitant to negatively evaluate an equal allocation in this third-person context. 
 These results provide initial evidence regarding into how children actively 
construct their conceptions of fairness, and in turn their responses to inequalities. As 
children experience inequalities, they gain a broader understanding of the harmful 
consequences of inequalities, as well as a more personal understanding of the overall 
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perspective of disadvantaged individuals. Supported by children’s own reported welfare 
following the first-person inequality, the present results suggest that when children 
experience being disadvantaged, they become particularly sensitive to how a 
disadvantaged peer might feel, how that peer might evaluate the allocation, and what 
responses to the allocation (e.g., rectifying it, or allocating equally) may help to mitigate 
these harmful consequences. Importantly, the results in the present study are 
correlational; future research should continue to investigate this developmental 
hypothesis using longitudinal designs that allow for a causal analysis of how children’s 
experiences with inequalities relate to their developing conceptions of fairness. 
 Summary for Aim 3. The third aim of the present study was to examine how 
children’s experiences with first-person inequalities related to their perceptions of, and 
responses to, third-person inequality contexts. The results support the hypothesis that 
children’s experiences with advantaged and disadvantaged status are related to children’s 
sensitivity to issues relating to equity and equality. Given that children move between a 
range of different contexts throughout their daily lives, understanding how children take 
experiences in one context into subsequent contexts is an important area for future 
research. 
 These results also provide support for an important component of the SRD model, 
in that children’s initial experiences were directly related to their evaluations and 
responses in subsequent contexts. The SRD model asserts that children actively construct 
their developing conceptions of moral and social issues based on their experiences 
engaging in, and observing, peer encounters. Consistent with this, the present study 
suggests that children’s everyday experiences with resource disputes (such as receiving 
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more or fewer toys or prizes than their peers) contributes to children’s understanding of 
these issues, and in turn how they decide to act in future disputes. 
 
Aim 4: Investigate the bidirectional relationship between children’s theory of mind 
(ToM) capacities and their responses to inequalities, controlling for age. 
 The final aim of the present study was to investigate children’s ToM capacities as 
a potential developmental mechanism for their conceptions of fairness. The first 
subsection examines this directly, by discussing how children’s ToM performance is 
related to their perceptions of, and responses to, the various inequality contexts in the 
present study. The second subsection in turn examines the bidirectional nature of the 
relationship between children’s ToM and their moral development by examining how 
children’s immediate context (e.g., their status within an inequality) relates to their ability 
to accurately identify others’ mental states, as assessed by the standard ToM assessments 
used in the present study. 
 How ToM relates to children’s perceptions of inequalities. We hypothesized 
that children’s ToM capacities would serve as an important developmental mechanism to 
account for age-related changes in children’s perceptions of, and responses to, 
inequalities. To test this hypotheses, analyses were conducted, controlling for age, to 
determine how children’s performance on the ToM assessments was related to their 
judgments regarding how resources should be allocated and their inclusion decisions. 
Supporting our hypotheses, with increasing ToM competence, children were more 
positive about equal allocations than rectifying and perpetuating allocations in response 
to the individually based allocation context, and were more positive about both equal and 
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rectifying allocations than perpetuating allocations in the group based allocation context. 
These results suggest that children’s ToM capacities play a critical role in their 
developing ability to incorporate the intentions of the allocator (whether they intended to 
reward participants based on their performance at the tasks, or based on their gender 
group membership) into their perceptions of how the resulting allocation should be 
addressed. This interpretation is consistent with past research documenting how 
children’s ToM competence plays an important role in their moral development generally 
(Smetana et al., 2012; Killen et al., 2011), as well as their ability to infer others’ 
intentions in resource allocation contexts (Li et al., 2017; Rizzo & Killen, 2017). 
Importantly, the present results extend our understanding of these issues by documenting 
how children’s ToM competence enables them to consider whether an allocator has 
legitimate (e.g., intending to allocate resources meritoriously), or unfair (e.g., intending to 
allocate resources according to ingroup bias) intentions when evaluating the resulting 
allocation.  
 Further supporting our hypotheses, children’s ToM competence was also related 
to their decision to cross group boundaries by including a gender outgroup peer. In 
particular, children with more advanced ToM, but not those with less advanced ToM, 
were more likely to choose to include an outgroup peer whom they witnessed performing 
well at the activities. Notably, this group was the only one to preferentially include an 
outgroup member. These results support past research documenting how children’s ToM 
capacities play an important role in their intergroup attitudes by allowing children to view 
individuals in terms of their own unique mental states (e.g., desires, abilities, 
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preferences), rather than being defined by their group membership (Mulvey, Rizzo, & 
Killen, 2015; Rizzo & Killen, 2017). 
 How children’s status within an inequality relates to their ToM. The ability to 
identify others’ mental states plays a fundamental role in how we interact in social 
contexts. Recognizing how our actions, or the actions of those around us, will impact 
others is critical to ensuring the fair treatment of others. The results from the present 
study are the first to demonstrate how children’s perceived social status relates to their 
ability to accurately identify others’ mental states; children who were assigned to hold an 
advantaged status performed worse on the false-belief assessment compared to children 
who were assigned to hold a disadvantaged status. 
 Past research has largely discussed mental state understanding as a stable, fixed 
competence, which one either does or does not possess. Specifically, in many instances, 
past research has assessed how participants’ performance on a ToM assessment in one 
context predicts other aspects of their social-cognitive competencies or behaviors, 
arguing that children’s performance on a ToM assessment is indicative of their ability to 
represent others’ mental states, and that this ability (which children either do or do not 
possess) is linked to other social competencies (e.g., Chalik, Rivera, & Rhodes, 2014; 
Dunn, Cutting, & Demetriou, 2000; Killen et al., 2011; Li, Rizzo, Burkholder, & Killen, 
2017; McLoughlin & Over, 2017; Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 2015; Peterson & Siegal, 
2002; Rizzo & Killen, 2017).  
One explanation for the present results is that participants who were assigned the 
disadvantaged status were more motivated to think and reason about the potential causes 
of the status differences (Brown & Bigler, 2004, 2005; Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010; 
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Kraus et al., 2012). Alternatively, participants who were assigned the advantaged status 
may have been more likely to avoid thinking about others’ mental states, to ignore 
(implicitly or explicitly) acknowledging that the fact that they were unfairly advantaged 
at someone else’s expense. This hypothesis is consistent with research linking outgroup 
dehumanization to decreases in individuals’ attributions of mental states to outgroup 
members (Haslam, 2006; McLoughlin & Over, 2017). Taken together, the present results 
are consistent with the argument that individuals’ contextualized perspective plays a role 
in determining their proclivity to think and reason about others’ mental states. 
Summary for Aim 4. The final aim of the present study was to investigate the 
bidirectional relationship between children’s ToM and their moral development. The 
present study provided continued support for the hypothesis that children’s ToM 
capacities serve as an important developmental mechanism for their moral development 
broadly, and their conceptions of fairness in particular (Killen et al., 2011; Smetana et al., 
2012; Sodian et al., 2016). With increasing ToM, children were more supportive of 
rectifying gender based inequalities, and were more likely to include a gender outgroup 
peer. These results suggest that children’s ToM plays an important role in their increasing 
concern for the harmful consequences of discrimination, as well as their ability to view 
outgroup members in terms of their mental states (e.g., their desires, preferences, and 
abilities), rather than as being defined by their group memberships. 
The present study was also the first to document how children’s status within a 
context relates to their ability to accurately identify others’ mental states. Children who 
were randomly assigned to an advantaged status performed worse on a standard false-
belief ToM assessment than did children who were randomly assigned to a disadvantaged 
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status. These results have important implications for how ToM is conceptualized as a 
social-cognitive capacity – in that it is variable across contexts, rather than being a fixed 
trait – and for our understanding of how children perceive contexts involving 
discrimination. 
These results provide strong support for the SRD model’s assertion that children’s 
social-cognitive abilities to consider others’ psychological states (e.g., their desires, 
beliefs, and intentions) are crucial for their social and moral development. Specifically, 
the SRD model argues that as children become better at thinking about and understanding 
the perspectives of others, they are better able to incorporate others’ desires and beliefs 
into their own understanding of social contexts. 
Limitations and Future Directions  
 As discussed above, the present study provides insights into children’s social and 
moral development, with a particular focus on how children perceive and respond to 
various inequality contexts based on their status and the type of inequality. There are a 
number of new research directions that could extend the findings in new ways, and to 
address potential limitations from the current study.  
 Intergroup contexts. In particular, the present study focused on gender for the 
intergroup contexts. Throughout the lifespan, individuals affiliate with numerous group 
identities. Although some of these affiliations are relatively stable (e.g., one’s gender or 
race), others are highly malleable (e.g., one’s school or career affiliation or geographic 
location). The present study investigated gender as the key intergroup variable due to the 
salient aspect of gender in early childhood, as well as research indicating that instances of 
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gender discrimination are pervasive from childhood to adulthood (Mehta & Stough, 
2009; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006; Mulvey & Killen, 2015). 
 Future studies, however, should continue to investigate a range of intergroup 
factors, such as race, nationality, or school/career/club affiliations, which vary in their 
salience to participants and their stability across the lifespan. Race, for example, may 
provide an interesting contrast to gender as an intergroup variable. By early childhood, 
children are already aware of different racial categories, and begin to show instances of 
racially based preferences and negative stereotypes about racial outgroup members 
(Dunham, Stepanova, Dotsch, & Todorov, 2015; Elenbaas et al., 2017; Kinzler, Dopoux, 
& Spelke, 2007; Mandalaywala & Rhodes, 2016). Yet, intergroup conflicts regarding 
race operate very differently from those pertaining to gender, and involve unique 
concerns. For example, while intergroup contact is thought to be an important component 
to reducing racially based prejudice and discrimination (Allport, 1954; Brewer & Brown, 
1998; Cameron, Rutland, Hossain, & Petley, 2011). Thus, although similar patterns of 
results may be found when substituting race for gender in future research on these topics, 
it is likely that children’s increased awareness of the wrongfulness of racially based 
exclusion may lead them to perceive racially based inequalities more negatively. 
 Different forms of status disparities. Another area that is important for future 
research to explore is how children perceive of, and respond to, different forms of status 
disparities. In the present study, status was operationalized as possessing more 
(Advantaged) or fewer (Disadvantaged) resources than one’s peer. Although this 
constitutes one important dimension of status, other forms of status may yield different 
patterns of results (Ridgeway, 2011). Operationalizing status in terms of one’s control 
  161 
	 	
over a context (e.g., who gets to make important decisions or who is assigned to 
prestigious posts), for example, may provide an interesting contrast to the present study. 
Given that status based on control or prestige is more abstract than the possession of 
resources, it is likely that the developmental patterns documented in the present study 
would be delayed into adolescence or adulthood. 
 Directionality of effects. The present study extended the extant literature on 
children’s perceptions of, and responses to, inequalities by directly comparing children’s 
responses from both advantaged and disadvantaged perspectives. This comparison, 
however, leaves open questions regarding the directionality of the effects. For example, is 
it the case that children who were disadvantaged by an inequality evaluated it to be more 
wrong, that children who were advantaged by an inequality evaluated it to be less wrong, 
or a combination of both? Future research should investigate this question empirically by 
assessing children’s responses to social and moral contexts from a range of both first- and 
third-person perspectives. This question is particularly important given that, although all 
of these perspectives (e.g., advantaged, disadvantaged, third-person witness) are distinct, 
valid perspectives on a context, understanding how children’s perceptions change based 
on their perspective is critical to a full understanding of social and moral development. 
 Cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. Finally, it is important to note that the 
present study utilized a cross-sectional design to examine how children’s experiences 
with inequalities relate to their intergroup attitudes (Aim 2), responses to third-person 
inequalities (Aim 3), and ToM (Aim 4). The results of the present study constitute critical 
first steps in examining these issues empirically. It is important to note, however, that 
future research using longitudinal or fully counterbalanced approaches designed to assess 
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causal relations between variables are needed to fully establish a causal link between 
children’s experiences with inequalities and their intergroup attitudes, responses to third-
person inequalities, and ToM. Future research along these lines has the potential to 
expand our understanding of key, causal, developmental mechanisms associated with 
children’s social moral development – namely, how children’s experiences influence 
their development. 
 “With age”. Aims 1, 2, and 3 examined how children’s perceptions of, and 
responses to various inequality contexts changed, with age. Although Aim 4 provided 
some evidence that children’s developing ToM competencies play a role in their 
developing perceptions of, and responses to, these contexts, future research should 
continue to examine what, exactly, is changing with age. It is highly unlikely that the 
developmental patterns documented in the present study can be generally attributed to 
maturational processes, or even the development of domain general cognitive skills such 
as executive functioning or language understanding. The results of Aims 2 and 3 provide 
tentative evidence that children’s early experiences – which occur with age in typically 
developing children in the proposed population – play an important role in their 
developing understanding of inequalities. For example, younger children, but not older, 
who were disadvantaged by the first-person inequality were in turn more likely to 
positively evaluate rectifying a subsequent third-person inequality. This suggests that 
children’s early experiences with being personally disadvantaged may be one type of 
experience from which children construct their conceptions of fairness.  
Importantly, however, future research should also be cautious in attempting to 
distill the experiences that drive children’s social and moral development into specified 
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criterion. As shown in the present study, the developmental patterns regarding children’s 
conceptualization of inequalities are complex, and individual differences (e.g., 
differences in ToM competencies, controlling for age) account for some, but by no means 
all, of this variation. The same is likely true for children’s specific experiences with, for 
example, disadvantaged status. More likely is the idea that children’s social and moral 
development is driven by a range of experiences, moderated by children’s immediate 
perceptions of those experiences, and influenced by the full range of children’s past 
experiences and perceptions of those experiences. Thus, although researchers should 
continue to push beyond describing development with age, it is also important to be 
cautious when investigating specific mediating variables and to be mindful of the 
complexities in children’s developmental milieu. 
Conclusion 
 The present study provides several novel insights into children’s developing 
understanding of fairness and their perceptions of, and responses to, inequalities. Across 
a range of assessments, the present study documented how children’s status within 
individual and gender based inequalities has a profound influence on how they perceive 
the inequality context; disadvantaged children demonstrated an overarching concern for 
rectifying the inequality, whereas advantaged children focused on equality. Children’s 
perceptions of the context were also related to the type of inequality that they 
experienced; children evaluated gender based inequalities to be more wrong, and 
attempted to rectify them to a greater degree, compared to individually based inequalities. 
Results also highlighted age-related changes in children’s ability to incorporate the type 
of inequality into their perceptions and responses. 
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 The present study also provides important evidence regarding the developmental 
mechanisms implicated in children’s developing conceptions of fairness. Children’s 
experiences in the various inequality contexts was related to their inclusion decisions, 
allocations in third-person inequality contexts, and their ToM abilities in contexts 
following the initial inequality. Cumulatively, these results indicate how children’s lived 
experiences can impact how they perceive, and in turn respond to, intergroup contexts 
such as decisions regarding whom to include into one’s group and how resources ought to 
be distributed amongst their peers. Finally, the present study contributes to a growing 
body of literature documenting the various ways in which children’s ToM acts as a 
developmental mechanism for children’s developing conceptions of fairness, to the end 
of reducing intergroup biases and instances of discrimination. It is anticipated that the 
findings from this project will provide a basis for curriculum innovations as well as 
intervention studies designed to reduce prejudice and bias in childhood, and to increase 
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